12
Voting Behavior Research in the 1980s: An Examination of Some Old and New Problem Areas*

Herbert B. Asher

The field of voting behavior is often viewed as the area within political science that has made the greatest progress in the generation of an empirically based, cumulative body of knowledge. Voting behavior research has been characterized by careful elaboration of theoretical approaches, serious attention to conceptual and operational questions, and sophisticated statistical analyses. When one asks where is the "science" in political science, a common reply is to point the questioner to the field of voting behavior.

Despite the scientific status accorded to voting behavior research, the field is currently in great flux.[1] There have been ongoing controversies about the models appropriate to the study of voting behavior, the conceptualization and measurement of key concepts, the specification of the basic models, and the analysis strategies employed to study core phenomena. New areas of research are becoming prominent as witnessed by the growth in congressional election studies and the increased interest in economic variables as determinants of political behavior. Likewise, some old areas are undergoing a rebirth of scholarly interest as can be seen in the current efforts at reconceptualizing the central concept of party identification.

Hence, any effort to describe the status of a field as complex and changing as voting behavior must of necessity make some difficult choices; the scope of the project must be limited in order to make it manageable. In this essay, I will focus primarily on research that falls under the general rubric of the social psychological approach. This approach holds that an individual's attitudes are the most immediate determinants of voting behavior, yet it recognizes that attitudes develop in, and their effects are shaped by, the social and

*Acknowledgments: This paper has profited much from the insightful comments of Paul Abramson, Richard Brody, Ada Finifter, Warren Miller, and Raymond Wolfinger. I am very appreciative of the efforts of Mary Pat Helbig to prepare the final version of this manuscript under very hectic circumstances.

institutional contexts within which a person lives. With respect to vote choice, this approach focuses on three clusters of attitudes: partisanship, issue attitudes, and candidate evaluations. With respect to the decision of whether to vote, the immediate attitudinal determinants are a set of civic orientations that include such factors as political efficacy, interest in the campaign, general involvement in politics, sense of citizen duty, and others. These civic attitudes are influenced by a person's position within the social structure, and they condition the effects of institutional factors on turnout. The decision to emphasize the social psychological approach reflects its dominant position in the field as exemplified by such influential works as *The American Voter* (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960) and *The Changing American Voter* (Nie, Verba & Petrocik, 1976). Moreover, much of the current controversy in the field of voting behavior takes place within the context of the social psychological tradition.[2]

This essay is also bounded by my decision to focus primarily on literature in which vote choice is the major dependent variable and to largely ignore materials in which turnout and other forms of participation are the foci of interest. This is in part an arbitrary decision that serves to keep the essay a reasonable length, but it also reflects my view that the more exciting developments in voting behavior research are occurring in the area of vote choice.

I have further limited the topic by emphasizing research on national elections and largely omitting state and local election research. This decision reflects the status of the field for it is the national election research that comprises a somewhat cumulative and comparable body of literature whereas the state and local election research is much more disparate in its approaches, core questions, and methods. Certainly the national election research has profited from an interacting, national community of scholars with common approaches and similar research agendas and from the availability of data sets, particularly the national election studies from the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies, that facilitate in-depth analyses of a specific election and comparative analyses across elections. With respect to the state and local literature, a very useful intellectual endeavor at this juncture would be a literature review and propositional inventory that would highlight the commonalities in the field, suggest the next steps in a research agenda, and propose appropriate research strategies to study state and local elections.

Finally, this essay has a temporal boundary to it. I will focus for the most part on developments in the field in the past decade. I assume that the reader is familiar with developments in the field up through the early 1970s; there are a number of already published review essays that detail earlier developments in voting research. Jensen (1969) and Silbey, Bogue, and Flanigan (1978) discuss historical analysis and the historical development of electoral behavior research, while Rossi's "Four Landmarks in Voting Research" (1959) does a thorough and insightful job of analyzing four books that have very much shaped the contemporary study of voting behavior. Rossi's essay traces the field of voting behavior until just prior to the publication of *The American Voter;* the Prewitt and Nie essay (1976) picks up from

this point and provides a thoughtful summary and critique of the subsequent election studies of the "Michigan School." Papers by Niemi and Weisberg (1976) and Pierce and Sullivan (1980) also serve to update developments in voting research; the former discusses contemporary controversies in voting research and lists the major election surveys and the research reports that have emerged from them, while the latter summarizes a body of substantive findings and also highlights a set of methodological considerations that have affected the field of voting behavior. Finally, Converse (1975) focuses on two current controversies in electoral behavior research: the determinants of individual vote choice, a topic which will be updated herein; and the sources of partisan realignment.[3]

Having established the boundaries of this essay, I would now like to present a brief overview of what follows. The essay begins with an examination of two classical questions of voting behavior research: what are the determinants of the vote choice—the three major determinants are party identification, issue attitudes, and candidate evaluation—and what is their relative importance? Recursive and nonrecursive models of vote choice are considered as are the conceptual and methodological problems inherent in measuring the determinants of vote choice and in separating out their effects on the vote decision. In the discussion of issues, special attention will be given to the rapidly growing body of literature on the electoral impact of economic conditions. The essay then turns to another "growth area" in the field of voting behavior—the study of congressional elections. The essay concludes with a brief summary of the key points and a discussion of how the notion of retrospective voting ties together many seemingly disparate themes in the essay in the context of a particular conception of democratic theory.

THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE CHOICE

Introduction

A central concern in voting behavior research has been the identification of the determinants of vote choice and the assessment of the relative importance of these factors. This research agenda, of course, reflects enduring questions of democratic theory about the role, competence, and performance of a democratic citizenry. Indeed, the empirical analysis of voting behavior, itself shaped by longstanding normative concerns, has served to stimulate debate about the requirements for a democratic political system as evidenced by the concluding chapter of *Voting* (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954).

In *The Voter Decides* (1954), Campbell *et al.* viewed partisanship, candidate evaluations, and issue attitudes as the most immediate attitudinal determinants of the vote. In *The American Voter* (1960), party identification was seen more explicitly as a long-term attitude not closely tied to any specific election context, while candidate and issue attitudes were considered to have more of a short-term component reflecting the candidates and issues prominent in a particular election. The authors of *The American Voter* divided issue and candidate attitudes into a set of six partisan attitudes and argued that party identification played a major role in shaping these six attitudes—

attitudes toward the Republican and the Democratic candidate, attitudes about the issues of foreign policy and domestic policy, group-related attitudes, and attitudes about the political parties as managers of government.

A simplified version of *The American Voter* model of vote choice is presented in the following diagram.



Using the terminology of causal analysis, we would label the above arrow diagram as a recursive (one-way causation) model. Party identification, issue attitudes, and candidate attitudes each have a direct effect on vote choice, but, according to the posited structure of the model, party identification also has indirect effects on vote choice via its effects on issue and candidate attitudes respectively. This model was the dominant one for characterizing voting behavior research through the early 1970s. Works by Goldberg (1966), Schulman and Pomper (1975) and Hartwig *et al.* (1980) analyzed variants of this core model and found that while the direct effect of party identification on vote choice declined somewhat in more recent elections, it still remained a strong predictor of vote choice, particularly when its indirect effects were considered. (Of course, the indirect effects of party identification on vote choice arise from the decision to have party identification influence candidate evaluations and issue attitudes.) The impact of issues varied dramatically over time, while candidate effects remained fairly strong consistently (Schulman & Pomper; Hartwig *et al.*). This basic model has come under attack along two broad fronts: (1) the recursive specification of the model has been challenged, and (2) the conceptualization and measurement of the explanatory components of the model have been criticized.

Recursive vs. Nonrecursive Formulations

The recursive model of vote choice was criticized almost from the beginning on the grounds that it failed to capture the richness of the possible relationships among the explanatory variables. For example, *The American Voter* explicitly recognized the possibility of a reciprocal (two-way causation) relationship between party identification and issue attitudes. Likewise, Goldberg (1966, p. 920) criticized his own revised dual mediation model in which party identification influenced partisan attitudes, but not the reverse; he argued that any plausible model should allow for partisan attitudes to have an impact on party identification. More recent critiques have argued for additional reciprocal linkages among the explanatory variables. Certainly it is plausible to argue for a reciprocal relationship between candidate and issue

attitudes; a set of issue preferences held by a person might very well influence his or her evaluation of a candidate, while a preference for one candidate over another might well result in bringing one's own issue preferences into line with those espoused by one's preferred candidate. One can also argue for reciprocal relationships between the dependent variable of vote choice and each of the explanatory variables. For example, Brody and Page (1972) provide a very nice discussion of possible linkages between issue attitudes and vote choice: issue preference may influence vote choice (a case of issue or policy voting), but the causal flow can run in the other direction if issue preferences follow an already made vote choice. One can even envisage a situation in which vote choice affects party identification: a person who voted for a certain party may subsequently decide that he or she is an adherent of that party, a plausible linkage given attribution theory.

Hence, the possible relationships among our variables are much more complex; conceivably we might have a model that looks like this.



Such a model captures the full complexity of the relationships among our variables, but unfortunately the components of the model cannot be estimated since there is insufficient information to generate a unique set of estimates of the various linkages. Technically, we say that the model is underidentified; intuitively, we can think of underidentification as analogous to a system of equations in which we have more unknowns than equations.

Thus we now have a model that captures the plausible reciprocal relationships, but which cannot yield satisfactory estimates of the linkages among the variables. Fortunately, there are two general strategies available which enable us to work with models that incorporate mutual causation. The first strategy is to construct explicitly nonrecursive models, but build them in such a way that they can be estimated. The second strategy is to construct recursive models in which certain variables are measured at multiple time points. In such a system, we can represent a mutual relationship between two variables X and Y not by the direct reciprocal model $X \rightleftarrows Y$, but by a recursive, time lagged model $X_{t_1} \longrightarrow Y_{t_2} \longrightarrow X_{t_3}$. We will talk about each of these approaches, citing recent examples in the literature and discussing research design considerations entailed by each approach.

One of the earlier nonrecursive works was Jackson's (1975) analysis of voting in the 1964 presidential election in which he explicitly incorporated a reciprocal linkage between the voters' party identification and their evalua-

tions of the policy positions of the candidates and political parties. The core of Jackson's model is depicted below.



Note that there is a reciprocal link between party identification and evaluations and that no arrow directly links party identification and vote choice; the existence of this latter linkage is tested in the model.

Jackson estimates an elaborated version of this model and obtains results which suggest that

> party identifications are highly influenced by people's evaluations of what policies each party advocates relative to their own preferences, that party affiliations have little direct influence on the voting decision except for people who see little or no difference in the parties, that party identifications are important in determining what positions people take on domestic social welfare issues and how they perceive the positions of the parties on foreign affairs issues, and finally that party identification has little influence on either positions or perceptions on the civil rights issue. (pp. 176-177)

Jackson concludes that party identifications are primarily based on issue considerations and that party loyalties will change if people's positions on the issues change or if new issues arise which cut across the existing party cleavages. Hence, assuming the correctness of Jackson's results—to be considered in the discussion of the Page and Jones work below—his analysis departs from the classical voting model in that it puts a very heavy emphasis on the role of issues in party preference and finds little direct impact of party identification on vote choice. Party identification may be a relatively long-standing decision, but the mechanism is not simply an issueless, family dominated political socialization process characterized by the reinforcement over time of initial party loyalties. Instead, according to Jackson, the stability of party identification is a reflection of the stability of issue partisanship, and the development of partisanship is shaped by the issue foundation underlying parental partisanship. Hence, the inclusion of a nonrecursive linkage does result in interpretations and emphases quite different from the classical model. It should be noted that Jackson's interpretations go well beyond the direct evidence presented in his article.

Probably the most ambitious, cross-sectional, nonrecursive voting model is that proposed by Page and Jones (1979). The core of their model is shown below; note that it allows for reciprocal links among policy distances, party

identification and candidate evaluations. Also note that no direct link is drawn between party identification and vote decision.



In estimating an elaborated version of this model, Page and Jones find that the relationship between policy distances and candidate evaluations is reciprocal. More importantly, they find that current party attachments are affected by the policy and candidate measures; indeed, for the 1976 election, the estimated effect of policy distance on party identification was .36, while the estimated effect of party identification on policy distance was .00. Hence, we again have evidence that party identification is more responsive to the current stimuli of politics than is suggested by the classical model.

The Jackson and Page and Jones works provide ample support that nonrecursive formulations are needed; recursive formulations by assumption rule out any findings such as those reported in these two articles. However, before accepting the Jackson, and Page and Jones findings as definitive, there are a number of cautionary notes that must be sounded. The first caveat is one appropriate for all pieces of data analysis, namely, do the measured indicators adequately tap the conceptual meaning of the variables? A more important set of considerations concerns the construction and estimation of nonrecursive models. The core models of Jackson, and Page and Jones depicted above are underidentified and hence cannot be estimated. In order to identify and then estimate these models, exogenous variables with certain properties must be formally incorporated in the model.[4] The selection of these exogenous variables is essentially a theoretical and substantive matter subject to certain statistical requirements; some desirable properties of the exogenous variables will be considered shortly.

In the real world of secondary data analysis, the selection and incorporation of exogenous variables is, of course, constrained by whatever variables happen to be measured in the data set being analyzed. This raises the possibility that the needed exogenous variables will not be in the data set or that the investigator will have to settle for less than satisfactory measures. The only way to be confident that the required exogenous variables will be available is to anticipate their need at the design phase of a research project. This requires the researcher to construct theoretical models prior to data collection, to determine whether these models are in fact identified, and to construct reliable and valid measures not only of the core variables but also of those exogenous variables needed to identify the model. Hence, a central task for those involved in the design of data collection efforts is to recognize and measure the variables needed to identify our nonrecursive models.

The Jackson, and Page and Jones articles are secondary analyses and

hence dependent on whatever measures are already available in the data sets they are using. The reader should recognize that the choice of exogenous variables can very much affect the results obtained, particularly when good exogenous variables are available to identify one part (equation) of a model and less satisfactory measures are available to identify other parts. Fisher (1971, pp. 242-248) discusses at length two desirable properties of any variables that may be used to identify an equation in a nonrecursive model: first, the variable should be uncorrelated (in the probability limit) with the disturbance or error term in that equation; second, the variable should closely causally influence the variables which appear in that equation—this implies that a reasonable correlation exists between the exogenous variable and the other variables. The variables used by Page and Jones and by Jackson to identify their equations do not uniformly satisfy the criteria set out by Fisher and hence certain equations and linkages may be estimated "better" than others. Yet it is hard to fault the authors for this since they are constrained by the availability of measures in the data sets they are using. But it again suggests how important it is to give serious attention to the problem at the design stage of research; finding theoretically plausible exogenous variables with desirable statistical properties is a difficult task.

Nonrecursive models also create problems since ordinary least squares is not appropriate to estimate such structures; hence, the researcher proposing to analyze nonrecursive models will need to upgrade his or her statistical estimation skills. There are a variety of estimation procedures appropriate for nonrecursive models, assuming the equations to be estimated are either exactly or overidentified. One can talk of single equation models of estimation, examples of which are two stage least squares and limited information maximum likelihood estimation, and systems of equations methods of estimation, examples of which are three stage least squares and full information maximum likelihood estimation. These techniques are mentioned, not to intimidate the reader, but to suggest the kinds of statistical skills that might profitably be acquired and to show that a theoretical commitment to a nonrecursive model entails a statistical commitment to move beyond ordinary regression analysis. Fortunately, there is a technique available for exactly and overidentified nonrecursive models that is readily understandable—two stage least squares. But even here, the data analyst must be sensitive to special problems that arise in the use of the procedure; see Kritzer (1976) in particular for a discussion of the issues of standardization and multicollinearity in two stage least squares. One final point needs to be made about the estimation of nonrecursive, and recursive, models. The quality of the obtained estimates will be a function of a number of things including the availability of reliable and valid measures and the correct structural specification of the model. Model specification is primarily a theoretical and not a statistical enterprise. Incorrectly specified models can still be estimated; however, the obtained estimates may not be substantively meaningful. Hence, as one builds nonrecursive models and incorporates exogenous variables to help identify such models, specification should be grounded as firmly as possible in theoretical assertions about the processes being modelled. The importance of this point will become especially clear when we review the literature linking

economic conditions and political behavior later in this chapter.

This essay has perhaps taken too much of a methodological and statistical turn. However, the theoretical decision to work with a nonrecursive model has some immediate consequences for the methodological and statistical decisions that must be made; it marvelously illustrates the interlocking nature of theoretical, methodological and statistical choices. This observation certainly holds for the other general strategy for representing nonrecursive relationships—using recursive models with variables measured at multiple time points. Probably the best substantive example of this approach in the field of voting behavior is the work of Markus and Converse (1979).

Markus and Converse construct a dynamic simultaneous equation model of vote choice that includes the usual set of explanatory variables, but which explicitly tries to model the social psychological processes by which the voter makes his or her vote choice. The model is dynamic in the sense that it examines political attitudes, not in the context of a single election, but instead over two elections on the premise that these attitudes are mutually dependent over time. For example, issue stands at time t depend on issue stands at time t-1; likewise, party identification at time t is influenced by party identification at t-1 and vote at t-1. Central to the Markus and Converse model is the assertion that issue preferences and candidate personalities do not affect vote choice directly; instead the authors argue that the major effect of these two attitudes—and also of party identification—is to jointly shape candidate evaluations that in turn directly affect vote choice. They build into their model a conditional relationship linking party identification to vote choice: party identification has more influence in shaping vote choice when the difference in candidate evaluations is small. When one candidate is much more highly evaluated than the other, the direct impact of party identification on vote choice vanishes, a notion very similar to the decision rule proposed by Kelley and Mirer (1974).

Markus and Converse found party identification to be fairly stable across elections, although previous voting behavior did have some effect on current party affiliation. Issue orientations, party identification, and candidate personalities were found to be important determinants of the evaluations received by Ford and Carter; moreover, the difference in evaluations of the two candidates enabled the authors to predict correctly the presidential choices of 90 percent of the voters. The authors emphasize that although the direct impact of party identification on candidate evaluations was less than the direct effects of issues and candidate personalities, its total effect was greater than the total effects of the other two variables because of party identification's indirect effects operating through candidate personalities. The authors conclude that candidate evaluations are the major determinant of vote choice, but stress that we must examine the causally prior effects of party loyalty and issue stands on candidate evaluations. Hence, we have further modifications of our classical voting model. And, again, some of these findings could not have been obtained had we stayed within the boundaries of a recursive, cross-sectional model.

The Markus and Converse approach obviously requires the use of a panel design. Panel data have certain advantages in the construction and testing of

models. The temporal ordering among the variables often enables one to treat lagged measures of a variable as predetermined which means that such variables will be useful in identifying equations. More importantly, it seems that the representation of mutual dependence by a longitudinal formulation as opposed to a cross-sectional, nonrecursive model more faithfully reflects the processes the researcher is trying to model. For example, the model



probably does a better job of representing the mutual dependence of party identification and vote on each other than does the model



At the least, there are questions about what a reciprocal linkage between variables measured at the same time actually means. Does the reciprocal linkage simply represent an average value of a process that has unfolded over time? Are the reciprocal estimates especially sensitive to the time point at which the investigator has gathered the observations? In general, more attention needs to be given to the interpretation of reciprocal linkages.

Of course, panel studies entail additional costs above and beyond the resources required for cross-sectional surveys, particularly in tracking the same respondents over time. Moreover, for many interesting research questions, a two wave panel would not be sufficient; three or more waves and the concomitant increase in costs would be required. It is not surprising that panel studies of national elections are infrequent. Furthermore, panel designs often use identical measures over time for the sake of comparability, yet in some instances in voting research, identically worded questions actually have different meanings over time as the social and political contexts change. Finally, panel designs are not panaceas. It is true that the temporal properties of the variables facilitate assigning causal priorities among them; however, as mentioned earlier, model construction is fundamentally a theoretical and substantive enterprise.

Despite the criticisms and limitations of nonrecursive and longitudinal models presented above, it is clear that these approaches are central to substantive advances in the field of voting behavior. Our standard cross-sectional and recursive models rule out by assumption too many substantively plausible linkages. The work of Jackson, Page and Jones, and Markus and Converse clearly demonstrates the substantive payoffs that come in using new approaches. However, before accepting the findings of Jackson, Page and Jones, and Markus and Converse as definitive, we should recognize that decisions about the conceptualization and measurement of variables and the specification and estimation of models have affected their substantive results just as these same decisions influenced the results of the earlier electoral research. Moreover, the findings of Jackson, Page and Jones, and Markus and Converse are not entirely congruent because of differences in specification,

estimation, and operationalization. For example, Markus and Converse find that party identification is the most stable element of their model, even more so than issue attitudes, whereas Page and Jones conclude that policy distances, an issue measure, influence party identification rather than the reverse. Hence, it appears from these two pieces of research that the less stable variable is influencing the highly stable variable, a seeming anomaly. Since Markus and Converse explicitly incorporate a longitudinal element in their analysis while the Page-Jones work is cross-sectional and since different specifications are employed, both findings can be correct. As one tries to resolve this apparent anomaly, one needs to ask the fundamental question of how and where the different explanatory variables enter the process of vote choice. Given that evaluations of particular candidates tend to be specific to the election at hand—except perhaps for candidates who have been on the national scene for a long time—there is probably little controversy about having candidate evaluations in close temporal proximity to the vote decision. But a more long-term factor such as party identification could enter the vote decision process at many stages and its impact could be direct or indirect. Hence, it becomes extremely difficult to separate out the unique effects of party, candidate, and issue attitudes, the theme of the next section of the chapter.

Assessing the Effects of Party, Candidate and Issue Attitudes

A common goal in voting behavior research is to estimate the magnitude of the effects of party identification, candidate attitudes and issue preferences on vote choice. The typical strategy is to regress vote choice (Y) on party identification (X_1), candidate attitudes (X_2) and issue orientations (X_3) and examine the obtained regression coefficients. However, this procedure is flawed in two major ways. First, the regression equation

$$Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3$$

is a model of direct effects only; it does not include any indirect effects of variables on vote choice. For example, the assertion that b_1 represents the effect of party identification on vote choice is an underestimation of its effect if partisanship also has indirect effects on vote choice via its impact on issue and candidate attitudes. In general, if one wishes to assess the total effects of variables on each other, one needs to move from direct effects regression models to more complex and interdependent causal systems such as those discussed in the first part of this essay.

Even if indirect effects did not have to be considered, the regression model depicted above would be unsatisfactory because of the operationalizations of party identification, issue orientations and candidate attitudes. Many of the measurement strategies that have been widely employed such as numerical counts of likes and dislikes of the parties and candidates, thermometer rating of the parties and candidates, and issue measures with a partisan or candidate proximity[5] component to them are problematic because

they tap at least two of the explanatory variables simultaneously, thereby making it impossible to sort out the distinct effect of each variable. The classic example is the citizen who says that he or she voted against Carter because of his incompetence or against Goldwater because of his impulsiveness. How are these responses to be coded? Surely they are references to a candidate, but almost as surely, they likely have an underlying issue rationale to them. There is probably no simple answer to this problem since the variables are so inextricably linked.

Some analysts (Kirkpatrick *et al.*, 1975; Nimmo & Savage, 1976; Miller & Miller, 1977; Shabad & Andersen, 1979; Kessel, 1980; Kinder & Abelson, 1981; and Miller *et al.*, 1982) have been careful to sort out different kinds of candidate references. However, because of the conceptual overlap and mutual dependence among party, candidate and issue attitudes, it may be impossible to construct "pure" measures of each; hence, analysts should exercise caution in making claims about the unique effects of each of the explanatory variables. And, certainly, there should be continued efforts to develop measures that better tap the underlying constructs and clarify their meaning.

The research of Kinder and Abelson (1981) is an excellent example of the kind of work that is needed; their analysis of the trait judgments made by survey respondents about the presidential contenders yields two nearly independent dimensions: competence and integrity. They found perceptions of candidate competence to be a powerful predictor of presidential vote in 1980 and in particular found that citizens' assessment of *national* economic conditions strongly shaped their evaluations of Carter's performance. In their general vote model, candidate competence and integrity along with positive and negative affect toward the candidates were the most immediate determinants of the vote decision. The effects of policies, party identification and national economic conditions were indirect, channeled through appraisals of the candidates. Moreover, they found that over the course of the 1980 campaign, changes in perceptions of the candidates were associated with themes and developments in the presidential campaign.

The findings of Kinder and Abelson provide support for the Jackson, Page and Jones, and Markus and Converse models in which candidate assessments are the most immediate determinants of the vote. Miller *et al.* (1982) elaborate on the Kinder and Abelson work and argue that the criteria of competence and integrity are enduring ones that have structured candidate evaluations over the 1952-1980 period. Hence Miller and his colleagues assert that the standard treatment of candidate evaluations as "idiosyncratic responses to superficial criteria" needs to be drastically revised and propose a reconceptualization in which candidate assessments are based primarily on perceptions of how the candidate will perform, or has performed, in office. Hence, candidate based voting has a rational basis to it; it is not simply a gut reaction to a candidate's personality or appearance. This revised notion of candidate based voting serves as an example of prospective and retrospective voting, a topic developed at the end of this essay.

Kessel's (1980) analysis of the likes and dislikes of the parties and candidates expressed by samples of survey respondents does a good job of sorting out candidate, issue and party references, yet it also illustrates how intrac-

table some of the problems are in disentangling issue and candidate effects. Kessel first examines citizens' responses under the general headings of candidate, party and issue references and then moves to a more refined classification. For example, the candidate references are divided into seven subcategories of record and incumbency, experience, management, intelligence, trust, personality and a general category. Although this classification has major substantive payoffs in allowing one to map out candidate images in some detail, the seven categories are not as distinct as they initially appear to be. For example, under the management component of candidate attitudes are listed (for 1976) such responses as:

1. good/efficient/businesslike administration; balance budget; lower/wouldn't increase national debt (reference 601 in the master code)
2. would spend less (than other side); would spend too little (reference 605 in the master code)

While these references certainly capture a management and/or efficiency dimension, they may also capture an issue dimension. Unfortunately, the NES surveys do not ask immediate followup questions that delve deeper into the respondent's concerns about spending. However, it is certainly plausible that the concern about spending is tied to specific policy preferences and support for specific programs. If so, these references are tapping an issue component as well as a candidate component, yet their treatment in the statistical analysis solely as a candidate reference would enhance the predictive power of candidate attitudes at the expense of issues. Although the problem is not at all serious in this particular example, the general problem of assigning a unique meaning to candidate, issue and party references is a difficult one.

Kessel employs maximum likelihood estimation procedures to assess the relative effects of the sixteen classes of responses (seven candidate, two party, and seven issue categories) on vote choice and finds that general candidate, general issue and party affect references tend to have the greater effects on vote choice. This conclusion is fine so long as one is careful to recognize that the obtained estimates measure direct effects only and not total effects. If one is interested in total effects, it will be necessary to posit a causal structure among the explanatory variables and assess the magnitude of the direct and the indirect effects. This again demonstrates the importance of the recursive and nonrecursive causal models of vote choice discussed in the first part of this chapter.

An exchange between Shaffer (1972; 1976) and Fiorina (1976) about the six component Michigan model (Stokes *et al.*, 1958; Stokes, 1966) is a useful starting point for suggesting new strategies for assessing the effects of partisanship, candidate evaluations and issue orientations on vote choice. Shaffer criticized the six component model on the grounds that all six components essentially tapped a single underlying party identification dimension and indeed were "simply six different ways of measuring the same thing" (p. 428). Fiorina correctly challenged this conclusion on a number of grounds. He observed that the first factor obtained in Shaffer's analysis accounts at most for 40 percent of the variance in the six components. Moreover, the fac-

tor loadings indicate that in most cases only about 30 to 40 percent of the variance of each component is accounted for by the common party identification factor. In addition, the correlations among the six components could not be reproduced very well by the common factor. Hence, Fiorina argued that the six components should be kept, even though they did have substantial variance in common. He claimed that although party identification may help shape these six components, there are other causal factors and more complex interrelationships involved. Shaffer rejoined that analysis in which the six components are entered into a regression equation and their separate effects compared can be very misleading, particularly when making cross-time and cross-variable comparisons.

I think a better way to view the Shaffer-Fiorina dispute is to recognize that party identification and issue and candidate attitudes are complex concepts—as we shall soon see—that cannot be adequately measured by a single indicator. Furthermore, the concepts of party identification, issue attitudes and candidate attitudes are latent (unmeasured) variables which we hope to tap adequately by means of our operational measures. The complexity of the concepts and the need to reproduce the true unmeasured variables requires a multiple indicators approach. Schematically, we might represent this situation by the following arrow diagram in which the circles represent latent or unmeasured variables, the rectangles measured indicators of the latent variables, and the u_is measurement error terms. Note in the diagram that there are multiple indicators of party identification and issue and candidate attitudes, but only a single indicator—reported vote—of the true vote choice.

The construction of indicators for each of our latent variables would be based on our conceptualizations of the unmeasured variables, although in the real world of secondary analysis we often have to make do with what is available. For example, one indicator of party identification might be the standard party identification question while other indicators might be thermometer evaluations of the parties or counts of the likes and dislikes of the parties expressed by citizens. Indicators of candidate attitudes might be thermometer ratings of the candidates and counts of the likes and dislikes of the candidates expressed by citizens. Finally, issue attitudes might be measured by a series of issue proximity measures.

This model can be estimated by a technique called LISREL (Jöreskog, 1970, 1973; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1978). In fact, a model similar to the above in its logic but richer in its selection of indicators has been estimated by Dennis (1982); in particular, Dennis utilized the new party support measures in the 1980 national election survey as indicators of the true party identification. The LISREL approach is very powerful since it enables one to generate consistent estimates of the parameters of a given causal (structural) model *and* a measurement model from the observed variance-covariance matrix. Too often we have been content to estimate only the structural model and to ignore the measurement model altogether. Furthermore, LISREL places few restrictions on the kinds of structural and measurement models that can be estimated; for example, LISREL allows reciprocal linkages in the structural model and correlated errors in the measurement model. Its utility is further demonstrated by the fact that multiple regression, path analysis, and com-

mon factor analysis can all be subsumed under the general LISREL model. LISREL will undoubtedly become a more prominent model testing and analysis procedure in the study of voting behavior.

In the model depicted below, LISREL (particularly its factor analysis component) will enable the researcher to assess the convergent and discriminant validity of his or her measures. For example, with multiple measures of partisanship and candidate and issue attitudes respectively, we would certainly want the indicators designed to tap one latent variable to correlate more highly among themselves than with indicators tapping a different latent variable. If they do not, we might doubt our indicators (and/or our underlying conceptualization). Likewise, we hope that our indicators can discriminate among the latent variables.

In conclusion, the effort to sort out the unique effects of party identification, issue orientations, and candidate evaluations will be a difficult if not im-



possible task. In order to accomplish this task, there must be sound conceptualization and measurement of each of our variables. However, there is currently great controversy about conceptual and measurement definitions, especially with respect to party identification, and it is to this topic that we now turn.

Party Identification

Party identification has been conceptualized as a psychological attachment to a political party. Citing reference group theory and small group influence processes, Campbell *et al.* (1960) viewed the political party "as the group toward which the individual may develop an identification, positive or negative, of some degree of intensity" (pp. 121-122). This identification is seen as structuring citizens' perceptions of politics, their evaluations of political objects, and their behavioral responses to political stimuli. Party identification has been important in the analysis of voting behavior for a number of reasons. First, it has been viewed as a major determinant of the political behavior of citizens. Second, party identification has been seen as a source of stability in the electoral cleavages characterizing the United States and as a dampener of electoral swings. Finally, party identification served as the core of the normal vote concept elaborated by Converse (1966) and as such provided a baseline from which to evaluate short-term partisan changes.

The traditional measure of party identification has been the two part question:

> Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? Those who classified themselves as Republicans or Democrats were then asked, Would you call yourself a strong (Republican, Democrat) or a not very strong (Republican, Democrat)? Those who termed themselves Independents were then asked, Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?

This two part question yields a seven category classification of party identification: strong Republican, weak Republican, Independent Republican, Independent, Independent Democrat, weak Democrat, and strong Democrat. This measurement strategy reflects a conceptualization of partisanship that assumes that Independent represents a neutral middle point along a unidimensional continuum ranging from strong Republican to strong Democrat and that Democrat and Republican identifications are polar opposite points along this continuum.

Currently, the unidimensional conceptualization and measurement of party identification are being challenged, and alternative conceptualization and measurement strategies are being proposed. Moreover, many of our empirical generalizations about party identification—such as its early development through a family-dominated political socialization process, its reinforcement and intensification over time and its concomitant stability—have been called into question. Hence, despite its pre-eminent role in the study of voting behavior, party identification is today being challenged on many fronts. (Also

see Shively, 1980, for a review of recent developments relevant to party identification.)

The Stability of Party Identification

The initial evidence about the stability of party identification came from recall questions about past partisanship, but such recall information can be very inaccurate (Niemi *et al.*, 1980). More direct and compelling evidence about the stability of party identification is provided by panel data. An analysis of the 1956-1958-1960 SRC panel data by Dreyer (1973) concluded that the stability of partisanship was high and that whatever changes did occur over time were random. Subsequent analyses by Dobson and St. Angelo (1975), Brody (1977), and Howell (1981) have challenged this latter conclusion, arguing that changes in partisanship were indeed responsive to real world events. For example, Dobson and St. Angelo found that Republicans were less stable in their partisanship than Democrats between 1956 and 1958, but that both groups behaved similarly between 1958 and 1960, a pattern they attributed to the "Republican" recession of 1958. A similar pattern held in the 1972-1974-1976 era with Republicans between 1972 and 1974 (the Nixon resignation year) much more likely than Democrats to move away from their partisanship, a party difference that practically vanished between 1974 and 1976. Brody argued that the economic climate and the low evaluation of the Republican President's performance made Republican identifiers more prone to changing their partisanship. Howell's analysis confirmed the responsiveness of party identification to short-term forces, although for Howell the major short-term force was past voting behavior. Even here, however, issues played a role in that their effects were channeled through past vote.

Hence there is much evidence accumulating that the conceptualization of party identification primarily as a long-term force unresponsive to current political stimuli is in need of revision. Party identification does respond to short-term influences; indeed, this responsiveness is one reason why nonrecursive formulations that allow reciprocal linkages between party identification and issue and candidate attitudes are needed.

However, the assertion that party identification is sensitive to short-term forces is *not* equivalent to saying that party identification is highly unstable; to the contrary, party identification remains one of the most stable of political attitudes. Converse and Markus (1979) find that partisan stability in the 1972-1974-1976 CPS panel far exceeded the stability of respondents' stances on issues—moral issues being an exception. Moreover, direction of partisanship is more stable than strength of partisanship; the bulk of the observed changes in the panel data are intra-party (e.g., from strong Republican to weak Republican) rather than interparty. Various research findings suggest that direction and strength of party identification can be viewed as conceptually distinct, the former being more stable and long-term and the latter more responsive to the immediate political setting. (This distinction has implications for the processes by which partisanship is acquired; see Claggett, 1981.)[8]

Finally, the work of Jennings and Niemi (1978) provides an even stronger test of the stability of partisanship. The authors analyzed a sample of high school seniors and some of their parents in 1965 and reinterviewed much of this sample in 1973. Among the parental sample, partisan stability was very high with very little polar changes in partisanship. Among the youth sample, partisan change was much more common, particularly movement into the Independent category. The authors conclude that the partisanship of young adults is indeed susceptible to the dominant political forces of the time.

Alternative Conceptualizations of Party Identification

If party identification does respond to short-term stimuli, then at least a partial reconceptualization of partisanship may be required. Fiorina (1977; 1981) provides one such reformulation. He defines a person's identification with a party as the difference between the person's past experiences with that party minus the person's past experiences with the other party plus some adjustment representing the initial partisan bias the person brings into the political arena. This formulation is useful for it incorporates past experiences yet weights them less than current experiences, thereby allowing recent events to alter partisan predispositions. In effect, party identification becomes "a running tally of retrospective evaluations" (1981, p. 89). This formulation grounds party identification in reality and allows past experiences to anchor party identification somewhat, thereby giving to party identification some element of a standing decision even as it is responsive to current political stimuli. In fact, Fiorina (1981) explicitly states that "there is an inertial element (party identification) in voting behavior that cannot be ignored, but that inertial element has an experiential basis; it is *not* something learned at mommy's knee and never questioned thereafter" (p. 152). But overall, Fiorina rests party identification in evaluations of prior experiences and as such gives the acquisition of partisanship a more rational basis.

Shively (1979) also suggests a rational basis for the acquisition and retention of a party identification. His functional model argues very straightforwardly that party identification is acquired in order to make manageable the decisional burden facing the voter. Party identification is seen here as an economizing device that reduces the costs of decision-making. A person will be more likely to develop a partisanship if other economizing devices (e.g., class and group loyalties) are not available. Shively presents some evidence for his model and develops some interesting implications.

The Fiorina and Shively works are important because they move the discussion of party identification away from a long-term attitude acquired in childhood which would be likely to be devoid of issue and policy content and, instead, anchor party identification in the political reality experienced by the adult citizen. This does not deny child-adult party identification linkages, but it does suggest that the holding of partisanship is a more complex and dynamic process with a rational foundation.

There is still much evidence that party identification tends to be learned in childhood even before the party label has much issue content for the youngster. However, this early acquired partisanship does change in response

to individual experiences and to the dominant political forces of the era. Howell's (1980) analysis of the effects of voting behavior on changes in partisanship reaches a similar conclusion; the development of adult partisanship "involves an interplay between the stable component of that attitude [party identification] and adult behavior [in Howell's case, voting behavior] which can be either reinforcing or nonreinforcing. Past behavior does influence future identification, but that influence is specified by both the stability and direction of the initial identification" (p. 298).

The Dimensionality of Party Identification

There are currently many questions being asked about party identification:

1. What actually is the object of party identification? What do citizens mean when they talk of political parties? Is party a set of ideas and issues, a set of elites, activists and candidates, a group of people like one's self or what?
2. What models can account for the development and acquisition of partisanship? Can the Fiorina and Shively notions be reconciled with the initial reference group conceptualization of partisanship?
3. What does party identification signify? Is it simply positive affect toward one party or does it also entail hostility toward the other party in a two party system? (Maggiotto & Piereson, 1977)
4. What does political independence mean? Is it indifference between the parties, support of both, or rejection of both? Assuming that we are working within the traditional unidimensional conceptualization and measurement of party identification, what about independent leaners: are they partisans or independents?[7]

Questions 3 and 4 lead into a discussion of the dimensionality of partisanship and the answers to these questions will in turn depend on and feed back into our conceptualization of partisanship. As mentioned above, the traditional party identification measure has been treated as unidimensional with strong Republicans and strong Democrats representing polar opposite points and independents representing a neutral midpoint along the scale. Presumably as one moved from strong Republican to strong Democrat across the categories of the scale, one was moving across increasingly Democratic categories.[8]

Early on, Petrocik (1974) observed that the seven fold party identification index did not behave as a unidimensional scale should. He found intransitivities in the scale as it related to other variables; for example, independent leaners were more likely than weak identifiers to be involved in politics, an anomalous result if one thinks of weak identifiers as having more intense partisan feelings which would result in higher levels of involvement. It turns out that independent leaners possess characteristics (e.g., higher education, higher income) generally linked to higher levels of involvement more than weak partisans do. Although the intransitivities uncovered by Petrocik dealt mainly with measures of involvement, inconsistencies also arise with respect to

partisan-related measures such as evaluations of the parties and candidates (Asher, 1980, pp. 62-63) and past loyalty to one's party. Often the independent leaners do not fall between the weak identifiers and the pure independents as would be expected if the party identification index is unidimensional and the ordering of the categories correct. Keith *et al.* (1977) make similar points about independent leaners. They find that the pure independents score very low on measures of political activity, interest and knowledge, while the independent leaners score high. Moreover, the leaners tend to be more loyal than the weak partisans to their party's presidential nominees and indeed often resemble the strong partisans in their voting behavior, a pattern that again challenges the unidimensionality of party identification. Katz (1979) also provides evidence arguing against unidimensionality. In one part of his analysis of panel data, he finds that strong party identifiers who switched their party loyalty were more likely to move all the way to strong identification with a new party than to move to some intermediate position. This suggested to Katz that strong Democrat and strong Republican were actually close points and not opposite ends of a unidimensional continuum. One way in which strong Democrats and strong Republicans might be close in a partisan space would be if that space were characterized by two dimensions—the direction of partisanship and the intensity of partisanship.

Valentine and Van Wingen (1980) and Howell (1980) also argue for two dimensions of party identification—partisanship and independence. Van Wingen and Valentine argue that the problems inherent in interpreting the standard party identification measure arises from the fact that it is inadequately tapping two dimensions simultaneously. They therefore call for the development of direct unidimensional measures of partisanship and of independence.

Weisberg (1980) has also shown that the unidimensional view of partisanship does not fit certain empirical observations. For example, unidimensionality places Democrats and Republicans as polar opposites which implies that there should be a strong negative correlation between evaluations of the two parties; instead, the correlation in any year is at most slightly negative and in some years practically zero. Weisberg also examines the preference order given by respondents to the objects Democrat, Republican and Independent as measured by thermometer ratings and finds that almost half of the respondents give orderings incompatible with the unidimensional interpretation that would place Independents in the middle of the partisan continuum. Hence Weisberg rejects the unidimensional view of party identification and instead proposes a multidimensional conceptualization that entails three dimensions: attitudes toward the Democrats, attitudes toward the Republicans, and attitudes toward independence. He tested this conceptualization using some of the new party support measures in the 1980 National Election Study surveys. In a similar fashion, Dennis (1981a) also analyzes the new party support measures and finds three facets of partisanship: partisan direction, party system support, and political involvement. Valentine and Van Wingen, Weisberg, and Dennis show how moving beyond a unidimensional formulation helps one sort out intransitivities in the tradi-

tional party identification index; in particular, the seemingly anomalous behavior of independent leaners is better accounted for in more than one dimension. More generally, their analyses suggest that political independence is a complex phenomenon and that our traditional party identification measure may lump together as independents many different types of respondents.

Whither the Traditional Party Identification Measure

In an unpublished paper, Dennis (1981b) examined in great detail the properties of three measures of partisanship: the traditional party identification index, a partisan supporter typology based upon new items in the 1980 NES surveys, and a measure based on feeling thermometers toward the parties. He found that while the traditional measure did slightly better in tapping long term retrospective aspects of voting behavior such as regularity of party voting, it did no better than the other measures in relating to a set of criterion variables. Although the traditional measure had slightly higher stability and reliability coefficients and its marginal distributions were somewhat more stable from survey to survey, Dennis on balance comes down in favor of using the partisan supporter typology—except when studying long-term overall trends in partisanship.

Dennis' conclusion raises very directly the fundamental question of whether we can continue to use the traditional measure of partisanship. This standard measure has the advantages of familiarity, availability, and comparability over time and to give it up would impose hardships in many analyses. Nevertheless, it is clear that our underlying unidimensional conceptualization of partisanship is not very well reflected in our standard party identification item. Weisberg (1980, p. 49) takes the reasonable position that it would be silly to give up the traditional measure, even with its known flaws, unless alternative measures provide "real theoretical and substantive gains." Certainly in the area of understanding political independence the traditional measure needs to be supplemented if not replaced. But with respect to representing the partisan predispositions and locations of citizens, the traditional measure is still very powerful. Moreover, it is possible for a unidimensional measure to do a reasonably good job in representing the positions of people in a multidimensional space. Shively (1980) provides some tentative evidence suggesting that the traditional measure does not overly distort the ordering obtained in a two dimensional space. Likewise, Weisberg (1980) states that the traditional measure reduces "the three-space into a single partisan dimension with minimal violence" (p. 48). Hence, the case seems strong for the continued, but careful use of the traditional measure.

Fiorina (1981) takes the distinctive position that we should first decide on our conceptualization of partisanship and then develop appropriate measurement strategies. Hence, if we want party identification to be unidimensional with strong Democrat and strong Republican representing polar extremes and independence simply representing the absence of partisanship, we should design measurement strategies that will accomplish this. Just because the traditional measure has been shown to tap at least two dimensions does not

mean that the conceptualization of party identification must change; it may be sufficient to alter the measurement strategies. Certainly at one level Fiorina is correct; conceptualization should guide measurement and not the reverse. However, as Weisberg (1982) argues, if reasonable empirical evidence indicates that citizens do not view parties as polar opposites along a unidimensional continuum, then we may have to reconceptualize party identification. (Fiorina would likely reject some of Weisberg's evidence as he views the party thermometers to be very contaminated measures.) Weisberg specifically proposes to conceptualize reactions to the parties as two separate dimensions.

The jury is still out in terms of which conceptualization and measurement strategies are preferable and under what circumstances. It is likely that different measures will be useful to address different substantive questions which means that in the future no single measure of partisanship will be expected to carry as much weight as the traditional measure has. Certainly questions about party identification will occupy a central place in the voting behavior research agenda for the foreseeable future. It is likely that the requirements of comparability and continuity will keep our traditional party identification measure in business even as work continues on new conceptualizations and measures. The works discussed herein represent a very promising start to a party identification dialogue, but one should be wary of allowing the new measures already developed to overly constrain future developments.

Candidate Attitudes

As discussed earlier, a number of recent models of presidential vote choice (e.g., Page & Jones, Kinder & Abelson, Markus & Converse) have posited candidate evaluations as the most immediate determinants of vote choice and as the variable through which other influences operate. Given the central importance of candidate assessments to the vote choice, it is surprising that research on candidate evaluations has lagged behind research on party identification and issue attitudes. Although we know from various pieces of research about the kinds of factors that shape candidate appraisals—party identification, issue preference, perceptions of national economic conditions and others—and we have some insights about the conditions under which different factors will be more or less important in shaping candidate assessments, until very recently we knew little about how candidate images develop and change over the course of the presidential campaign from the primaries to the general election.

The study of the development of candidate images of course requires a longitudinal design that spans the entire presidential selection process and not simply the general election campaign. After all, if as some recent analyses suggest, presidential elections are mainly candidate choices, and if most voters have made their vote choice weeks or months before Election Day in November, then the sources of candidate images must reside earlier in the selection process. Fortunately there are some new data sources that facilitate the study of candidate appraisals throughout the campaign period. For exam-

ple, the various national surveys and the specific primary election exit polls conducted by such organizations as CBS News/*New York Times* (which are available to the social science community through ICPSR) are useful sources of information as are statewide polls conducted throughout the election period. Potentially important sources of data are the polls conducted for the presidential candidates, but these are not easily available to the social science community. Certainly one of the richest data sources available to election analysts is the 1980 National Election Studies conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan. The design of the NES/CPS surveys explicitly recognized the need to obtain observations throughout the presidential selection process. The complex design had a number of components: a panel of respondents interviewed in February, June, September, and post-election; a national cross-section interviewed in April and reinterviewed after the November election; and the traditional pre- and post-general election surveys.

These various data sets have contributed mightily to our ability to trace the development of candidate evaluations over time, yet even these sources have limitations that suggest how severe data problems can be in studying political phenomena longitudinally. The limitations of these data sets are partially a function of the fact that investigators have a diverse set of substantive questions on their agendas that cannot be adequately addressed by the same design. For example, one set of questions relevant to the primary election season would be the determinants of turnout and vote choice in presidential primaries. Such questions are best addressed by specific state surveys conducted in close temporal proximity to election day in those states. Another set of research questions might be the development of candidate evaluations during the primary season and the role of the media in nationalizing and publicizing the results of specific primary elections; here the optimal design might be national surveys, either cross-sections or preferably panels.

Obviously, it would be ideal to conduct specific state surveys to capture the contextual richness of the campaigns in specific states as well as to conduct repeated national surveys to detail the process of information diffusion about the candidates and the electoral consequences of this information. In the real world, however, resource constraints force investigators to make difficult choices. For example, one cannot conduct multiple surveys to capture all the important events and influences in a campaign. The first slices into an ongoing process will probably establish the baseline from which to evaluate subsequent change. For example, the first NES/CPS survey in 1980 was conducted in February after George Bush's popularity and public awareness as measured in the polls had jumped because of the major media coverage he received for his success in the Iowa precinct caucuses. Likewise, the first measurement of attitudes toward John Anderson in the 1980 NES/CPS surveys came in the April measurement, weeks after Anderson's strong showings in Vermont and Massachusetts and his concomitant increase in national visibility.

In a similar vein, resource constraints of both time and money force restrictions on the measures actually included in one's surveys. For example, the NES/CPS surveys asked certain followup questions about the 1980 presi-

dential contenders only of those respondents who had heard much about the candidates and who knew a lot about them. Respondents who had heard of the candidates, but felt that they did not know much about them were not asked the subsequent candidate image questions. This decision seems appropriate if one wishes to minimize the measurement of non-attitudes; moreover, it reduces the length, and therefore the cost, of the interview. However, this decision also prevents the investigator from ascertaining what the limited awareness respondents actually know and feel about the candidates, thereby making a baseline assessment more problematic and the study of change more difficult. Similarly, many of the polls conducted by news organizations are tied to specific primaries; often they are exit polls of voters who participated in those primaries. Typically, these surveys are far less extensive than the NES/CPS instruments. For example, the major measure of candidate qualities in the 1980 CBS/*New York Times* exit polls is the question, "Which of these qualities best describes why you voted for your candidate today?" with a followup question asking about the second most important quality. This format does not permit any comparative assessment of the candidates across a set of qualities. Likewise, the issue questions in the CBS/*New York Times* polls are limited and do not incorporate any of the advances in issue measurement—such as proximity items—found in social science surveys.[9]

Despite the difficulties involved in studying the development of candidate attitudes and awareness, there are a number of longitudinal studies that have made a good start in analyzing the content and sources of candidate images. Patterson's (1980) study of the 1976 presidential campaign examined popular awareness of the candidates, perceptions of the candidates' prospects for winning the nomination, and images of the candidates over the course of the campaign. Patterson found that the level of awareness of many of the candidates was very low before the primaries. Recognition increased mainly for one candidate, Jimmy Carter, whose early successes generated media coverage which in turn helped him win later primaries. The work of Zukin and Keeter (1983) on the 1980 campaign confirms some of Patterson's findings. Using NES/CPS, CBS/*New York Times* and New Jersey Poll surveys, Zukin and Keeter found relatively little learning and minimal increases in knowledge about the candidates in 1980. The learning that did occur was mainly for two candidates—Bush and Anderson—who enjoyed some early successes in the primary season. The authors argue that citizens learn about victorious candidates through media reports. They note that losing candidates almost always fall in the popularity polls while winners gain, although the latter effect is conditioned by how the media report their victories. The previously discussed work of Kinder and Abelson (1981) found that evaluations of the candidates were responsive to the themes and events of the campaigns. Similarly, Norrander (1982) found that the reasons given for voting for a candidate in the 1980 primaries seemed to correspond very closely to the kinds of emphases presented by the campaign. Hence, a common reason given for voting for John Anderson was that he was different; this likely reflects the Anderson campaign theme "Think about the Anderson difference." Likewise, many voters "learned" that George Bush was competent

and experienced, probably a reflection of his campaign theme "A President we won't have to train."

In general, the research reviewed above suggests that much of what is learned about the candidates is determined by the candidates' own campaign emphases and by the media reporting of primary election outcomes, particularly the inordinate coverage given to the victors. While this research has made an impressive start in tracing the growth and sources of candidate learnings, more work needs to be done on the agents and processes involved and on the individual level characteristics which facilitate learning. Future research endeavors will undoubtedly require complex longitudinal designs, better measures of the campaign communication context, and extensive measures assessing the candidates along issue and personal dimensions.

Issues

The role of issues in elections and the ability of the average citizen to cast an "issue vote" have been controversial topics in the field of voting behavior. The early voting studies, especially *The American Voter,* presented a less than flattering portrait of the voter's issue competence. The challenge to this portrait came on two broad fronts. First, it was argued that the time period studied in the early voting analyses was unusually quiescent and issueless; hence the finding of low levels of issue voting was time bound. It was argued that in more politically contentious times, particularly when the parties and candidates offered clearer and more distinctive choices, the level of issue voting would be higher. Second, it was argued that the methods and data used to assess issue voting in the early studies were inadequate and thereby systematically understated the amount of issue voting. Thus various investigators called for such modifications as the use of proximity measures, for issue selection to be respondent-determined rather than researcher-determined, and for issue salience to be explicitly incorporated in the analysis. A number of studies conducted in the more turbulent 1960s and 1970s using more sophisticated measures found levels of issue voting higher than in the 1950s. This "revisionist" literature itself has since come under attack on methodological grounds. Moreover, subsequent analyses of recent elections suggest that the studies done in 1964 and 1972 may have been conducted in an era just as atypical as the 1950s.

I do not wish to go into the details of the issue voting controversy here since there are a number of review essays and chapters that detail the contending positions in the controversy. For a discussion of the methodologies and data used in the early issue voting literature, see Kessel (1972). Asher (1980) and Kinder and Sears (1982) provide reasonably comprehensive and current reviews of the issue voting debate. And Brody and Page's (1972) discussion of the different processes that could produce a correlation between voter-candidate proximity on an issue and vote choice remains essential reading for analysts wishing to assess the extent of genuine issue voting. Hence in this section I want to review very briefly a few developments in the issue voting debate and then offer some general comments about how that debate has proceeded. Finally, I will review the rapidly growing body of literature on

the impact of economic conditions on voting behavior, a flawed collection of analyses that focus on one type of issue: the state of the economy.

On the methodological side, the development of new issue formats and the assessment of the consequences of question wording and question filters has immediate relevance to the issue voting—and the beliefs systems—controversy (see in particular the work of Aldrich *et al.*, 1982, and Bishop *et al.*, 1978a, 1978b, 1979 and 1980). On the substantive side, the work of Carmines and Stimson (1980) has distinguished between two kinds of issue voting, one based on "hard" issues and the other on "easy" issues. Hard issue voting results from a careful weighing of the alternatives (in a Downsian sense) and should be most prevalent in those citizens with the cognitive and conceptual skills to make such comparative assessments. Easy issue voting occurs for issues that are largely symbolic rather than technical, that deal with policy ends rather than means, and that have been on the political agenda for some time. Voters can respond to such issues on a gut level and hence need not possess any particular conceptual skills in order to cast an issue vote. Carmines and Stimson find that with respect to Vietnam, a hard issue, level of information (a measure of cognitive and conceptual abilities) affected the relationship between policy position and vote; issue voting was most pronounced among high information respondents. For desegregation, an easy issue, information level had much weaker effects. One conclusion the authors draw is that issue voting is not necessarily a sign of political sophistication since easy issue voting does not require any special intellectual skills. The Carmines and Stimson work will force future discussions of issue voting to be more careful about equating issue voting and citizen competence; high levels of issue voting do not necessarily indicate a highly competent electorate of rational decision-makers. In a related vein, the work of Rabinowitz *et al.* (1982) also provides insights about the properties and behavior of the electorate. The authors examined the effects of issue salience and, unlike some earlier studies, found that the salience of an issue to the voter did shape his or her political behavior. However, the one most salient issue for each voter did not dominate the vote decision; the electorate was not a collection of single issue voters. These recent works jointly suggest that when salient issues are also easy issues, the amount of issue voting in an election is likely to be high. However, these works also suggest that issues are only one of a number of influences on the vote decision and that the extent of issue voting will depend on the characteristics of the voters, the campaign emphases of the candidates and the nature of the issues themselves.

In many ways, the issue voting debate has been a stimulating one characterized by innovative conceptual, methodological and statistical contributions. Yet in some respects, the issue voting controversy has become sterile, in part because in our emphasis on social science methods and procedures, we have lost sight of the real world political questions motivating the debate in the first place. Issue voting occurs in the context of a campaign and election in which candidates seek support from the electorate, voters in some way respond to and impose constraints on candidates, and citizen-candidate interactions take place mainly within a media-dominated context. In essence, the campaign is a process of political communication, the major communication

flow being from candidates to voters through controlled (e.g., partisan commercials) and uncontrolled (e.g., nightly news shows) media. (The communication flow can of course run in the opposite direction as citizens directly or indirectly express their preferences.)

If we think of the campaign as a communication process, then we want to know how well the candidate's mediated campaign is reaching the electorate; we literally want to know whether the campaign and the citizenry are on the same wavelength. This concern has a number of consequences for the issue voting controversy as well as for the debates on belief system constraint and levels of conceptualization. For example, if the campaign emphasizes certain issues, it is important to determine whether voters are responding to those issues. We can certainly study issues that are idiosyncratically important to citizens, but we would be remiss if we failed to assess citizens' reactions to the candidates' issue agendas. Thus, we should feel fully comfortable in querying voters about a set of issues that we as political scientists deem to be important in the campaign based on the emphasis given these issues by the candidates and the mass media. Likewise, criticisms of the use of certain measures such as the likes and dislikes of the parties and candidates on the grounds that these are partisan stimuli that are not as relevant to independents—and therefore make independents appear less competent—seem to me to ignore the very basic political fact that elections are candidate and party contests. Similarly, those who challenge the use of liberal-conservative terminology in studying levels of conceptualization and belief system constraint are ignoring the fact that such terminology is widely used by the candidates and media in discussing politics. Again, the campaign is a communication process and it is important to know whether candidates and political commentators are indeed speaking the same language as the voters.

The above argument does not deny that there are other appropriate ways of studying issue voting, belief system constraint, and the like. Certainly it is important to assess the substantive consequences of the measurement decisions we have made. And it certainly is important to know whether voters make decisions on the basis of issues idiosyncratically important to them or whether citizens employ their own unique frameworks in organizing their attitudes. However, these formulations of the questions often get so entangled in social science methodology that the political reasons for studying the topics in the first place get overlooked.

Economic Conditions and Voting

The bulk of the work on economic conditions and voting has been done in the context of congressional elections and, therefore, might have been included in the next section. I prefer to treat it under the rubric of issues, however, since the central theme of this research is how one particular cluster of issues—economic conditions—affects vote choice. In addition, much of this literature can be subsumed under the notion of retrospective voting. That is, a recurrent theme of these works is how voters' evaluations of the prior and current state of the economy shape subsequent vote decisions. This concern

with the effects of economic conditions is pursued in both aggregate and individual level analyses, the latter better capturing the core elements of a retrospective voting model.

Congressional elections, especially the midterm election, have often been viewed as a referendum on the performance of the incumbent presidential administration with the state of the economy being a major factor entering into the voter's judgment of the President. A number of aggregate analyses seem to provide solid support for the contention that congressional election outcomes are responsive to national economic conditions. Kramer (1971) examined congressional elections in presidential and midterm years and found that increases in per capita personal income helped congressional candidates of the President's party and declines in personal income hurt them; changes in the inflation rate and unemployment levels did not seem to have any independent impact. Arcelus and Meltzer (1975) disagreed with Kramer's results, arguing that "with the possible exception of inflation, aggregate economic variables affect neither the participation rate in congressional elections nor the relative strengths of the two major parties" (p. 1238). Goodman and Kramer (1975) criticize Arcelus and Meltzer on a number of grounds and produce evidence which supports Kramer's earlier contentions. Bloom and Price (1975) contribute to this debate by suggesting an asymmetry in the effects of economic conditions; economic slumps hurt the party of the President, but economic upturns do not help.[10] Tufte (1975; 1978) flatly concludes that the midterm election is a referendum on presidential performance and the administration's handling of the economy. He argues that although the President's party almost always loses votes in the off-year election, that loss will be less if the President is enjoying high popularity or if the economy is going well or both.

Two more recent analyses that attempt to specify conditions under which economic effects will occur at the aggregate level arrive at contradictory conclusions. Owens and Olson's (1980) analysis runs counter to the bulk of the previous findings. They partially disaggregate the national analysis by examining economic conditions and vote outcomes at the congressional district level. They essentially find that voting in the 1972, 1974, and 1976 congressional elections was not affected by short run economic fluctuations and conclude that congressional elections outcomes are determined by the kinds of political factors discussed later. Hibbing and Alford's (1981) contribution is to examine economic effects within subgroups of candidate-defined districts. At the aggregate level, they find that the electoral margins of incumbents are more sensitive to economic conditions than is the case for nonincumbents; moreover, the effect is stronger for high seniority, in-party incumbents which makes sense if one thinks of those incumbents as having greater responsibility for the state of the economy. Hibbing and Alford's interpretation runs counter to the general direction of the incumbency literature which argues that incumbents immunize themselves and convert elections to local rather than national affairs. Hibbing and Alford's argument that incumbent electoral performance is more sensitive to economic conditions still does not result in incumbents being defeated. Because incumbents start with greater electoral margins, they can afford a downward shift in their

electoral support and still have their vote percentage remain over the 50 percent mark.

The general thrust—with some notable exceptions—of these aggregate studies is that economic conditions—and presidential popularity—are strongly related to the overall distribution of the national House vote. However, when one moves from the aggregate to the individual level, the results are much more mixed, particularly in examining the effects of the personal as opposed to the national economic situation. Thus, Fiorina (1978) and Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) find scant effects of personal economic conditions on congressional voting—although Fiorina finds effects on presidential voting—while Weatherford (1978) and Klorman (1978) do observe such effects. Weatherford notes that working class citizens were more likely than middle class citizens to deviate from their expected vote in response to the personal economic difficulties associated with a recession. He attributes this finding to the simple notion that working class people feel the effects of recession more than middle class persons.

Hibbing and Alford (1981) and Kuklinski and West (1981) also find evidence of personal economic effects. Just as incumbency status affected the aggregate relationship uncovered by Hibbing and Alford, it also affected the individual level pattern: retrospective personal financial conditions influence vote choice, particularly for senior incumbents of the President's party. Kuklinski and West's contribution is to operationalize personal economic situations in terms of perceptions of future well being, as opposed to retrospective judgments, and to explicitly compare House and Senate voters. Overall they find a strong relationship between citizens' expected financial well being and vote choice in Senate elections but not in House elections. Kinder and Kiewiet (1979), in contrast, assert that it is only when economic variables are operationalized in terms of national economic conditions and perceptions of the parties' ability to deal with economic problems that economic variables will have an impact on the vote.

Critique and Conclusion

By now the reader should be overwhelmed by the range and disparities of the findings on economic effects. Indeed, this body of literature is a mess to disentangle for a number of reasons. First, there is often a lack of correspondence between theories, levels of analysis and data. For example, much of the literature is positing, at least implicitly, a rational economic voter, yet many of the analyses are on the aggregate rather than the individual level. Often there is a lack of clarity about whether the critical variable is objective economic condition or perceived economic condition.

Moreover, the various studies are non-comparable in a variety of ways. They often span different periods of time and examine different kinds of elections. They often focus on very different economic conditions such as inflation or unemployment or personal income. In general, model specifications differ in important ways across the various studies. Model specification is a serious problem in this body of literature since important non-economic variables are often omitted from equations which raises the possibility that the estimates of

the effects of economic conditions are seriously biased. Finally, the economic effects one is trying to isolate may be relatively small and difficult to disentangle from errors of measurement, specification and sampling.[11]

There surely remains much to be done in assessing the effects of economic conditions on voting behavior. We presently have many discrete findings at the aggregate and individual levels which do not cumulate very well. Moreover, it seems likely that some of our findings are mainly artifacts of various model and measurement decisions rather than general statements about the linkages between economics and politics. In general, we need to do a better job of relating findings about economic effects to characteristics of the political system since some of the findings have potentially important normative implications for the operation of the American political system. Although the evidence about the consequences of personal economic situation for vote choice is mixed, there is some solid evidence (Rosenstone, 1982) that personal economic adversity reduces turnout. Hence those citizens most hurt by bad economic times may have the least to say about who will govern. And given that it is the already less well off who are hurt most by bad economic times, the biases in the election system and the economic system may be substantial. In the conclusion to this essay, I will pursue the notion of how retrospective voting, based on economic or non-economic issues, underlies one conception of democratic theory in which citizen influence is limited.

CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Introduction

The study of congressional elections is a growth area in the field of voting behavior as evidenced by two recent books on the topic (Hinckley, 1981; Jacobson, 1983) and scores of journal articles dealing with such subjects as incumbency advantages, midterm elections, issue voting in congressional elections, and others. Until this recent flurry of publications, our knowledge of congressional elections was dominated by two articles (Miller & Stokes, 1963; Stokes & Miller, 1962) based upon constituency and congressional data collected in 1958. These two articles suggested that congressional elections were low information events, that citizens had little knowledge of the candidates and issues. Fewer than half the respondents could identify which party controlled the Congress and almost half of the voters in contested House elections claimed to have voted without having heard anything about either candidate. Rather than being candidate and issue contests, voting in House elections was seen as a matter of partisanship; citizens supported candidates mainly on the basis of their party affiliations. Even the changes in the outcome of House elections from the presidential to the subsequent off-year election were not viewed in issue terms; instead, Campbell (1966) proposed a surge and decline explanation of House elections that relied heavily on differential turnout and defection rates in presidential and off-year elections and on the nature of the presidential election itself.

Today the dominant portrait of congressional elections is far different. No longer is the vote decision viewed primarily as a function of partisanship;

the central explanatory variables are candidate qualities and evaluations, particularly the differential awareness and strengths of incumbents versus challengers. The effects of party identification are weaker, in part because of the growth in the number of independents and because of the lessened loyalty of partisans to their party's nominee. In particular, the research of Cover, and Mann and Wolfinger has shown that the decline in party identification's impact on congressional voting can largely be attributed to the increased tendency of voters of the challenger's party to defect from their partisanship and support the incumbent. Even issues and ideology are being cited as sources of congressional voting.

Much of the evidence for this revised portrait has come from the 1978 congressional election survey conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan. The 1978 survey included a rich battery of items assessing the extent of citizen awareness of candidate qualities, activities, and issue stance. Moreover, the design of the 1978 survey used the congressional district rather than the county or SMSA as the primary sampling unit which facilitated the study of district level phenomena. The crucial contributions of the 1978 survey are evidenced by one very simple finding, noted by numerous analysts, that awareness of candidates is much higher when a test of name recognition is used rather than a test of name recall as was used in the 1958 survey. In addition to the 1978 survey, other important sources of data became available to congressional scholars in the 1970s, especially information about congressional perquisites and their utilization and reliable data about campaign financing.

Even before the availability of these new data sources, various investigators had noted trends that seemed to belie the portrait presented in the early studies based on the 1958 data. Certainly the core observation was the increase in incumbent electoral safety and the parallel decline in marginal congressional districts (Erikson, 1971; Mayhew, 1974). Numerous explanations of this phenomena were proposed and tested. Tufte (1973) suggested that reapportionment decisions were protecting incumbents, but Ferejohn (1977) showed that incumbent safety had increased in both redistricted and non-redistricted seats. Mayhew (1974) argued that incumbency advantages resided in the ability of incumbents to promote themselves and increase awareness through skillful use of perquisites such as the frank, and that this increased awareness on the part of the voters had electoral payoffs for incumbents. Ferejohn (1977) noted that if Mayhew's explanations were correct, one should observe over time an increase in the recognition levels of incumbents and an increasing gap between the recognition of incumbents versus challengers. Ferejohn found no such pattern, thereby calling into question Mayhew's explanation. Ferejohn then proposed a variation on Mayhew's theme and presented evidence indicating that party identification had become less of a cue to congressional voters. He suggested that incumbency was replacing partisanship as a voting cue, although he had no direct evidence for the reasons for the increased reliance on incumbency. Ferejohn noted that the decline in the effect of partisanship was not only due to the changed distribution of partisanship (i.e. the growth in the proportion of independents), but also to the tendency of partisans to be less loyal to their

party's nominees.[12] This tendency was demonstrated dramatically by Cover (1977) who found that "since 1972 about half of those identifying with the challenger's party have deserted their party's congressional candidate in contested elections involving an incumbent" (p. 535). Hence for loyalists of the challenger's party, party identification or a coin flip would predict their votes equally well. Cover posits that the skillful use of congressional perquisites may be responsible for this incumbency advantage, but inspection of Gallup Poll data shows no pattern of increased incumbent recognition. Hence Cover concludes that incumbents have profited from changes in citizen behavior, but it is indeterminate as to whether incumbents played a significant part in generating these changes. Finally, Fiorina (1977a; 1977b) argued that the source of increased incumbency safety lay in the growth of the bureaucracy which can be electorally profitable for representatives as they intercede on behalf of constituents. This explanation does not require a growth in awareness of the incumbent, but only a change in the content of that awareness. If today congressmen are known more for their casework and constituency services, activities likely to be highly valued by constituents, whereas in the past congressmen were known more for policy stances which could be controversial and electorally costly, then the changed content of awareness could provide important electoral benefits to incumbents.

Most of the earlier works reviewed above pointed in some way to incumbency advantages and incumbent behavior as inducing behavioral change in voters, but little direct information was available about citizens' perceptions of the candidates. Fortunately, the 1978 CPS congressional election survey data permit one to assess in detail awareness of and information about the candidates and it is to these works that we now turn.

Incumbency Advantages and Comparative Candidate Assessments

The more recent literature on congressional elections can be organized around two general themes: the advantages of incumbency and the importance of comparative candidate evaluations. Initially it was the advantages of the incumbent that were emphasized, but as research has progressed, analyses have demonstrated that it was the comparative assessment of incumbents vis-a-vis their challengers rather than incumbency advantages alone that explained the electoral safety of incumbents. Thus, just as recent presidential vote models posit candidate evaluations as the immediate determinant of the vote, so some recent analyses of congressional voting argue for comparative candidate evaluations as the variable through which other influences operate. The relevant literature is voluminous and often repetitious and thus I will simply highlight some for the core findings.

Various works (Mann & Wolfinger, 1980; Abramowitz, 1980; Hinckley, 1980a, 1980b, 1981; Parker, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1981; Goldenberg & Traugott, 1980, 1981; Epstein & Frankovic, 1982; Ragsdale, 1981; Jacobson,

1981; Cover & Brumberg, 1982; and Fowler, 1980) provide evidence supportive of the following assertions:

1. Incumbents are much better known and more highly evaluated than challengers.
2. The advantage the incumbent enjoys in terms of awareness is partially a function of the communication resources and constituency servicing opportunities available to the incumbent. There is some evidence directly linking perquisite utilization to increased saliency and more positive evaluations of incumbents. Overall, there is much more contact of various kinds between the incumbent and the voter than between the challenger and the voter.
3. The seriousness of the challenger in terms of political skills and experience, fund raising abilities, and awareness is a crucial determinant of the election outcome. Weak challengers are one type of incumbency advantage.
4. The disparity in recognition and resources between incumbents and challengers is much greater for the House than for the Senate. Senate challengers are much better able to attract resources, become known, and run credible campaigns, and hence Senate challengers enjoy a higher election success rate than House challengers. Moreover, Senate elections are more likely to entail explicit comparative assessment of the candidates by the voters, while House elections will have more incumbent-only based decision making.[13]
5. Ideology and partisanship seem to have a greater effect on assessments of Senate candidates than House candidates. In particular, House incumbents seem to be evaluated on the basis of personal qualities, voter contact activities, district servicing and the like and less on grounds of policy, ideology and the like (although see discussion below).
6. National forces such as presidential popularity and economic conditions play a relatively small part in House election outcomes (although see discussion below and the section on economic conditions and voting). House elections are primarily local events.
7. The effects of party identification on congressional, especially House, vote choice is more indirect than direct, often operating through candidate evaluation that itself is a function of personal and media contact with the candidate and recognition of the candidate. In general, candidate recognition is a function of the availability of information about the candidates; such information is more easily obtained for incumbents than for challengers, especially in the House.

Obviously not all the authors cited above would agree with all of these conclusions, but they seem to be a reasonable distillation of the current research. The above list ignores a number of other mechanisms affecting incumbent electoral performance that might be categorized as part of the strategic environment. Jacobson and Kernell (1981, 1982) argue that would-be candidates for Congress make their decisions about whether to run on the basis of the likely conditions that will exist at election time. In particular, if national economic conditions and presidential popularity are seen to favor

the President's party nine months to a year before the election, then his party will attract highly qualified challengers. Likewise, if things seem bleak for the President's party, then the opposition is likely to attract strong challengers. Hence given what was said earlier about the electoral importance of the quality of the challenger, the Jacobson and Kernell thesis has much to say about the outcome of the November election.[14] Note that their argument views the impact of national economic conditions and presidential popularity on vote to be an indirect one mediated by the quality of the challenger emerging under differing economic conditions.

Payne (1980; 1982) also suggests a strategic component to congressional election outcomes. He argues that House members with aspirations to higher elective office work harder to increase their House electoral margins which may serve as a boost to their prospects for electoral advancement. Payne argues more generally that the personal election advantage of House incumbents has increased, particularly for the ambitious, upwardly mobile, publicity seeking representative who is successful in building a personal following. Payne suggests that one reason for the increase in incumbent's success may be a compositional change in House membership, that today a higher proportion of representatives are ambitious publicity seekers who act to enhance their electoral fortunes.

Issue and Ideology in Congressional Elections

Because they are scarce information, candidate-centered contests, the amount of issue voting in congressional elections is low. Mann and Wolfinger (1980) report on the basis of the 1978 CPS survey that "only 15% of all voters remembered how their representative voted on any bill in the past couple of years. Fewer than half could say whether they generally agreed or disagreed with the way that representative voted in Washington" (p. 629). In general, only a very small proportion of the open-ended comments about incumbents concerned their voting record and these were largely favorable. Hill and Hurley (1980) reach similar conclusions about the low level of issue awareness of the electorate, although they attribute part of the blame for this situation to the lack of clarity and distinctiveness of the representative's issue positions. Uslaner (1980) tried to assess what the maximum impact of issues might be under conditions most favorable to issue voting and generally concluded that House members had little to fear on issues, although there was some chance that issues could defeat an incumbent when confronted by a well financed challenger. For the Senate, however, Uslaner claimed that issues had greater electoral consequences for incumbents. An analysis of the 1974 congressional elections (Conway & Wyckoff, 1980) found that candidate variables and party identification were much more important influences on vote choice than were Watergate and economic attitudes. Hence, it seems that issues will normally play a very limited direct role in vote choice in congressional elections, especially for the House. Of course, salient issues can arise and be exploited effectively, particularly by well funded candidates, so that the potential for major issue effects remains.[15]

With respect to ideology, the available evidence suggests effects somewhat stronger than those for issues. Abramowitz (1980; 1981) found that in Senate races in 1978 in which ideological clarity between the candidates was high, ideology had a substantial impact on vote decision; ideology played a small role in House elections. In particular, ideological proximity affected the Senate vote choice among independents and supporters of the challenger's party; if the incumbent Senator was ideologically distant from these groups, he lost votes. Using a measure of the discrepancy between the representative's and the district's ideology, Johannes and McAdams (1981) found that such a factor had significant effects on the member's re-election prospects. Finally, Jacobson (1981), using a different measure of ideological proximity in a differently specified equation, found the effects of ideological proximity lagged far behind those of candidate and party variables.

A reasonable summary conclusion is that congressional elections are candidate and party affairs and that issue and ideological effects are generally weaker, operating at the margins and indirectly. Conditions may arise in which specific issues may become very important, but this is the exception rather than the rule. Of course, one need not have all citizens voting on the basis of issues in order to have dramatic election effects; a little issue voting could go a long way in determining partisan control of a congressional seat.

Critique and Conclusion

The research reviewed above has told us much about the factors influencing vote choice in congressional elections. However, there are a number of trends in the literature that are worrisome. Foremost among these is an excessive concern with statistically estimating the relative effects of numerous independent variables on such dependent variables as vote choice, candidate recognition, candidate evaluations, and others. Although ultimately we should be testing and estimating complex multivariate models, it seems that some of the current efforts are premature on a number of grounds. For example, the justification for the specification of any particular model is often weak; different structures could be posited and different results would then be obtained. Hence, the obtained estimates are very much a function of a model that itself may be questionable, which suggests that we should not place too much weight on any particular estimated coefficient.

A closely related point is that some of the literature is insensitive to the consequences of entering different numbers of different classes of predictors into an equation. For example, if one estimates an equation for vote choice that has as independent variables one measure of partisanship, one measure of issue proximity, and four measures of candidate qualities, then under *ceteris paribus* conditions it is likely that any single candidate attribute will prove to be less important than partisanship or issue proximity, mainly because its contribution is being shared with the other measures of candidate qualities. This would not be a problem if the structural model being tested were the correctly specified one, but in most instances it is not; often the models tested are very much a function of the availability of measures. This is becoming more of a problem as more information about congressional

utilization of perquisites becomes available; it is very tempting to plug a new indicator into a regression equation to assess its effect. Also contributing to the prematurity of some of our model estimation is the fact that many of our indicators are only crude surrogates for the true underlying causal variable; had we been able to collect better measures, our results might have been different. Certainly much of the debate between Johannes and McAdams (1981), Fiorina (1981) and McAdams and Johannes (1981) arises from placing too much reliance on an equation whose specification and measures can be questioned.

The above argument should not be read as a blanket condemnation of equation estimation. If the aim of such research is simply to suggest possible influences and provide admittedly crude estimates of their effects, then there is no serious problem. But too often the obtained estimates are treated as demonstrating generalizable and precise relationships when in fact the results are very much a function of the model construction and measurement decisions discussed above. It seems to me that the appropriate posture is demonstrated by Jacobson (1981) who after regressing vote on numerous independent variables and finding that party identification and likes and dislikes of the candidate have the greatest explanatory power concludes ". . . the most important message of this equation is that so many different factors contribute independently to the voting decision" (p. 197).

Currently there are many efforts being made to construct and test complex models of congressional vote choice analogous to the presidential vote models discussed earlier in this paper. A common characteristic of a number of these models is positing evaluations of the candidates as the most immediate determinant of vote choice. For example, Hinckley's (1980) schematic of congressional voting has evaluation of the candidates as the sole variable impinging on the vote, while the model of Goldenberg and Traugott (1980) has relative candidate recognition, relative candidate evaluation and party identification as the three direct determinants of the vote with party identification having an indirect effect through its impact on relative candidate evaluations. The Ragsdale (1981) model posits incumbent evaluations and challenger evaluations as the direct determinants of vote and allows for a reciprocal linkage between these evaluations. In turn, each candidate's evaluations are shaped by contact, media and recognition. Although these models differ in their various antecedents, at heart they are all candidate-centered models of congressional voting. Undoubtedly, the next phase of congressional voting research will be an elaboration and further testing of such decision-making models.

CONCLUSION

Some Methodological Considerations

We are witnessing in voting behavior research the ever increasing use of complex statistical procedures. More specifically, the field of electoral behavior has moved sharply in the direction of constructing and estimating explicit causal models of vote choice. This development means that future in-

vestigators will need a firm foundation in econometric estimation techniques in order to keep on top of the literature. Yet we should remain sensitive to the limitations of our statistical techniques and to those factors that can generate misleading results. Of particular importance is model specification; we must recognize that the estimation of poorly specified models may yield nonsense results, no matter how powerful the estimation procedure is. Since specification is a theoretical and substantive matter, it behooves us to devote more thought and care to model construction and not to jump too quickly to data analysis.

In a related vein, we should be careful not to frame our research questions in terms of false choices, e.g., is it incumbency or is it party identification? We need to employ analysis procedures such as nonrecursive path analysis that do not by assumption rule out plausible alternatives. And we should remind ourselves that many of the effects of interest to us may be small in magnitude but still of great substantive importance. Since many elections are decided in the 60%-40% range, small effects can dramatically alter election outcomes.

Finally, we must be careful that progress in a field not be overly data-driven and that we not allow ourselves to become trapped by specific measurement strategies. It is clear that the issue voting debate and congressional elections research have profited tremendously by the availability of carefully thought out new measures. However, we must continually ask ourselves whether current measurement strategies are hindering or helping us in addressing questions on our research agenda. And we must recognize that for certain questions such as the effects of economic conditions and the referendum interpretation of midterm elections, our models and data are inadequate in many respects and that research projects explicitly designed to study these topics are required.

Some Substantive Considerations

It seems clear that presidential and congressional elections have increasingly come to be viewed as candidate dominated choices with the effects of other variables such as party identification and issue attitudes increasingly viewed as being channeled through candidate evaluations. In particular, it appears that voters' perceptions of the performance of the presidential incumbent, and their relative awareness of the incumbent versus the challenger in congressional races, are major factors shaping election outcomes. Thus many observers argue that the Ford and Carter defeats in 1976 and 1980 resulted from negative evaluations of how these two incumbents had handled or mishandled the nation's economy.

This emphasis on candidate centered voting can be subsumed under the retrospective voting model, the core element of which is that voters evaluate the performance of the incumbent administration and, if dissatisfied with that performance, remove the incumbents from office. The notion of retrospective voting has a number of features that make it appealing to scholars of elections. First, it casts the vote decision in a rational, performance-based light and hence continues the effort begun by Key to redeem the competence

of the American voter. At the same time, the demands placed on the individual voter by the retrospective model are not great. All the voter need be able to do is to place the blame for bad times on the incumbent administration; there is no requirement for full and complete information nor for a Downsian calculation of the relative payoffs to be obtained from various election outcomes. Furthermore, many different factors can be analyzed under the retrospective model. Economic conditions may most often serve as the basis for retrospective voting, but other issues could certainly result in performance-based voting. In addition, the retrospective model is appealing because it forces one to think in terms of an election period longer than the post-Labor Day campaign. Indeed, under the retrospective model, the entire administration of the incumbent may be evaluated, thereby injecting into the campaign questions of governance and performance. Finally, the retrospective model forces one to conceptualize candidate evaluations as central to the vote decision rather than to view candidate attitudes as a residual category to be considered after the effects of partisanship and issues are removed.

These latter three reasons are to me the payoff in utilizing the retrospective voting model. However, I think the first reason is potentially too beguiling to political analysts trying to salvage the voter's reputation and competence in democratic theory. One needs to be careful not to make too great claims for a democratic political system, even when it does satisfy the requirements of retrospective voting. Years ago, Joseph Schumpeter (1950) formulated a procedural conceptualization of democracy that fits the retrospective model well. Schumpeter wrote "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (p. 26). For Schumpeter, the key requirement of a democratic system was that there be free and open competition among competing sets of elites. If this condition was met, then voters dissatisfied with the performance of the incumbents could oust them at the next election. For Schumpeter, the primary function of the citizen's vote was to produce a government that in turn would have substantial discretion in formulating and instituting policies subject to the electorate's retrospective judgment at the next election. Hence, under Schumpeter's view, elections are not prospective affairs in which voters give policy mandates to guide the victorious party. Instead, the policy consequences of an election are quite minimal and the role of the voter very limited. Thus, the retrospective voting model, which clearly fits under the Schumpeter perspective, should not be viewed too optimistically as the salvation of the individual citizen. The retrospective model and Schumpeter's procedural view of democracy do not require much competence on the part of the voters.

In contrast to the retrospective model is a prospective model in which citizens are required to evaluate the various payoffs from the election of one party versus another and to choose appropriately among these choices. If such a model indeed operated in the real world, then the rational independent citizen of classical democratic theory would truly have been resuscitated. Moreover, with prospective voting, the possibility of electoral mandates and citizen influence is obviously enhanced, a sharp contrast to the retrospective

model in which the victorious candidate and party have a nearly free rein in how they will address the problems that proved the undoing of the previous incumbent administration. Hence, the retrospective model does not necessarily elevate the citizen to a position of great influence and competence as its proponents might suggest. Citizens may select the government, but the policy implications of their vote beyond a rejection of the incumbents are difficult to ascertain.

There is an additional concern with performance-based explanations of voting and that is the potentiality for circularity. Although none of the authors discussed in this essay have fallen into the trap, it becomes a temptation to move from the election outcome back to an explanation of that outcome. That is, if the incumbent wins, the electorate must have been satisfied with the performance of the ins. One needs to be careful to keep the independent and dependent phenomena separate. In studying retrospective voting, the analyst will need to be careful to present evidence that demonstrates that evaluations of the incumbent had a causal impact on the election outcome.

In conclusion, the ferment that currently exists in the study of voting behavior is an indication that this is a subfield in which important work remains to be done. The prominence of new conceptualizations and models, the utilization of sophisticated analysis procedures, the employment of complex research designs, and the expansion of data sources all bode well for driving the field to a fuller understanding of the reasons for individual vote decisions and of the collective consequences of these individual choices.

FOOTNOTES

1. In his commentary on this paper, Warren Miller (1982) argues that in many respects the field of voting behavior does not merit the label of science. He attributes this to the fact that scholars in the field often treat questions of measurement, design, methodology, and substantive theory in a disjointed and discrete fashion. Such practices yield a portrait of confusion and the apparent noncumulativity of research findings in the field even when results may actually be complementary.
2. The decision to emphasize the social psychological tradition, of course, results in the neglect of other important current strands of electoral behavior research. One notable omission is the rational choice perspective in which the voter is viewed as a rational actor choosing among party and candidate alternatives on the basis of the likely policy payoffs to be received by the election of one party vs. another. This approach portrays the voting act as more purposive, policy-oriented and rational than does the social psychological tradition.
3. Another criterion which delimits this paper is my decision to focus primarily on published literature since these works have in most cases undergone a peer review process which means that to some degree they represent a collective judgment about the state of the field. But, one cautionary note is in order. Having recently completed a three-year stint as co-editor of *American Journal of Political Science,* it seems to me that there is in the review and editorial process a bias that results in the published literature presenting a portrait of greater ferment and controversy in the field than does the unpublished literature. This occurs simply because the substantive results of many meritorious papers confirm the prevailing wisdom and

hence receive editorial decisions that their findings are not of sufficient importance to justify the allocation of always scarce journal space.

One could construct an argument that papers challenging the conventional wisdom would have greater difficulty in surviving the review and editorial process, particularly if such papers were disproportionately reviewed by scholars representing the prevailing wisdom. However, my distinct impression is that this is not the case, although perhaps had the challenge to the prevailing wisdom been more fundamental and threatening, reviewers would have been more likely to defend that status quo. Nevertheless, I am concerned that the one paper challenging the current wisdom is more likely to receive a wider audience through publication than the two or three or whatever number of papers which confirm the current wisdom.

4. Models generally contain two classes of variables—exogenous and endogenous. Exogenous variables are those that do not depend on any other *measured* variables in the model; endogenous variables are those that are influenced by other measured variables. Any model can be represented by a set of structural equations where there is one equation for each endogenous variable in the model. Each equation simply states which variables directly affect the endogenous variable in question. It is the coefficients of each equation that are to be estimated and the determination of whether a model is identified is made on an equation by equation basis. That is, it is possible that certain equations will be identified and hence be estimable, while other equations will be unidentified and not subject to estimation. See Asher (1983) for a fuller discussion of these points.
5. Proximity measures have been used widely in the past decade to study the impact of issues on vote choice. In essence, a proximity measure captures not only where the voter stands on an issue, but also where the voter perceives the candidate to stand on that issue. Thus, one can calculate a distance between the voter's and the candidate's stances; presumably the closer the voter is to the candidate, the greater the likelihood of voting for that candidate.
6. The fact that some party shifts are observed calls into question assertions about the early learning of partisanship and its subsequent intensification over the life cycle. The question of whether party identification intensifies over the life cycle or whether the observed age cohort differences in partisan intensities is a function of differential generational experiences has sparked a major controversy in recent years. It will not, however, be dealt with in this paper. See the work of Abramson (1976; 1979) and Converse (1976; 1979) for the definitive statement of the contending positions about this controversy.
7. Shively (1977) argues that independent leaners should be classified as independents despite the fact that they exhibit high loyalty to their party's nominees. He suggests the leaners are true independents who in response to the second part of the traditional party identification question are simply reporting their intended November vote. Hence, leaners under this notion would, of course, exhibit strong loyalty to a party. Shively (1980, pp. 234-235) presents additional evidence on behalf of treating leaners as independents; over time the "partisanship" of leaners seems to change in response to a change in vote intention whereas for genuine partisans, the rate at which their partisanship changed in the presence of changes in vote preference was much lower. Thus Shively argues that leaners do not behave very much like partisans and therefore should be treated as independents, although he readily admits that the evidence is not overwhelming.

   There is additional evidence supporting the notion that leaners be treated as independents rather than as partisans. For example, Abramson *et al.* (1982, p. 17) show that in voting for Congress, independent leaners are less likely than weak partisans to support candidates of the party to which they lean. Moreover, a

number of studies including Weisberg (1980) indicate that independent leaners are more likely to view themselves as Independents rather than as partisans. Finally, a number of socialization studies including Abramson (1983, p. 100) have shown that the transmission of partisanship from parents to children is more successful for weak partisans than for independent leaners.

Other analysts (Miller & Miller, 1977) view leaners more as covert partisans rather than true independents. With respect to evaluations of political stimuli and measures of partisan behavior, leaners often resemble weak and even strong partisans more than they resemble pure independents. For example, Wolfinger *et al.* (1976, p. 151) and Keith et al. (1977) show that in voting for President, independent leaners are more similar to strong partisans than they are to weak identifiers. Moreover, Asher (1980) and Keith *et al.* have challenged Shively's notions that leaning is simply an expression of vote intention. Keith *et al.* note that the number of cases on which Shively's conclusions rest is very small and that one reason for this is that most leaners were very stable in their vote intentions over two year periods. Asher (1980, p. 61) found that leaners were very stable in the direction of their leaning over a four year period; in some cases, vote intention changed over time but the direction of leaning did not. More importantly, Asher argued that if leaning is simply a matter of vote intention, then the frequency of independent leaners should increase as Election Day draws near and more independents have made their vote decision. However, an analysis of the distribution of partisanship in 1976 by time of interview showed no increase in the proportion of independent leaners among those respondents interviewed closer to Election Day. Hence, Asher argues that for purposes of understanding voting behavior, leaners should be treated as partisans.

Undoubtedly, the leaning category is actually a mix of partisans and independents and the problem is to sort out the relative size of the two groups. Clearly the traditional party identification measure encounters its greatest difficulty in the leaning category, a point emphasized further in the text.

8. Miller (1982) criticizes some of the recent literature on party identification on the grounds that it is not true to the conceptual meaning of the original measure. He asserts that one can always improve explained variance, but that this is not the overriding criterion in choosing one measure over another. Miller argues that many of the proposed revisions in the measurement of partisanship do not improve on the original measure's ability to capture the enduring long term component of party identification. Instead, according to Miller, the new measures do well in accounting for variance because they incorporate short term factors which were not part of the original conceptualization of party identification. Miller's argument parallels Fiorina's (1981) discussion in the text.
9. There are many additional points that can be made about the strengths and weaknesses of different data sources. The NES/CPS surveys are useful for tracing candidate awareness at the national level. But since the growth in candidate awareness is probably tied to the reporting of specific primary election outcomes, the timing of the NES/CPS surveys is not very suitable for picking up specific election effects. Any effort to use the NES/CPS surveys to study the reasons for vote choice in a particular primary or cluster of primaries would run into small N problems once respondents living in non-primary states and nonvoting respondents in primary states are removed from the analysis. In addition, given that the NES/CPS surveys were conducted in February, April and June, many citizens who did vote in particular primaries may have been interviewed weeks after their primary participation. Hence, their interview responses may have been shaped more by media reports of subsequent primaries and campaign events than by factors that affected their primary vote at the time it was cast.

The exit polls done by CBS/*New York Times* are tied to specific primaries and are useful for assessing the determinants of vote choice including the effects of specific campaign appeals made by the candidates. By definition, these polls cannot be used to study the determinants of turnout since only voters are interviewed. The exit polls include a very small set of measures and some of these are not repeated in surveys throughout the primary season; this limits the over time comparisons that can be made. Obviously, the various exit polls done in each state cannot be panels; the national surveys done by CBS/*New York Times* are also not panels. Without panel data, all one can do is assess the net amount of attitude change that has occurred and not the gross amount.

Repeated within-state surveys are useful for they enable one to trace the growth of candidate awareness and to assess the effects of media reporting of that state's primary. Although one must obviously be wary of generalizing from any single state, repeated measures within the same state might be a nice compromise between the NES/CPS and CBS/*New York Times* designs discussed above. It certainly would limit costs and would enable one to map the development of candidate awareness resulting from media reporting of other states' primaries and from the actual primary campaign effort made in that particular state. For a detailed discussion of the advantages and limitations of various data sources and for an excellent example of the creative use of multiple data sources to address the variety of substantive questions mentioned in the text, see Zukin and Keeter (1983).

10. This asymmetry notion has its analog in studies of the effects of presidential popularity on midterm voting. Kernell (1977) proposed a negative voting model such that a decline in presidential popularity hurts his party more than an improvement helps. Other studies on the effects of presidential popularity yield mixed results. Piereson (1975) found that evaluations of the President affected the vote of independents, not only for congressional offices, but also for state and local contests. Ragsdale (1980) however finds that presidential popularity has only weak effects on midterm elections when compared to other influences such as party identification and perceptions of the candidates. She argues that her analysis is preferable to others since her model is better specified than others due to its inclusion of other relevant variables.
11. Sigelman and Tsai (1981) present more specific criticisms of the research on the effects of personal financial status. They argue that too many studies search only for symmetric effects when the influence of economic variables could be asymmetric, depending upon whether the economy is improving or declining. They also argue that the typical question tapping personal financial situation—some perception of one's changing financial status—is not highly correlated with one's level of financial satisfaction. They try to remedy some of these deficiencies in their own study, but still find few effects of personal financial situation.
12. A similar argument has been made by Nelson (1978).
13. In a personal communication, Raymond Wolfinger emphasizes that caution should be exercised in making comparisons between the House and the Senate, mainly because a variety of problems exist with the Senate election data in the 1978 NES/CPS survey. Wolfinger points out that the sample entirely excluded a number of states with Senate elections and in some other states with Senate elections had a very small number of respondents. Moreover, most of the sample that voted in a Senate election in which an incumbent was running came from three states where GOP incumbents were challenged by strong Democratic opponents. Hence, the findings based on the Senate data may be misleading, particularly since a number of lop-sided contests in which the challenger fared poorly were not included in the sample.

14. Jacobson and Kernell (1982) add an intriguing party differential to their thesis. Since the Republican Party has been highly successful in fund raising and in providing support for its challengers, the willingness of Republican challengers to seek office should be less dependent on national conditions. Hence their argument would predict low net losses for the GOP in 1982, despite the poor state of the economy, in part because of the high quality of the Republican candidates. Moreover, the earlier work of Jacobson (1978, 1980) indicates that sufficient expenditures can purchase for the challenger a level of name recognition comparable to that for the incumbent. In general, the gains from campaign spending are greater for challengers than for incumbents. Hence, the prosperity of the GOP seemed to bode well for its challengers in 1982. In fact, Republican challengers did not fare well in 1982; only one challenger was successful in knocking off a Democratic incumbent. Nevertheless, the Jacobson and Kernell thesis is intriguing, although it may become less relevant should the national Democratic Party be successful in improving its fund raising and candidate support activities.
15. Songer (1981) presents evidence showing high awareness of the voting stands of congressmen in two Oklahoma districts. However, this evidence is not clearly linked to voting and hence says little directly about issue voting.

REFERENCES

Abramowitz, Alan I. A comparison of voting for U.S. Senator and Representative in 1978. *American Political Science Review,* 1980, *74,* 633-640.

Abramowitz, Alan I. Choices and echoes in the 1978 U.S. Senate elections: A research note. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 112-118.

Abramson, Paul R. Generational change and the decline of party identification in America: 1952-1974. *American Political Science Review,* 1976, *70,* 469-478.

Abramson, Paul R. Developing party identification: A further examination of life-cycle, generational, and period effects. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *23,* 78-96.

Abramson, Paul R. *Political attitudes in America.* San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1983.

Abramson, Paul R., Aldrich, John H. & Rohde, David W. *Change and continuity in the 1980 elections.* Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982.

Aldrich, John H., Niemi, Richard G., Rabinowitz, George, & Rohde, David W. The measurement of public opinion about public policy: A report on some new issue question formats. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1982, *26,* 391-414.

Alford, John R. & Hibbing, John R. Increased incumbency advantage in the House. *Journal of Politics,* 1981, *43,* 1042-1061.

Arcelus, Francisco & Meltzer, Allan H. The effect of aggregate economic variables on Congressional elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1975, *69,* 1232-1239.

Asher, Herbert B. *Presidential elections and American politics* (rev. ed.). Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1980.

Asher, Herbert B. *Causal modeling* (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, Inc., 1983.

Berelson, Bernard R., Lazarsfeld, Paul F., & McPhee, William N. *Voting.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

Bishop, George F., Oldendick, Robert W. & Tuchfarber, Alfred J. Experiments in filtering political opinions. *Political Behavior,* 1980, *2,* 339-369.

Bishop, George F., Oldendick, Robert W., Tuchfarber, Alfred J. & Bennett, Stephen E. Effects of opinion filtering and opinion floating: Evidence from a secondary analysis. *Political Methodology,* 1979, *6,* 293-309.

Bishop, George F., Tuchfarber, Alfred J., & Oldendick, Robert W. Change in the structure of American political attitudes: The nagging question of question wording. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *22,* 250-269.

Bishop, George F., Oldendick, Robert W. & Tuchfarber, Alfred J. Effects of question wording and format on political attitude consistency. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1978, *42,* 81-92.

Bloom, Howard S. & Price, H. Douglas. Voter response to short-run economic conditions: The asymmetric effect of prosperity and recession. *American Political Science Review,* 1975, *69,* 1240-1254.

Born, Richard. Perquisite employment in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1960-1976: The influence of generational change. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1982, *10,* 347-362.

Brody, Richard A. Stability and change in party identification: Presidential to off-years. Paper delivered at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association; Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 1977.

Brody, Richard A. & Page, Benjamin I. Comment: The assessment of policy voting. *American Political Science Review,* 1972, *66,* 450-458.

Campbell, Angus. Surge and decline: A study of electoral change. In Angus Campbell *et al. Elections and the political order.* New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966.

Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E. Miller, Warren E. & Stokes, Donald E. *The American voter.* New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960.

Campbell, Angus, Gurin, Gerald, & Miller, Warren E. *The voter decides.* Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1954.

Carmines, Edward G. & Stimson, James A. The two faces of issue voting. *American Political Science Review,* 1980, *74,* 78-91.

Claggett, William. Partisan acquisition versus partisan intensity: Life-cycle, generation, and period effects, 1952-1976. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 193-214.

Collie, Melissa P. Incumbency, electoral safety and turnover in the House of Representatives, 1952-1976. *American Political Science Review,* 1981, *75,* 119-131.

Converse, Philip E. Public opinion and voting behavior. In Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby (Eds.). *NonGovernmental politics, handbook of political science* (Volume 4). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975.

Converse, Philip E. *The dynamics of party support: Cohort-analyzing party identification.* Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, Inc., 1976.

Converse, Philip E. Rejoinder to Abramson. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *23,* 97-100.

Converse, Philip E. & Markus, Gregory B. Plus ca change. . .: The new CPS election study panel. *American Political Science Review,* 1979, *73,* 32-49.

Conway, M. Margaret. Political participation in midterm congressional elections: Attitudinal and social characteristics during the 1970's. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1981, *9,* 221-244.

Conway, M. Margaret & Wyckoff, Mikel L. Voter choice in the 1974 congressional elections. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1980, *8,* 3-13.

Cover, Albert D. One good term deserves another: The advantage of incumbency in congressional elections. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1977, *21,* 523-541.

Cover, Albert D. & Brumberg, Bruce S. Baby books and ballots: The impact of congressional mail on constituent opinion. *American Political Science Review,* 1982, *76,* 347-359.

Cover, Albert D. & Mayhew, David R. Congressional dynamics and the decline of competitive congressional elections. In Larry Dodd & Bruce Oppenheimer (Eds.). *Congress reconsidered* (sec. ed.). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1981.

Dennis, Jack. On being an independent partisan supporter. Paper presented at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Cincinnati, April, 1981. (a)

Dennis, Jack. Some properties of measures of partisanship. Paper presented at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September, 1981. (b)

Dennis, Jack. New measures of partisanship in models of voting. Paper presented at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Milwaukee, April, 1982.

Dreyer, Edward C. Change in stability and party identification. *Journal of Politics,* 1973, *35,* 712-722.

Edwards, George C., III. The impact of presidential coattails on outcomes of congressional elections. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1979, *7,* 94-108.

Epstein, Laurily K. & Frankovic, Kathleen A. Casework and electoral margins: Insurance is prudent. *Polity,* 1982, *14,* 691-700.

Erikson, Robert S. The advantage of incumbency in congressional elections. *Polity,* 1971, *3,* 395-405.

Erikson, Robert S. Is there such a thing as a safe seat? *Polity,* 1976, *9,* 623-632.

Ferejohn, John A. On the decline of competition in congressional elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1977, *71,* 166-176.

Fiorina, Morris P. Partisan loyalty and the six component model. *Political Methodology,* 1976, *3,* 7-18.

Fiorina, Morris P. The case of the vanishing marginals: The bureaucracy did it. *American Political Science Review,* 1977, *71,* 177-181. (a)

Fiorina, Morris P. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington establishment.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. (b)

Fiorina, Morris P. An outline for a model of party choice. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1977, *21,* 601-625. (c)

Fiorina, Morris P. Economic retrospective voting in American national elections: A micro-analysis. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *22,* 426-443.

Fiorina, Morris P. *Retrospective voting in American national elections.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981. (a)

Fiorina, Morris P. Some problems in studying the effects of resource allocation in congressional elections. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 543-567. (b)

Fisher, Franklin M. The choice of instrumental variables in the estimation of economy-wide econometric models. In H. M. Blalock, Jr. (Ed.). *Causal models in the social sciences.* Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.

Fowler, Linda L. Candidate perceptions of electoral coalitions. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1980, *8,* 483-494.

Goldberg, Arthur S. Discerning a causal pattern among data on voting behavior. *American Political Science Review,* 1966, *60,* 913-922.

Goldenberg, Edie N. & Traugott, Michael W. Congressional campaign effects on candidate recognition and evaluation. *Political Behavior,* 1980, *2,* 61-90.

Goldenberg, Edie N. & Traugott, Michael W. Normal vote analysis of U.S. congressional elections. *Legislative Studies Quarterly,* 1981, *6,* 247-258.

Goodman, Saul & Kramer, Gerald H. Comment on Arcelus and Meltzer. *American Political Science Review,* 1975, *69,* 1255-1265.

Hartwig, Frederick, Jenkins, William R. & Temchin, Earl M. Variability in electoral behavior: The 1960, 1968, and 1976 elections. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1980, *24,* 553-558.

Hibbing, John R. & Alford, John R. The electoral impact of economic conditions: Who is held responsible? *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 423-439.

Hinckley, Barbara. Issues, information costs, and congressional elections. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1976, *4,* 131-152.

Hinckley, Barbara. The American voter in congressional elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1980, *74,* 641-650. (a)

Hinckley, Barbara. House reelections and Senate defeats: The role of the challenger. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1980, *10,* 441-460. (b)

Hinckley, Barbara. *Congressional elections.* Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981.

Hinckley, Barbara, Hofstetter, C. Richard & Kessel, John H. Information and the vote: A comparative election study. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1974, *2,* 131-153.

Howell, Susan E. The behavioral component of changing partisanship. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1980, *8,* 279-302.

Howell, Susan E. Short term forces and changing partisanship. *Political Behavior,* 1981, *3,* 163-180.

Hurley, Patricia A. & Hill, Kim Quaile. The prospects for issue-voting in contemporary congressional elections: An assessment of citizen awareness and representation. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1980, *8,* 425-448.

Jackson, John E. Issues, party choices, and presidential votes. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1975, *19,* 161-185.

Jacobson, Gary C. The effects of campaign spending in congressional elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1978, *72,* 469-491.

Jacobson, Gary C. *Money in congressional elections.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.

Jacobson, Gary C. Incumbents' advantages in the 1978 congressional elections. *Legislative Studies Quarterly,* 1981, *6,* 183-200.

Jacobson, Gary C. *The politics of congressional elections.* Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1983.

Jacobson, Gary C. & Kernell, Samuel. *Strategy and choice in congressional elections.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981.

Jacobson, Gary C. & Kernell, Samuel. Strategy and choice in the 1982 congressional elections. *PS,* 1982, *15,* 423-430.

Jennings, M. Kent & Niemi, Richard G. The persistence of political orientations: An over-time analysis of two generations. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *8,* 333-363.

Jensen, Richard. American election analysis: A case history of methodological diffusion. In Seymour Martin Lipset (Ed.). *Politics and the social sciences.* New York 1969.

Johannes, John R., & McAdams, John C. The congressional incumbency effect: Is it casework, policy compatibility, or something else? An examination of the 1978 election. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 512-542.

Jöreskog, Karl G. A general method for analysis of covariance structures. *Biometrika,* 1970, *57,* 239-251.

Jöreskog, Karl G. A general method for estimating a linear structural equation system. In Arthur S. Goldberg & Otis Dudley Duncan (Eds.). *Structural equation models in the social sciences.* New York: Seminar Press, 1973.

Jöreskog, Karl G. & Sörbom, Dag. *LISREL IV—A general computer program for estimation of a linear structural system by maximum likelihood methods.* Chicago: National Education Resources, 1978.

Keeter, Scott & Zukin, Cliff. New images and old horses: The origin and development of citizens' image of presidential candidates. In Doris A. Graber (Ed.). *The President and the public.* Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982.

Keith, Bruce E., Magleby, David B., Nelson, Candice J., Orr, Elizabeth, Westlye, Mark, & Wolfinger, Raymond E. The myth of the independent voter. Paper pre-

sented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 1977.

Kelley, Stanley, Jr. & Mirer, Thad W. The simple act of voting. *American Political Science Review,* 1974, *68,* 572-591.

Kenski, Henry C. The impact of unemployment on congressional elections, 1958-1974: A cross-sectional analysis. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1979, *7,* 147-154.

Kernell, Samuel. Presidential popularity and negative voting: An alternative explanation of the midterm congressional decline of the President's party. *American Political Science Review,* 1977, *71,* 44-66.

Kessel, John H. Comment: The issues in issue voting. *American Political Science Review,* 1972, *66,* 459-465.

Kessel, John H. *Presidential campaign politics: Coalition strategies and citizen response.* Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1980.

Key, V. O., Jr. *The responsible electorate.* Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick. Policy-oriented voting in response to economic issues. *American Political Science Review,* 1981, *75,* 448-459.

Kinder, Donald R. & Abelson, Robert P. Appraising presidential candidates: Personality and affect in the 1980 campaign. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 3-6, 1981.

Kinder, Donald R. & Kiewiet, D. Roderick. Economic discontent and political behavior: The role of personal grievances and collective economic judgments in congressional voting. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *23,* 495-527.

Kinder, Donald R. & Sears, David O. Political behavior. In E. Aronson & G. Lindsey (Eds.). *The handbook of social psychology* (3rd ed.). Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1982.

Kirkpatrick, Samuel A., Lyons, William & Fitzgerald, Michael. Candidates, parties, and issues in the American electorate. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1975, *3,* 247-284.

Klorman, Ricardo. Trend in personal finances and the vote. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1978, *33,* 31-48.

Kramer, Gerald H. Short-term fluctuations in U.S. voting behavior, 1896-1964. *American Political Science Review,* 1971, *65,* 131-143.

Krehbiel, Keith & Wright, John R. The incumbency effect in congressional elections: A test of two explanations. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1983 forthcoming.

Kritzer, Herbert M. Problems in the use of two stage least squares: Standardization of coefficients and multicollinearity. *Political Methodology,* 1976, *3,* 71-93.

Kuklinski, James H. & West, Darrell M. Economic expectations and voting behavior in United States House and Senate elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1981, *75,* 436-447.

Maggiotto, Michael A. & Piereson, James E. Partisan identification and electoral choice: The hostility hypothesis. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1977, *21,* 745-767.

Maisel, L. Sandy. Congressional elections in 1978: The road to nomination, the road to election. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1981, *9,* 23-47.

Mann, Thomas E. & Wolfinger, Raymond E. Candidates and parties in congressional elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1980, *74,* 617-632.

Markus, Gregory B. & Converse, Philip E. A dynamic simultaneous equation model of electoral choice. *American Political Science Review,* 1979, *73,* 1055-1070.

Mayhew, David R. Congressional elections: The case of the vanishing marginals. *Polity,* 1974, *6,* 295-317.

Mayhew, David R. *Congress: The electoral connection.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974. (b)

McAdams, John C. & Johannes, John R. Does casework matter; A reply to Professor Fiorina. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 581-604.

Miller, Arthur H. & Miller, Warren E. Partisanship and performance: Rational choice in the 1976 presidential election. Paper presented at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 1977.

Miller, Arthur H., Wattenberg, Martin P. & Malanchuk, Oksana. Cognitive representations of candidate assessments. Paper delivered at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, Colorado, September 2-5, 1982.

Miller, Warren E. Commentary on 'Voting behavior research in the 1980s: An examination of some old and new problem areas.' Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, Colorado, September 4, 1982.

Miller, Warren E. & Shanks, J. Merrill. Policy directions and presidential leadership: Alternative interpretations of the 1980 presidential election. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1982, *12,* 299-356.

Miller, Warren E. & Stokes, Donald E. Constituency influence in Congress. *American Political Science Review,* 1963, *57,* 45-57.

Nelson, Candice J. The effect of incumbency on voting in congressional elections, 1964-1974. *Political Science Quarterly,* 1978, *93,* 665-678

Nie, Norman H., Verba, Sidney & Petrocik, John R. *The changing American voter.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.

Niemi, Richard G., Katz, Richard S. & Newman, David. Reconstructing past partisanship: The failure of the party identification recall questions. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1980, *24,* 633-651.

Niemi, Richard G. & Weisberg, Herbert F. The study of voting and elections. In Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Weisberg (Eds.). *Controversies in American voting behavior.* San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976.

Nimmo, Dan & Savage, Robert L. *Candidates and their images.* Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1976.

Norrander, Barbara K. *Mass behavior in presidential primaries: Individual and structural determinants.* Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1982.

Owens, John R. & Olson, Edward C. Economic fluctuations and congressional elections. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1980, *24,* 469-493.

Page, Benjamin I. & Jones, Calvin C. Reciprocal effects of policy preferences, party loyalties and the vote. *American Political Science Review,* 1979, *73,* 1071-1089.

Parker, Glenn R. The advantage of incumbency in House elections. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1980, *8,* 449-464. (a)

Parker, Glenn R. Cycles in congressional district attention. *Journal of Politics,* 1980, *42,* 540-548. (b)

Parker, Glenn R. Sources of change in congressional district attentiveness. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1980, *24,* 115-124. (c)

Parker, Glenn R. Interpreting candidate awareness in U.S. congressional elections. *Legislative Studies Quarterly,* 1981, *6,* 219-234.

Patterson, Thomas E. *The mass media election: How Americans choose their President.* New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980.

Payne, James L. The personal electoral advantage of House incumbents, 1936-1976. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1980, *8,* 465-482.

Payne, James L. Career intentions and electoral performance of members of the U.S. House. *Legislative Studies Quarterly,* 1982, *7,* 93-99.

Pierce, John C. & Sullivan, John L. An overview of the American electorate. In John C. Pierce & John L. Sullivan (Eds.). *The electorate reconsidered.* Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, Inc., 1980.

Piereson, James E. Presidential popularity and midterm voting at different electoral levels. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1975, *19,* 683-694.

Prewitt, Kenneth & Nie, Norman. Election studies of the Survey Research Center. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1971, *1,* 479-502.

Rabinowitz, George, Prothro, James W. & Jacoby, William. Salience as a factor in the impact of issues on candidate evaluation. *Journal of Politics,* 1982, *44,* 41-63.

Ragsdale, Lyn. The fiction of congressional elections as presidential events. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1980, *8,* 375-398.

Ragsdale, Lyn. Incumbent popularity, challenger invisibility, and congressional voters. *Legislative Studies Quarterly,* 1981, *6,* 201-218.

Rosenstone, Steven J. Economic adversity and voter turnout. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1982, *26,* 25-46.

Rossi, Peter H. Four landmarks in voting research. In Eugene Burdick & Arthur J. Brodbeck (Eds.). *American voting behavior.* New York: The Free Press, 1959.

Schulman, Mark A. & Pomper, Gerald M. Variability in electoral behavior: Longitudinal perspectives from causal modeling. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1975, *19,* 1-18.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. *Capitalism, socialism, and democracy.* New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1950.

Shabad, Goldie & Andersen, Kristi. Candidate evaluations by men and women. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1979, *32,* 18-35.

Shaffer, William R. Partisan loyalty and the perceptions of party, candidates and issues. *Western Political Quarterly,* 1972, *25,* 424-433.

Shaffer, William R. Rejoinder to Fiorina. *Political Methodology,* 1976, *3,* 19-26.

Shively, W. Phillips. Information costs and the partisan life cycle. Paper presented at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 31-September 4, 1977.

Shively, W. Phillips. The development of party identification among adults: Exploration of a functional model. *American Political Science Review,* 1979, *73,* 1039-1054.

Shively, W. Phillips. The nature of party identification: A review of recent developments. In John C. Pierce & John L. Sullivan (Eds.). *The electorate reconsidered.* Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, Inc., 1980.

Sigelman, Lee & Tsai, Yung-Mei. Personal finances and voting behavior: A reanalysis. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1981, *9,* 371-399.

Silbey, Joel H., Bogue, Allan G. & Flanigan, William H. Introduction. In Joel H. Silbey *et al.* (Eds.). *The history of American electoral behavior.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Songer, Donald R. Voter knowledge of congressional issue positions: A reassessment. *Social Science Quarterly,* 1981, *62,* 424-431.

St. Angelo, Douglas & Dobson, Douglas. Party identification and the floating vote: Some dynamics. *American Political Science Review,* 1975, *69,* 481-490.

Stokes, Donald E. Some dynamic elements of contests for the presidency. *American Political Science Review,* 1966, *60,* 19-28.

Stokes, Donald E., Campbell, Angus, & Miller, Warren E. Components of electoral decision. *American Political Science Review,* 1958, *52,* 367-387.

Stokes, Donald E. & Miller, Warren E. Party government and the salience of Congress. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1962, *26,* 531-546.

Tufte, Edward R. The relationship between seats and votes in two-party systems. *American Political Science Review,* 1973, *67,* 540-554.

Tufte, Edward R. Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1975, *69,* 812-826.

Tufte, Edward R. *Political control of the economy.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Uslaner, Eric M. Ain't misbehavin': The logic of defensive issue voting strategies in congressional elections. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1981, *9,* 3-22.

Valentine, David C. & Van Wingen, John R. Partisanship, independence, and the partisan identification question. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1980, *8,* 165-186.

Weatherford, M. Stephen. Economic conditions and electoral outcomes: Class differences in the political response to recession. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *22,* 917-938.

Weisberg, Herbert F. A multidimensional conceptualization of party identification. *Political Behavior,* 1980, *2,* 33-60.

Weisberg, Herbert F. Party evaluations: A theory of separate effects. Paper presented at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 29-May 1, 1982.

Wolfinger, Raymond E., Rosenstone, Steven J. & McIntosh, Richard A. Presidential and congressional voters compared. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1981, *9,* 245-256.

Wolfinger, Raymond E., Shapiro, Martin & Greenstein, Fred I. *Dynamics of American politics.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976.

Yiannakis, Diana Evans. The grateful electorate: Casework and congressional elections. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 568-580.

Zukin, Cliff & Keeter, Scott. *Citizen learning in presidential nominations.* New York: Praeger, 1983.

13

Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion*

Donald R. Kinder

V. O. Key once wrote that "to speak with precision of public opinion is a task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost" (1961, p. 8). Key was right. Nevertheless, my audacious purpose here is to speak with precision of what we have learned about American public opinion over the last twenty years and what we might try to learn next.

The task seems even more difficult now than Key imagined because of the dramatic events that have marked American politics through the last two decades. It has been a tumultuous time, stained by assassinations, race riots, a bleeding war abroad that provoked deep divisions at home, flagrant violations of public trust, roller-coaster economics, and more. As these events unsettled American society, so too did they challenge conventional thinking about American public opinion. Much of what we thought we knew twenty years ago is now widely regarded as false, or at least as hopelessly outdated. Controversy, not progress, seems to have been the field's most important product.

---

*An earlier version of this essay was delivered as an invited "theme" address at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, Colorado, September 1-4, 1982, under the title "Enough Already about Ideology: The Many Bases of American Public Opinion." It is drawn from a more extensive analysis of public opinion and political action, written with David O. Sears, prepared as a chapter for *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (3rd edition), G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (Editors), 1983. At one stage or another, many people commented on the project. I thank them all, especially Robert Abelson, Paul Abramson, W. Lance Bennett, Philip Converse, Ada Finifter, Morris Fiorina, John Jackson, M. Kent Jennings, D. Roderick Kiewiet, Jon Krosnick, Richard Lau, Gregory Markus, David Mayhew, Walter Mebane, Warren Miller, Steven J. Rosenstone, Randolph Wagner, Janet A. Weiss, and Robert Weissberg. The manuscript was prepared, again and again, with great competence and good cheer by Nancy Brennan, Maureen Kozumplik, Barbara Lohr, and Joyce Meyer.

But that verdict is too easy and too cynical. As I hope to demonstrate, we have in fact learned a great deal about American public opinion, in part *because* of the turbulence of the last two decades. Indeed, the period beginning with the assassination of John Kennedy and ending with the resignation of Richard Nixon represents, from the perspective of a science of public opinion, a splendid natural experiment. Progress, not controversy, is honored and recapitulated here.

My point of departure is provided by an observation made by Walter Lippmann (1922) more than half century ago. In *Public Opinion,* Lippmann declared that the trials and tribulations of daily life are compelling in a way that politics could never be. To expect ordinary people to become absorbed in the affairs of state, wrote Lippmann, would be to demand of them an appetite for political knowledge quite peculiar, if not pathological.

Over the years, Lippmann's thesis has aged with uncommon grace. According to countless surveys spread over more than five decades, Americans are in fact indifferent to much that transpires in politics, hazy about many of its principal players, lackadaisical regarding debates that preoccupy Washington, ignorant of basic facts that the well-informed take for granted, and unsure about the policies advanced by presidents and presidential hopefuls (Kinder & Sears, 1983). To be sure, a significant portion of this confusion and ignorance is not of the citizens' own making, but must be traced instead to the complexity of political life and to the ambiguity that governments often cultivate (see Bennett, 1975; Page, 1978). It is nevertheless true that the events of political life are, for most Americans, most of the time, peripheral curiosities.

This is a fundamental fact and one that should be kept in mind in the pages ahead, but it tells us little in detail about how everyday political thinking proceeds. Theories that presume that the public possesses a voracious appetite for political information should, of course, be greeted with great skepticism. But having said that, we are left with the mystery of how people arrive at those political opinions they do hold. What logic, if any, can be said to underlie public opinion?

This essay opens by taking up a possibility that has commanded monstrous attention: that the ordinary American's political beliefs may be derived from abstract ideological principles, sweeping ideas about how government and society should be organized. As we will see only too clearly, the ideology literature is laced with difficulties and entanglements. One conclusion is perfectly obvious, however: the field of public opinion has been far too occupied with the ideological possibility. Alternatives have suffered neglect, and the consequences have not been benign. The second part of the essay is therefore dedicated to promoting ways of understanding how Americans form and organize their political ideas other than through deductions from ideological principles: ways dominated by personal needs, by self-interest, by group identifications, by core values, and by inferences from history. The essay then closes with a general exhortation, accompanied by specific recommendations, in support of a livelier and closer interdependence between research on public opinion, on the one hand, and psychological theory, on the other.

IDEOLOGICAL INNOCENCE?

Perhaps Americans deduce their specific political opinions from general ideological principles. To many analysts, this has seemed an irresistibly appealing solution to the problem of political reasoning, for citizens and for governments alike. From the individual's perspective, deductions from abstract political concepts might substitute for the extensive acquisition of and rumination over political information—since that surely does not happen. Then political reasoning might be sophisticated, even if informationally thin. If Americans reason ideologically, then their grasp of politics is certainly substantial: "new political events have more meaning, retention of political information from the past is far more adequate, and political behavior increasingly approximates that of sophisticated 'rational' models, which assume relatively full information" (Converse, 1964, p. 227). From the governments' side, if ordinary citizens were to reason ideologically, as political elites presumably do, then the prospects for democratic control would be enhanced. That is, if leaders and general publics thought about politics along generally the same lines, there would be at least the possibility of genuine communication between them. Leaders would be better positioned to try to do what the public desired on those occasions when leaders ask for instruction. In short, the extraordinary interest in the possibility of ideological reasoning was and still is an expression of concern for the quality and very possibility of democratic forms of government.

However this may be, the possibility that Americans in large numbers might be moved by ideology was regarded as quite preposterous two decades ago. National surveys carried out in the late 1950s and early 60s turned up few full-fledged liberals or conservatives, much less more exotic political types. According to these early explorations, the vast majority of Americans were thoroughly innocent of ideology (Campbell *et al.*, 1960; McClosky *et al.*, 1960; McClosky, 1964; Prothro & Grigg, 1960).

In the past decade, however, consensus on this point has come undone. The field is now in "crisis" (Bennett, 1977). The cozy consensus of the past has been replaced by the often unfriendly arguments of today: some arcanely technical, some broadly methodological, some interpretational, and some plainly political. To be faithful to this complex and treacherous literature, I review it in four parts. First I quickly sketch the original claim—that the American public is largely innocent of ideology—particularly as realized in the writings of Converse (1963, 1964, 1975a, 1975b). I concentrate on Converse because his rendering of the ideological innocence argument is the most powerful and because it effectively set the terms for most subsequent work—indeed, for too much subsequent work. Though accepting his terms, research that followed Converse has often been critical of his conclusions; that revisionist literature is reviewed next. Then I take up proposals regarding ideology that lie largely outside the principal tussle between Converse and his critics, but bear obviously upon it. In the final section I draw the various pieces together and deliver a general verdict on the claim of ideological innocence.

The Original Claim

Converse approached the problem of ideology by trying to describe the public's general belief systems. These he defined as configurations ". . . of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" (1964, p. 207). Guided by this definition and making use of national surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center in 1956, 1958, and 1960, Converse concluded that dramatic, perhaps unbridgeable, differences divided elites from masses. Turning from the political belief systems of activists to those of ordinary citizens, "constraint declines across the universe of idea-elements, . . . the range of relevant belief systems becomes narrower and narrower. Instead of a few wide-ranging belief systems that organize large amounts of specific information, one [discovers] a proliferation of clusters of ideas among which little constraint is felt. . ." (Converse, 1964, p. 213). Simultaneously, "the character of the objects that are central in a belief system undergoes systematic change. These objects shift from the remote, generic, and abstract to the increasingly simple, concrete, or 'close to home' " (p. 213).

Converse was led to these conclusions in part because of Americans' unfamiliarity with ideological concepts. Those questioned in the 1956 survey were asked to discuss the good and bad points of the two major political parties and, in a parallel series of questions, to comment on the major presidential candidates. According to Converse's coding, active use of ideological terms was confined to just 2.5 percent of the public. Near-ideologues, those who made some use of abstract concepts but appeared neither to rely upon them heavily nor to understand them very well, comprised another one-tenth of the national sample. This left fully 88 percent of the general public ideologically innocent.

Even the recognition of standard ideological terms was not widespread. The 1960 interview included a series of questions designed to ascertain citizens' understanding of liberalism and conservatism. Those interviewed were asked to assign these labels to the two parties—if they first indicated that there existed meaningful party differences—and then to explain what they meant. Just one-sixth of the public both assigned the labels properly and explained party differences in terms of broad ideological themes.

Of course, ideology might still flourish among the public, if it turned out that many people simply could not articulate or recognize the principles that in fact determined their beliefs. If many Americans really used ideological principles, but could not express them easily or quickly, their opinions on various issues should still exhibit consistency, tied together as they would be by underlying ideological principles. To test for such "constraint," Converse computed correlations between opinions on topical issues within two groups, both interviewed in 1958: a national cross-section of the general public, and a smaller group made up of candidates for the United States House of Representatives. Respondents in each group were asked their opinions on a series of domestic and foreign issues: aid to education, government guarantee of employment, military support for countries menaced by Communist aggression, and the like. Substantial constraint between opinions on such issues was

apparent only for the candidates. Indeed, among the public, there was little consistency at all. Converse concluded that the opinions expressed by ordinary citizens on particular issues do not derive from widely-shared, general principles. Weak correlations across different topics reflected citizens' failure to master and employ the abstract ideological concepts that might have tied the topics together (Aberbach *et al.*, 1981, Chapter 5; Butler & Stokes, 1974; Converse & Pierce, 1983; Klingemann, 1979; Miller & Miller, 1976).

Not only did policy opinions appear largely insulated from one another, they also seemed to wobble capriciously back and forth over time. The policy questions included in the 1958 national survey referred to above were also posed to the same respondents two years earlier, in the 1956 survey as well as two years later, in 1960. Although there were virtually no aggregate shifts in opinion on any of these issues across this period, and despite precautions taken to discourage superficial replies, at the individual level change was the rule. Stability coefficients (Tau-Beta's) ranged from .28, in the case of the issue that perhaps best reflected the enduring philosophical dispute between liberals and conservatives—whether the federal government should have any role in the construction of housing and the production of electricity—to .43 and .47 in the case of policies that impinged upon blacks—the desirability of establishing a fair employment practice commission and the desirability of school desegregation, respectively. On the average, less than two-thirds of the public came down on the same side of a policy controversy over a two-year period, where one-half would be expected to do so by chance alone.

Oddly enough, the opinions on public policy expressed by survey respondents in 1960 could be predicted just as well by their opinions in 1956 as by their opinions in 1958. This pattern led eventually to Converse's "black and white" model of opinion change that partitioned the public on any particular issue into two groups: one composed of citizens who are quite indifferent to it and when pressed, either admit ignorance or invent a "non-attitude" (Converse, 1963); the other, of those who possess genuine opinions and hold onto them tenaciously. The heart of Converse's message here is that the real opinion holders are usually greatly outnumbered.

In short, most Americans approach the political world innocent of ideology: indifferent to standard ideological concepts, lacking a consistent perspective on public policy, and with authentic opinions on only a handful of policy questions. All this, according to the conventional wisdom of two decades ago.

Counter-claims

The most elaborate challenge to the conventional wisdom came in the form of Nie, Verba, and Petrocik's *The Changing American Voter* (1979). Nie and his associates argued that one of the several ways in which the American voter had changed since the 1950s was that he or she had become more ideological. Nie, Verba, and Petrocik looked at citizens' replies to the open-ended candidate and party questions, as had Converse, this time examining the series from 1952 to 1976. They reported that ideological reactions to candidates, virtually invisible in 1952, increased dramatically in 1964 and then

declined sharply in 1976.[1] They concluded that given proper circumstances—like the ideologically polarized contest between Johnson and Goldwater—a substantial fraction of the American public is capable of thinking ideologically, a conclusion that quickly became the new conventional wisdom (also see Field & Anderson, 1969; Pierce, 1970).

There are serious deficiencies in the new wisdom, however. Nie and associates worked not from verbatim readings of the original protocols, as had Converse, but from replies already coded by the SRC staff. As a consequence, Nie *et al.*'s measurement of ideological reasoning was reduced to tallying up the incidence of ideological terms. A better test of the claim that American voters had changed would require close replications of Converse's original analysis. Several such painstaking efforts have recently been published. They indicate that the American public's use of ideological concepts *has* increased since the 1950s but that the increase has been glacial: from roughly 2½% in Converse's analysis to about 7% in several analyses from the late 1960s and early 1970s (Klingemann, 1979; Klingemann & Wright, 1973; Miller & Miller, 1976; Pierce & Hagner, 1982). By these reports, ideological reasoning seems to respond sluggishly if at all to fluctuations in the ideological character of political debate.

What, then, should be made of the quite sensational changes reported by Nie, Verba, and Petrocik? Presumably they reflect a facility on the public's part to pick up the labels that ideologically-charged campaigns make prominent. The use of ideological vocabulary, of course, in no way guarantees that the underlying ideas are deeply understood or even that the terms are correctly used. It appears that revisionists have demonstrated increases only in what might be called the non-ideological use of ideological terminology (Levitin & Miller, 1979; Smith, 1980; Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1981 say this is what they meant all along). Such demonstrations do little damage to the original claim of innocence.

Another challenge to the original claim comes from the recent finding that when asked directly, many Americans are quite willing to describe themselves in ideological terms. Since 1972, those interviewed in SRC/CPS national election studies have been asked whether they think of themselves as liberals or conservatives, and if so, to locate themselves on a 7-point scale, stretching from extreme liberal (on the far left of the scale, naturally) to extreme conservative (on the far right). Self-professed liberals tend to favor redistributive welfare policies, social change, and leftward leaning presidential candidates, while self-professed conservatives tend to express misgivings about racial integration, celebrate capitalism, and give their votes to conservative candidates. These results are interesting (particularly as presented and interpreted by Conover and Feldman, 1981), but they do not signify, as some have maintained (Holm & Robinson, 1978; Stimson, 1975), the sudden emergence of an ideology ridden public.

This claim goes too far on a number of grounds. First, when provided the opportunity, three Americans in ten concede that they never think of themselves as liberals or as conservatives (29% in 1972, 33% in 1976, 36% in 1980). Second, among those who do identify themselves in ideological terms, large numbers embrace moderation. In 1976, for example, fully 39% of those

who declared some acquaintance with ideological terms selected the exact mid-point of the scale, labelled "moderate, middle-of-the-road." No doubt some of them were passionate centrists, but for many the middle may reflect ideological neutrality, perhaps even confusion (Levitin & Miller, 1979). Third, evidence regarding the political significance of self-professed ideology is underwhelming. Correlations with opinions on public policy issues seldom exceed .3 and are apparent in any case only among the most politically engaged of the public (Converse & Pierce, 1983; Levitin & Miller, 1979; Stimson, 1975). Fourth and finally, there is what citizens say they mean by their ideological choices. In Klingemann's 1974 survey of the United States, only one-third of those who characterized themselves in ideological terms also furnished definitions of any political depth, referring in most cases to social change or to fiscal prudence (*cf.*, Conover & Feldman, 1981).

In short, ostensibly ideological identification need not have genuinely ideological underpinnings, just as increases in the use of ideological vocabulary need not entail increases in ideological thinking. No doubt for some Americans, ideological identifications do summarize a general political stance: for government intervention or free enterprise; for social change or social stability. But not for most.

This brings us to the empirical centerpiece of the revisionist argument: the compelling demonstration of greater cohesion in the American public's beliefs on public policy beginning in the 1960s (Nie & Andersen, 1974; Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1979). Nie and his associates replicated Converse's original analysis of constraint in seven national surveys running from 1956 to 1972. Through the late 1950s and early 1960s, Nie *et al.* found—as had Converse—little constraint between opinions on issues of social welfare, equality of opportunity, foreign relations and the like. This changed in 1964. Suddenly opinion on school integration became aligned with feelings about big government; foreign policy views became linked to beliefs regarding the federal government's responsibility to subsidize medical care; and so on. Detected first in 1964, this new-found structure in public opinion persisted at about the same level through 1968, and has since slightly declined (see Miller & Miller, 1977; Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1979, p. 369). Nie and his colleagues interpreted these results to indicate a sea change in public thinking, provoked by the tumultuous events of the 1960s.

Not so. In 1964, coincident with the increase in cohesion in public thinking on policy matters, the formats of the public policy questions were altered. The changes seemed innocuous enough: from a conventional Likert format to an arrangement in which respondents were asked to choose between a pair of opposing alternatives; and from a gentle to a somewhat more insistent invitation to admit to no opinion at all. Could such subtle changes explain what Nie and Andersen took to be ". . . dramatic shifts in both the breadth and depth of liberal/conservative attitude structure. . ." (p. 571)? They could and probably did. (The most lethal weapon in this debate has been the experiment; see especially Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1978; Sullivan, Piereson, Marcus, & Feldman, 1979; a more complete bibliography can be found in Kinder & Sears, 1983.) It is now clear that most of the apparent change in opinion structure is artificial, produced not by political metamorphosis but by mun-

dane alterations in question wording. This radically inverts the revisionists' message. Despite profound changes in American politics through the 1960s, the structure of public opinion changed not at all.[2]

Surely the most devastating element of the original claim of ideological innocence was how few people seemed to possess real preferences regarding public policy. Converse believed that the public's wandering over time from one side of a policy question to the other was symptomatic of the shallowness of opinion. Reluctant to admit their own ignorance, people invented evanescent opinions—liberal on one occasion, conservative on the next.

Well, maybe not. Converse's critics interpret instability to be a reflection instead of unclear questions; responses may not be stable, but the underlying opinions are. Instability reflects vague questions, not vague citizens (Achen, 1975, 1983; Converse, 1974, 1980; Erikson, 1979; Jackson, 1982; Judd & Milburn, 1980; Judd, Krosnick, & Milburn, 1981; Martin, 1981; Milburn & Judd, 1981; Pierce & Rose, 1974).[3]

If revisionists are correct, the original claim comes undone, at two points. Threatened first is the non-attitude thesis itself—that on many matters of public policy, most people possess no genuine preferences at all. Also threatened is the analysis of attitude constraint. Once purged of measurement error, the public's opinions on public policy questions no longer seem quite so feebly-structured (see Achen's, 1975, Table 3).

In adjudicating this conflict, much hinges on how instability is understood. According to Converse's interpretation, instability on any particular issue should vary from one person to the next. Stability should be comparatively high among people engaged by the issue and comparatively low among people whose political interests lie elsewhere. Testing this prediction was Achen's (1975) way of resolving the debate. Achen regressed his estimate of the measurement error associated with each policy question for each survey respondent against demographic characteristics (e.g., education, income, occupation) and measures of general political interest (e.g., concern over election outcome, interest in campaign, etc.), with feeble returns. Variation in education or in political engagement proved to be a weak predictor of error. Achen concluded that since unreliability was spread so evenly across the public, it should properly be ascribed not to citizen confusion but to questionnaire imperfection. (For comparable tests, see Erikson, 1979; and Judd *et al.*, 1981.)

But Achen's results are in fact compatible with a strict reading of Converse's argument. Converse emphasized the fragmentation of the public into narrow factions, each preoccupied with different policy matters. Demonstrating that *general* interest in politics fails to predict opinion stability does no damage to this view. A persuasive disconfirmation of Converse's claim requires showing, for example, that those citizens intrigued by matters of foreign policy do not differ from the rest of the population in the stability of their opinion on aid to foreign countries. Such evidence would be quite impossible to square with Converse's claim that instability reflects not measurement problems but weaknesses in opinion.

Comparisons of this sort are scarce, but those that have been reported favor Converse's original claim: policy-specific interest *does* seem to be

associated with the durability of opinion over time (Converse, 1964, pp. 244-245; Schuman & Presser, 1981, Chapter 9). Moreover, collateral evidence of various kinds seems to contain serious anomalies for the critics of the non-attitude thesis. First, political elites appear to cling tenaciously to their own political beliefs. The best evidence of this now available is provided by Putnam and his associates (1979), in a panel study of Italian regional councillors. Interviewed first in 1970 and again in 1976, the councillors remained remarkably steadfast in their political opinions. On the question of government workers' right to strike, for example, councillors' opinions were substantially more stable across a six-year period (Pearson r = .75) than were the American public's belief across two years, on *any* of the policy questions included in either major SRC/CPS panel study. Does this radical contrast mean that Putnam and his associates have made historic breakthroughs in the formulation of questions, or does it reflect rather the greater attention and thought given to politics by Italian councillors than by average Americans? (For equally striking contrasts involving French Deputies and the French public, see Converse & Pierce, 1983.) Or consider that by simple correlations, identification with a political party is vastly more stable over time than are preferences on policy questions (Converse, 1964; Converse & Markus, 1979). Revisionists are forced to interpret this to mean that question writers have stumbled upon comparatively precise ways of asking respondents about their party affiliations, but haven't yet discovered how to ask questions about policy. This seems tortured, especially in light of recent agitation over the need to improve the measurement of party identification (see Weisberg, 1980).

In short, instability in political opinion cannot be reduced entirely to technical problems of measurement. Instability reflects both fuzzy measures *and* fuzzy citizens. When confronted with policy debates of great and abiding interest to political elites, many Americans can do no better than shrug. Instability largely reflects the fleeting attention commonly paid to politics, the preeminence of private desires over public ones.[4]

The durability of public opinion on policy matters also depends, finally, on the character of the policy itself. One of the clearest and least controversial lessons of recent research is that Americans are decisively more stable on some policy matters than on others. In particular, when policies become entangled with moral, racial, and religious values, indifference and non-attitudes may vanish altogether. In the mid-1970s, for example, nearly every American knew what the government should do about abortion, racial busing, and equal rights for women (Converse & Markus, 1979; Kinder & Rhodebeck, 1982). Whether Americans shrug or become impassioned when confronted with policy alternatives has therefore much to do with the nature of the times.

Altogether Different Claims

It is crude stereotyping on my part to refer to the diverse critics of innocence as though they belonged to the same club, but there is at least one kernel of truth to it. The promoters of the original claim and most of their critics share a common paradigm. However the revisionists tinker with

method, or however their conclusions depart from ideological innocence, they nevertheless accept the basic terms established by Converse two decades ago.

Others do not. Converse's most persistent and able critic over the years has been Robert Lane (1962, 1969, 1973). Lane not only puts forward a powerful, layered attack on Converse's approach, he also argues for and illustrates in his own work an alternative approach, herein called *ideographic*.

Lane complains first of all that Converse, and nearly everyone else, examines only the products of political reasoning, not the process of reasoning. To learn about how people think about politics requires, according to Lane, radical departures from the conventional survey interview. Lane's *Political Ideology* (1962) was based upon a set of intensive, intimate, individually tailored interviews. Through what Lane calls a "contextual analysis" of these conversations, the process of political reasoning is supposedly revealed:

> An opinion, belief, or attitude is best understood in the context of other opinions, beliefs, and attitudes, for they illuminate its meaning, marks its boundaries, modify and qualify its force. Even more important, by grouping opinions the observer can often discover latent ideological themes; he can see the structure of thought: premise, inference, application. There is no other satisfactory way to map a political ideology. (Lane, 1962, pp. 9-10)

Lane also criticizes Converse for holding up his own ideas about how beliefs should be patterned as the uniquely appropriate standard for the public. (In one guise or another, this is the ideographic camp's favorite complaint; see Bennett, 1975, 1977; Brown, 1970, 1980; Conover & Feldman, 1980; Marcus, Tabb, & Sullivan, 1974.) According to Lane, Converse's "confusion" on this point—imposing his understanding of what political beliefs should belong with what other beliefs—slants his results. Such confusion gives priority "to the analyst's role in setting forth the idea-elements *he* thinks are important, developing the conceptual framework that the analyst regards as most likely to "govern" the more specific beliefs (exemplars), and thus providing a guided opportunity for measuring association and change. Equally important, this focus on the analyst gives him, but not the subject, an opportunity for talking about the patterns of idea-elements association" (Lane, 1973, p. 99). Lane avoids this problem in his work by providing his subjects with ample opportunity to express their own perhaps unique patterning of ideas in their own terms. Through such transactions, the definition of constraint allegedly passes from the analyst to the subject.

The confusion Lane ascribes on these matters to Converse in fact properly belongs mainly to Lane—a point that is itself usually confused. In the first place, Lane's criticism ignores Converse's analysis of the persistence of opinion over time. Such an analysis requires no assumptions regarding the particular ways in which beliefs should be patterned, only that they show reasonable stability. Indeed, this is a major reason why Converse undertook the analysis in the first place.

Secondly, although Converse does indeed impose his own standards elsewhere in his analysis, he does so deliberately. He may be wrong in his choice,

but he is not at all confused. His choice is of course the standards imputed to characterize the thinking of political elites: reliance upon abstract, general principles. Lane is perfectly correct to insist that we should not conclude from the public's apparent failure to organize its policy preferences in these terms that the public therefore has no capacity to organize its political ideas at all. Converse did not—Lane's insinuation notwithstanding—nor should we.

And in the third place, Lane's cure for Converse's alleged confusion has problems of its own. Objectivity and replicability are hardly the hallmarks of contextual analysis. Although not without real virtues, Lane's approach is always vulnerable to the charge that he has not so much discovered the ideology of the "common man" (Lane's phrase) as he has unwittingly contributed to its momentary creation.[5]

Lane's most valuable contribution has been to insist on a broadened conception of political belief. In Converse's analysis, and in most that followed, opinions on public policy were given great attention—to Lane's way of thinking and to mine, inordinate attention. Political belief systems include policy preferences to be sure, but they also incorporate "the fundamental views which form the ideational counterpart to a constitution: ideas on fair play and due process, rights of others, sharing of power, the proper distribution of goods in society (equality), uses and abuses of authority. . ." (Lane, 1962, p. 15).

Lane's *Political Ideology* (1962) reflects his critique of the mainstream. He employed intensive contextual analysis and invited his subjects—15 working-class men of "Eastport"—to express their political beliefs in their own terms. Moreover, the interviews ranged well beyond public policy, touching on matters of equality, freedom, democracy and the like.

Consider, for illustrative purposes, Lane's discerning examination of the ordinary citizen's beliefs regarding equality. The uniquely egalitarian style of American social relations has struck observers from de Tocqueville to the present. Lane argues, however, that members of the working class generally do not want equality; that they are, in fact, afraid of it; and that inequality provides to them important gratifications: those that derive from identification with a just society, as well as the obvious satisfactions that result from comparisons with those lower in the social order. This was perhaps most plainly revealed in the subjects' uniformly fearful reactions to the possibility, posed to them by Lane, of a new social order in which inequality would be erased. Economic equality would deprive citizens of the goals of life; incentives would be destroyed; such a society could not long endure. For the common man, an egalitarian society would bring bewilderment and alienation, for "their life goals are structured around achievement and success in monetary terms. If these were taken away, life would be a desert" (1962, p. 78). Lane concluded that citizens do entertain genuine, occasionally deeply-felt political beliefs, not only about equality but about other fundamental political matters as well (Hochschild, 1981; Lamb, 1974; Sennett & Cobb, 1972; Ward, 1982).

Contrary to popular opinion, this conclusion in no way undermines Converse's original allegations. Because Lane and Converse (and hence, Lane and most everyone else) mean quite different things by ideology—Lane explores

everyday notions of freedom, equality, and democracy while Converse worries about the public's appraisal of parties, candidates, and especially public policy—their conclusions touch each other only obliquely.

Rather than being a disconfirmation, it is far more appropriate and useful to regard Lane's findings as contributing another piece to the puzzle of political reasoning. If the ingredients of political ideology are broadened beyond conventional practice in the manner prescribed by Lane, then the ordinary American may properly be characterized as ideological. People make sense of equality, freedom, and democracy, though the sense is often personalized and idiosyncratic. It is an ideology not to be confused with that of the articulate, self-reflective, political sophisticate. But it is an ideology nevertheless: "There should be no doubt that in Eastport the common man has a set of emotionally-charged political beliefs, a critique of alternative proposals, and some modest programs of reform" (Lane, 1962, p. 15).

Although the relationship is predominantly complementary, there is one place where Lane's and Converse's arguments *do* directly intersect. To aid his description of the working-class man's political ruminations, Lane distinguished between two opposite modes of thought: "contextualizing," or thinking that places political events in topical, temporal, and historical perspective; and "morselizing," or thinking that considers events in isolation. Lane concluded that, with an occasional exception, morselizing was by far the dominant tendency: "This treatment of an instance in isolation happens time and again and on matters close to home: a union demand is a single incident, not part of a more general labor-management conflict; a purchase on the installment plan is a specific debt, not part of a budgetary pattern—either one's own or society's. The items and fragments of life remain itemized and fragmented. . ." (Lane, 1962, p. 353). As a consequence, constraint must be provided other than by deduction from abstract, general principles. In this way, but moving from a different conception of ideology and a radically different method, Lane simply reinforces the conclusion of ideological innocence.

Innocence Reappraised

"Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study." So Converse began his seminal essay nearly two decades ago (Converse, 1964, p. 206); so it is today. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a more fitting tribute to Converse's assertion than the tangle of arguments and evidence spilled across the preceding pages. The difficulty of the subject, however, is not all that we have learned.

We have learned in the first place that ideological innocence is a fully appropriate verdict *if* by innocence we mean that few Americans make sophisticated use of sweeping ideological ideas; most are indifferent to standard ideological terminology. Even among those who claim an ideological identity, large numbers abandon the left and the right for the middle to embrace ideological neutrality. Although many Americans do pick up ideological labels when confronted with distinctively ideological presidential campaigns, they evidently do so without appreciating their political connotations. In fact,

the proportion of the public making use of ideological concepts has grown glacially in twenty years, suggesting that genuine ideological reasoning may depend less on the occasional appearance of ideological campaigns and more on gradual compositional changes in the public.

Innocence of ideology is revealed also in the political connections Americans never make. Few Americans express consistently liberal, conservative or centrist positions on policy—either during the turbulent, ideological 1960s or during the serene Eisenhower years. In Lane's felicitous phrase, Americans "morselize" their political beliefs (1962, p. 353).

Morselization of opinion is of course different from having no opinion at all. And the non-attitude thesis, certainly the most controversial allegation in the original claim of ideological innocence, now seems less powerful. Opinion instability, it is now recognized, is partly the product of hazy questions. It has also become clear that issue publics need not be limited to narrow splinters of the general public: some issues engage the attention of nearly everybody. This leaves us somewhat more confident of the public's capacity to develop genuine political preferences than Converse was in 1964.

That the original claim of ideological innocence is largely sustained does not mean that the American mind is empty of politics; innocent as typical Americans may be of ideological principles, they are hardly innocent of political ideas. Such ideas, however, defy parsimonious description. Some beliefs are classically liberal, some classically conservative. There are some authentic opinions, tenaciously held; there are some non-attitudes, casually expressed. There are patches of knowledge and expanses of ignorance. "A realistic picture of political belief systems in the mass public, then" wrote Converse (1964, p. 247), "is not one that omits issues and policy demands completely nor one that presumes widespread ideological coherence; it is rather one that captures with some fidelity the fragmentation, narrowness, and diversity of these demands."

PLURALISTIC ROOTS OF POLITICAL BELIEFS

What are the sources of the fragmented, narrow, and diverse political demands that lurk in the American mind? On this point, the last twenty years of research have been more destructive than constructive. One prominent possibility—that political ideas are deduced from sweeping ideological principles—has been emphatically dispatched. This is important, but because of the field's fixation with the ideology question, we now know rather more about how Americans do *not* think about politics than about how they do.

The debate between Lane and Converse—between the ideographic camp and the defenders of the paradigm—revolves largely around the sources of constraint. Converse assumed that the roots of political belief are mainly social. According to Converse, ". . . the shaping of belief systems of any range into apparently logical wholes that are credible to large numbers of people is an act of creative synthesis characteristic of only a miniscule proportion of any population . . . to the extent that multiple idea-elements of a belief system are socially diffused from such creative sources, they tend to be diffused in "packages" which consumers come to see as natural wholes" (1964, p. 211).

Hence the politically engaged may manifest more consistency among their policy beliefs (Nie & Andersen, 1974; Barton & Parsons, 1977; Converse, 1975b; Judd, Krosnick, & Milburn, 1981) because they are more attentive to public life and therefore adopt combinations of political ideas that more faithfully reflect positions taken by well-placed leaders. In this sense, constraint is socially determined (*cf.* Abelson, 1975). In contrast, the ideographic tradition emphasizes the psychological sources of belief. Lane and others grant to ordinary citizens considerable autonomy to repackage ideas, to make them their own. The determination of constraint shifts from leaders' intellectual and rhetorical achievements to the ordinary citizens' own experiences, group relations, private needs and values. There is of course no need to choose between the social and psychological positions, and in the pages ahead, which are dedicated to sources of constraint other than ideological deduction, I try to respect both.

I will now take up in an illustrative way five alternative sources of constraint, from the intimate and concrete, to the remote and abstract. If not by a coherent ideology, perhaps the ordinary person's political thinking is shaped by (1) the expression of private needs and motives; (2) single-minded pursuit of self-interest; (3) identification with salient social groups, whose fortunes and prospects are seen to be affected by political decisions; (4) the affirmation of core values; and (5) inferences drawn from the unfolding of political history. My general purpose here is to direct attention away from the ideology question, so that we may begin to understand how citizens come to terms with the bewildering complexity that is modern political life.

1. Personality

According to Lane (1973), the analysis of political belief independent of personality is grotesque, for it "fails to take into account the individual's predispositions, his private 'decision rules,' the personal functions of a belief for his ongoing life strivings" (p. 91). Understanding the roots of a particular political belief requires, in his view, an appreciation of the part the belief plays in personality.

One general psychological tradition treats political opinions as though they were partly the playthings of the mind's inner conflicts. Smith, Bruner and White (1956) refer to the general process by which political beliefs come to stand for or express internal troubles as "externalization" (p. 43; *cf.* Katz, 1960). The externalization hypothesis was given grandest expression, of course, in *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno *et al.*, 1950). There is no need to recount in detail here the study itself or the methodological fusillade it set off. Hyman and Sheatsley's (1954) essay still stands as the most comprehensive and most damaging critique of the original work. But in effectively discrediting the evidence marshalled by Adorno and his colleagues, Hyman and Sheatsley did no necessary damage to the externalization hypothesis itself. In fact, evidence reported in the three decades following publication of *The Authoritarian Personality,* though it has come in a trickle, generally sustains Adorno *et al.*'s insistence that political belief and personality are intimately entwined (Brown, 1965; Kirscht & Dillehay, 1967; Wilson, 1973).

Lane (1962) also enlisted externalization in his discussion of working class men coping with the burdens of freedom. Lane suggested that those men who felt most troubled by freedom—who could not fully enjoy it themselves, who thought freedom dangerous, who worried extravagantly about its extension—were also those most uneasy about their own impulses. Apprehensions over sexual and aggressive appetites, over impulsive purchasing habits, over eating and drinking sprees, seemed to lead to hesitation and ambivalence about political freedom. "The burden of freedom for modern (and ancient) man," wrote Lane (1962, p. 55), "comes from relying on an inadequate system of personal controls. For him, therefore, the solution is the reinforcement of convention, the specification of behavioral codes, the demand for sanctions against behavior, the encroachment of the criminal code upon the area of individual choice."

Recent work on political intolerance reinforces Lane's point. Sullivan and his colleagues (Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Piereson, 1981) defined political intolerance as a willingness to impose restrictions upon the activities of unpopular groups, through prohibiting their public gatherings, tapping their telephones, and so forth. They found that intolerance was especially common among those Americans who were "psychologically insecure"—who, on an omnibus measure of personality, were revealed to be dogmatic, misanthropic and authoritarian, low in self-esteem, and preoccupied with safety and sustenance. Thus personal inadequacies, which the psychologically insecure presumably have plenty of, are projected onto disreputable political groups. Such groups must be carefully monitored and controlled, lest they somehow spoil the American way.

By this scandalously brief review, the externalization hypothesis seems well supported. Ethnocentrism, conservative values, the burdens of freedom, political intolerance—all seem to have a partial basis in "inner troubles." Granted that personality is an elusive concept, and that it has routinely been mangled in application to politics. Nevertheless, it does appear that the roots of political belief do occasionally go this deep, reaching the murky province of intrapsychic conflict and desire.[6]

2. *Self-interest*

Nearly as intimate a basis of political belief as personality, and certainly one that political scientists feel more comfortable with, is self-interest. There is no more familiar presumption than that people support policies that promote their own material interests and oppose policies that threaten them. As *The American Voter* put it, beliefs on public policy are determined not by a coherent ideological stance but by "primitive self-interest" (1960, p. 205).

The presumption of self-interest is strong, but the evidence is not. For example, the economic predicaments of private life have only weak and intermittent effects on which policies citizens endorse. Neither losing a job, nor deteriorating family financial conditions, nor pessimism about the family's economic future has much to do with support for policies designed to alleviate personal economic distress (Denney, Hendricks, & Kinder, 1980; Kinder &

Kiewiet, 1981; Kinder, 1981; Lowery & Sigelman, 1981; Schlozman & Verba, 1979; Sears & Citrin, 1982; Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980). When economic self-interest does influence policy beliefs, moreover, the effects tend to be highly circumscribed. For instance, the unemployed, more than working people, believe that the national government should provide jobs, but they do not support unconventional or drastic solutions to unemployment, nor do they favor schemes to redistribute income (Schlozman & Verba, 1979). Consider another anomaly for self-interest: disruptions to private life occasioned by the sudden onset of energy shortages in 1974 seemed to have no ramifications for opinion on energy policy. People whose lives were most disrupted were no more likely to support greater conservation or the development of alternative energy sources than were their more fortunate counterparts whose personal lives went on unaffected by the crisis (Sears, Tyler, Citrin, & Kinder, 1978). Another: although war would seem to engage self-interest in an ultimate way, having close relatives or friends in Korea or Vietnam did not appear to affect opinion about the war (Mueller, 1973; Lau, Brown, & Sears, 1978). A final case, equally problematic for the self-interest presumption, comes from research on public opinion on school busing for racial desegregation. Opposition to busing, it turns out, has little to do with its personal consequences. Parents of children enrolled in public schools in neighborhoods affected by busing for desegregation are generally no more opposed to busing than any other segment of the public (Gatlin, Giles, & Cataldo, 1978; Kinder & Rhodebeck, 1982; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982; Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979; Sears & Kinder, 1971).

Laid end to end, these studies do much to undermine the faith widely invested in material self-interest. As a basis for political belief, primitive self-interest seems to have been drastically overpromoted. Why this is so—why the links between self-interest and belief are so tenuous—is not yet clear. One possibility is that self-interest is typically overwhelmed by long-held, emotionally powerful predispositions. According to this "symbolic politics" account, people acquire predispositions (like racial prejudice or nationalism) rather early in life that shape their political views in adulthood. Interpretation and evaluation of political events are essentially affective responses to salient symbols that resemble the attitude objects to which similar emotional responses were conditioned in earlier life. Whether or not the event has some tangible consequence for the citizen's personal life is irrelevant; the pertinent personal stake is a symbolic one, which triggers long-held, affect-laden, habitual responses (Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980; Kinder & Sears, 1981).

A second general possibility directs attention to how people understand their own predicaments, particularly what they see as the causes for their problems, and how they think such problems could and should be solved. In the economic domain, Americans seldom blame themselves for their own predicaments, but neither do they blame government. Nor do they look to government for assistance in solving their economic difficulties. Instead, Americans see their predicaments as due to proximal, particularistic causes and rely on their own resources in seeking remedies. Thus people typically understand economic problems in ways that muffle their political ramifica-

tions. In so doing, the power of self-interest is eroded (Kinder & Mebane, 1983; Brody & Sniderman, 1977; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979).

3. Group Identification

Can groups succeed where self fails? Perhaps political ideas reflect the web of allegiances and antipathies that individuals develop toward groups. From this perspective, political opinions are "badges of social membership": they are declarations, to others and to ourselves, of social identity (Smith, Bruner & White, 1956). Support for affirmative action reflects sympathy for the plight of blacks (Kinder & Sears, 1981); opposition to social welfare programs derives from hostility toward the poor (Feldman, 1983); support for war in Asia reflects fear of Communism (Mueller, 1973); enthusiasm for political repression hinges on whose phones are to be tapped (Sullivan *et al.*, 1981); and so forth.

Perhaps the most effective general demonstration of the important role played by social identity in political reasoning is the persistent prominence of social groups in Americans' appraisals of parties and presidential candidates. In Converse's original coding of open-ended replies in the 1956 SRC survey, citizens who made use of social groups comprised by far the largest single category—42 percent of the entire public. Such citizens typically named benefits and deprivations that parties and candidates had visited upon social groups in the past or might deliver in the future. This is not ideology at work, according to Campbell *et al.* (1960), but "ideology by proxy," since there

> . . . is little comprehension of "long-range plans for social betterment," or of basic philosophies rooted in postures toward change or abstract conceptions of social and economic structure of causation. The party or candidate is simly endorsed as being "for" a group with which the subject is identified or as being above the selfish demands of groups within the population. Exactly *how* the candidate or party might see fit to implement or void group interests is a moot point, left unrelated to broader ideological concerns. (p. 234)

However unsophisticated the underlying process, the political meaning people find in social groups may be very powerful in shaping their beliefs. Moreover, Converse's (1964) original findings seem quite representative of other times and places. Many things have changed since 1956, but references to groups continue to occupy a central place in citizens' appraisals of parties and candidates—and not only in the United States (Kagay & Caldeira, 1980; Key, 1961; Klingemann, 1979; Stokes, 1966). But *which* group identifications are important?

One natural possibility is social class. According to Lipset, "the most impressive single fact about political party support is that in virtually every economically developed country the lower-income groups vote mainly for the parties of the left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the right" (1963, p. 234). Indeed, middle and upper class Americans differ from their working and lower classes compatriots in the candidates they choose, the parties they support, and the social welfare policies they advocate

(e.g., Alford, 1963; Centers, 1949; Converse, 1958; Hamilton, 1972; Ladd & Hadley, 1975).

At least as impressive as the regularity of the association between class and political preference in the United States, however, is its modesty. "Class struggle" is much too strong a phrase to impose on the rather anemic correlations typically reported; even "class conflict" may be too strong. Among Western democracies, the United States finishes close to last on measures linking class and political choice (Alford, 1963; Inglehart, 1977, p. 199). And while never very imposing, the link between class and political belief in the United States has in the past three decades steadily eroded (Abramson, 1974; Inglehart, this volume; Ladd & Hadley, 1975; Ladd & Lipset, 1981; Schlozman & Verba, 1979). Declining economic conditions may resurrect this weakening association, but in the meantime, we need to look at lines of conflict other than those defined by class.

Race is one obvious choice. Over the past four decades, whenever surveys have been taken, black and white Americans have differed systematically and often enormously in their support for open housing, federal assistance to "minorities," school integration, welfare, and on other matters of policy touching race. In a 1976 survey, for example, while blacks favored school integration by more than five to one, most whites declared that school integration was none of the federal government's business (this comparison and those that follow are taken from Converse *et al.*, 1980, and Miller *et al.*, 1980). Blacks and whites also divide deeply over perceptions of the progress American society has made in ridding itself of racial discrimination. Substantial differences emerge as well on questions that, while manifestly unrelated to race, nevertheless evoke the recent political experience of black Americans. Over the last several decades, for instance, far fewer blacks than whites worried that the federal government was too powerful. Similarly, in surveys conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s, blacks were much more likely than whites to approve of protest as a legitimate means to political change.

The differences cited here seem primarily to reflect racial group membership and identification and not education, income, or other correlated characteristics: multivariate analysis sustains race as the preeminent predictor (Knoke, 1979). Moreover, political differences between blacks and whites rapidly diminish on questions that bear only obliquely on race. Although more blacks than whites support an activist federal government in the realms of employment, medical care, and housing, the differences are much less dramatic than on policies dealing directly with race. Thus, the power of racial group identifications is most pronounced on questions that bear directly and unambiguously on the fortunes of racial groups. This is no small thing, in a political system so deeply divided over race.

4. Values

Values are general and enduring standards. In theoretical reconstructions of belief systems, they are usually accorded a more central position than are attitudes. According to Allport (1961), attitudes in fact depend on pre-

existing social values (pp. 802-803). And according to Rokeach (1973), values ". . . lead us to take particular positions on social issues"; "predispose us to favor one particular political or religious ideology over another"; help us ". . . to evaluate and judge, to heap praise and fix blame on ourselves and others" (p. 13). Presumably the psychological machinery here is quite simple. Proposals and events are supported to the degree they are understood to further cherished values and to impede pernicious ones (Rosenberg, 1968; Dawson, 1979). Here I concentrate on a pair of values that seem particularly relevant to contemporary American politics: *individualism* and *egalitarianism* (Hofstadter, 1948; Huntington, 1981; Lipset, 1963; Merton, 1957; Myrdal, 1944; Pole, 1978; Verba, Orren, & Ferree, 1981).

To 19th century French writers in the aftermath of the Revolution, individualism meant the disintegration of social solidarity and the appalling collapse of social purpose. This was never the view in the United States. Here individualism has always stood for the beneficence of democracy and capitalism. As Lukes (1973) put it, American individualism is "a symbolic catchword of immense ideological significance," incorporating under one label "equal individual rights, limited government, *laissez-faire,* natural justice and equal opportunity, and individual freedom, moral development and dignity" (p. 20). For our purpose it is useful to examine in detail just one politically consequential strain of individualism, that which pertains to economic life.

Economic individualism includes a presumption against government regulation of economic conduct. It celebrates the virtues of hard work and sacrifice. It equates idleness with sin. Its most central element is the conviction that in America, the hard-working and talented, regardless of origin, will eventually find success.

Defined in these ways, economic individualism is widely endorsed by Americans—even by poor Americans, whose own experiences are evidently insufficient to shake support for the individualistic creed. " 'All men can better themselves': the circumstances of American life do not imprison men in their class or station—if there is such a prison, the iron bars are within each man." So argue the working-class men of Eastport (Lane, 1962, p. 61); the middle-class and the rich, naturally enough, agree (Feldman, 1983; Goodban, 1981; Huber & Form, 1973; Hyman, 1953; Schlozman & Verba, 1979).

Americans are also inclined to believe that the poor deserve their poverty. Explanations of poverty that emphasize exploitation, prejudice, or collapse of the educational system attract faint support. The primary causes of poverty are located instead within the poor themselves (Feagin, 1975; Feldman, 1983; Gurin, Gurin, Lao, & Beattie, 1969; Gurin, Gurin, & Morrison, 1978; Ryan, 1971; Strumpel, 1976). Popular *cures* for poverty also reflect the imprint of individualism. Economic hardships can (and should) be surmounted through individual diligence and discipline. Collective efforts are judged to be much less desirable—even by those crippled by economic deprivation (Feldman, 1983; Gurin *et al.,* 1969; Sniderman & Brody, 1977).

Each of these components of economic individualism has its parallel in Americans' racial beliefs. While acknowledging the existence of some racial discrimination, white Americans believe that opportunities are plentiful for blacks; that blacks are themselves largely to blame for their disadvantaged

economic position; and that blacks—like everyone else—can and should overcome poverty, discrimination, and other obstacles through individual effort, not through collective efforts, and especially not through "government handouts" (Feldman, 1983; Kinder & Sears, 1981).

Direct evidence on the consequences of individualism for political belief is unfortunately mainly circumstantial, as in the discovery of a form of racial prejudice—called "symbolic racism"—that seems to fuse conventional anti-black sentiments with traditional American values, economic individualism most of all. Symbolic racism appears to underly whites' opposition to welfare, "reverse discrimination," "forced" busing, and other government programs that violate individualism (Sears & Kinder, 1971; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Kinder & Sears, 1981). Whereas white Americans support compensatory programs that foster equal opportunity for blacks, they strongly oppose preferential treatment that guarantees racially equal results, since to do so would amount to a desecration of individualism (Lipset & Schneider, 1981). In these terms welfare represents government's betrayal of the effort and sacrifice of those who do work—for the comfortable middle class of Orange County (Lamb, 1973) as for the working class men of Boston (Sennett & Cobb, 1972).

Common to these otherwise divergent investigations is the conclusion that values—economic individualism in particular—shape opinions on politics—social welfare and racial policy in particular. Also common to these investigations, unfortunately, is their circumstantial quality. It is alleged that economic individualism underlies political belief. But because the two are never assessed independently, we remain uncertain about the connection that supposedly joins them.

More direct efforts correct this limitation although they have problems of their own. For instance, Feldman's (1983) analysis of the 1972 SRC/CPS National Election Study reveals consistent associations between economic individualism on the one hand and resistance to social welfare policy on the other. Embracing the caricature of America as the land of opportunity appears to dull enthusiasm for government subsidized health care and employment. "Appears to" is used advisedly, for Feldman's analysis presumes that values cause beliefs unilaterally. Perhaps they do; certainly his evidence that Americans' beliefs about economic opportunity are impressively stable between 1972 and 1976 is consistent with this point. But opinions on policy questions might also influence the priorities people assign to values (this same reservation applies as well to Conover and Feldman, 1980, and to Feagin, 1975). In short, more conclusive evidence on the power of individualism awaits a more sophisticated analysis, one that allows for more complex causal possibilities.

Individualism has often competed against egalitarianism in American political history (Lipset, 1963; Ladd & Lipset, 1981). It is a competition that egalitarianism has often lost. As Pole (1978) put it: ". . . only at comparatively rare—and then generally stormy—intervals has the idea of equality dominated American debates on major questions of policy. Equality is normally the language of the underdog. . ." (p. ix). The consequences of the American commitment to egalitarianism are nevertheless apparent: in the

comparatively early institutionalization of universal suffrage, in Americans' widespread support for public education, and in the now nearly unanimous opposition among the white majority to racial discrimination (Lipset, 1963; Lipset & Schneider, 1981; Ladd & Lipset, 1981).

More pointed evidence on egalitarianism is difficult to obtain. The best, perhaps, is provided by Rokeach (1973). In a national survey undertaken shortly after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Rokeach found that the importance individual whites attached to equality was associated with their reactions to the King assassination—egalitarians more often reported anger and shame—and with their support for racial desegregation—egalitarians more often supported desegregation efforts. In the entire sample, moreover, egalitarianism was associated with sympathy for the poor, enthusiasm for social welfare policies, support for anti-Vietnam War student protests, and opposition to the war itself. Rokeach also found that equality was prized much more by blacks than by whites: in a list of 18 values, blacks ranked equality second while whites placed it 11th. All this evidence certainly sustains Pole (1978)—equality does indeed seem to be the language of the underdog—but cannot solve the causal question. Does egalitarianism lead to support for racial integration or is it the other way round?

Again we are left dangling. According to the most perceptive observers, individualism and egalitarianism are central to the American political tradition. They seem clearly implanted in American public policy and social practice, and they are somehow bound up with the public's political beliefs. But do values in fact drive the opinions people hold about politics? We do not know yet.

5. *Inferences from History*

The final alternative considered here, history, requires a change in perspective. So far I have tried to suggest the ways in which particular opinions might be derived from general dispositions, like group identification or core values. Now I want to introduce an explicitly dynamic component to public opinion and suggest how everyday thinking about politics is influenced by the unfolding of events.

The last ten years have seen an explosion of scholarly work on the impact of history on changes in American public opinion. Research has focused, variously, on the public's support for racial integration and racial equality (Greeley & Sheatsley, 1971; Taylor, Sheatsley, & Greeley, 1978); on the trust Americans place in their national government (Miller, 1974; Citrin, 1974); on opposition to war (Mueller, 1973); and on what problems the American public regards as important (Behr & Iyengar, 1982; Hibbs, 1979; MacKuen, 1981). Here, for illustrative purposes, I will concentrate on two especially consequential cases: the effects of events on changes in party identification and on changes in support for the president.

The American Voter defined party identification as a "durable attachment, not readily disturbed by passing events and personalities." Indeed, "only an event of extraordinary intensity can arouse any significant part of the electorate to the point that its established party loyalties are shaken" (p. 151).

Critics have since disagreed, arguing that party identification should be regarded *not* as a standing decision, but as a ". . . running balance sheet on the two parties" (Fiorina, 1977, p. 618). Is party identification responsive to new events or is it not?

A first point to make is that individual Americans do not take their commitment to party lightly. While two-year continuity coefficients for policy opinions hover around .35, the corresponding coefficient for party identification is about .85. Moreover, movement consists primarily of people traveling in and out of the Independent categories, rather than from one party to the other (Converse, 1964; Converse & Markus, 1979).

That party identification falls short of perfect stability, however, leaves room for the possibility that voters withdraw or invest support in the parties as their appraisal of events dictate. There is now good evidence that this does happen. Change in party identification does reflect a kind of running balance sheet on the performance of government—most notably, on matters of peace and war, unemployment and inflation, and civil rights (Fiorina, 1981; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981; Rivers, 1980). For example, changes in Americans' intensity of party identification between 1972 and 1976 followed changes in their assessments of the parties' performance on economic matters. Across the four years, Democrats identified more strongly with their party when they took a dim view of the current (Republican) administration's economic performance; Republicans showed the complementary pattern, though not as consistently nor as strongly (Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981). These results support the revisionist position in principle without, however, doing much violence to the traditional conception of party identification as a standing decision. Although statistically respectable and theoretically important, the effects cited here are not large.

Policy disagreements may also motivate party change. In an analysis of the Jennings-Niemi 1965-1973 panel study, Markus (1979) found modest movement toward the Democratic Party among high school seniors in 1965 provoked by opposition to the Vietnam War and by support for racial integration. (For additional evidence of the impact of policy positions on party identification, see Jackson, 1975a, 1975b; Franklin & Jackson, 1981.)

Finally, voting for the opposition party's candidate also leads to shifts in party support. In this respect, Knoke's probing of the 1956-1960 SRC panel (1977, Chapter 6) fits nicely with Markus and Converse's (1979) exploration of the 1972-1976 panel. Both concluded that voting against party in one election diminishes identification with the party in subsequent elections. Again, however, the effects were modest. Conversion from one party to the other would require, by these estimates, an uninterrupted and extended *series* of contrary votes—a path few voters follow.

So party identification is *not* immovable; it is influenced by the performance of government, by policy disagreements, and by the emergence of new candidates. The loyalty citizens feel for party is at least partially a function of what governments and parties do, and what they fail to do.[7]

History also leaves its mark on the president's ability to muster support in the general public. Between election periods, the incumbent president's popularity soars and, much more often, declines. With the exception of

Eisenhower, every president since Franklin Roosevelt has departed from office less popular than when he entered it. This singular fact led Mueller (1973), who was the first to examine the dynamics of presidential support systematically, to include time in his regression equation. According to Mueller's estimates, a president's popularity suffers a bit during deep recessions and unpopular wars and is boosted temporarily during international crises. But the overriding determinant of a president's support is simply time. Mueller concluded that time erodes a president's support because more time means more opportunities to ". . . create intense, unforgiving opponents of former supporters" (1973, p. 205).

Mueller's pioneering procedure has since been criticized. Kernell (1978), among others (see, for example, Brody & Page, 1975), argued that time merely covers the events that are in fact responsible for fluctuations in presidential support and that to include time in prediction equations is necessarily to preempt the possibility of identifying those events.

With time removed, with more adequate measures of events, and with more appropriate estimation techniques, change in presidential support turns out to be closely tied to performance. A president's support depends first on the vitality of the nation's economy; high unemployment, rising prices, slow growth in real disposable income, all eat away at a president's support. So does American involvement in unpopular wars; as the number of Americans killed in action in Vietnam grew, public support for Presidents Johnson and Nixon deteriorated. Presidents also suffer when they flagrantly violate, or at least appear to violate, the public's trust. During the Watergate period, with each additional incriminating revelation, President Nixon's support dwindled. Finally, dramatic, sharply focused international crises involving the president typically boost his support. No doubt President Carter was the greatest recent beneficiary of this phenomenon. The seizure of the American embassy in Teheran followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan produced an extraordinary surge in popular support for the President—enough of a boost, perhaps, for Carter to repel Kennedy's challenge in the primary season (Hibbs, Rivers, & Vasilatos, 1982a, 1982b; Kernell, 1978; Kernell & Hibbs, 1981).

Considered together, economic conditions, war, scandal, and international crises explain virtually all of the over time variation in presidential support. This implies that public opinion is sharply responsive in the aggregate to conspicuous national and international events.

Of course, history does not announce its lessons simply and neatly. Events must be interpreted. According to my earlier analysis, the meaning of events should be revealed in part as they are filtered through the citizen's own needs, group identifications, core values, and the like. Hints that this is so can be found in recent and more refined investigations into the dynamics of presidential support. Hibbs and his colleagues (1982b) examined approval trends within occupational groups. Blue and white-collar workers responded in highly similar fashion to international crises and to Watergate revelations. Elsewhere, however, interesting class differences emerged. First, the impact of mounting American casualties in Vietnam on presidential support was greater among the working class than among the middle class. And second,

while the effect of change in the unemployment rate on presidential ratings was more pronounced among working class Americans than among the middle class, this was reversed for inflation: changes in prices influenced the president's support more among the middle class than among the working class.

These results may be seen in terms of self-interest. Thus the Vietnam findings "square with data indicating that the children of lower-status workers suffered a disproportionate share of the casualties" (Hibbs *et al.*, 1982b, p. 324). And the unemployment/inflation results are broadly consistent with the distribution of "the burdens and rewards conferred by fluctuations in aggregate economic conditions" (p. 326).

Both sets of results are compatible with other interpretations, however. Regarding the first, Schuman's (1973) investigation of American antiwar sentiment identified two forms of opposition to the Vietnam war: one moral, based on criticism of the war's goals and how it was conducted; and another pragmatic, based on disillusionment over failing to win it. The moral calculus was more prevalent among middle-class opponents; the pragmatic calculus motivated working-class opposition to the war. So the presidential approval results may reflect not class bias in the distribution of casualties (and therefore, self-interest), but class differences in the logic by which the war was evaluated.

That the working-class seems especially sensitive to changes in the unemployment rate in their presidential evaluations while the middle-class is influenced especially by changes in inflation may also be interpreted in terms other than self-interest. For one thing, Americans whose personal lives have been visited by serious economic difficulties are generally no more likely to disparage the president's performance than are the economically untroubled (Kinder, 1981). For another, while the Democratic party draws its supporters disproportionately from the working-class, the Republicans do better among the middle-class. And in the post-war period at least, the Democratic Party has championed the maintenance of full employment, while the Republican Party has worried more about restraining inflation. Hence the class difference may conceal what is really a partisan difference. Indeed, when the presidential approval model is re-estimated within *party* groups, the unemployment/inflation differences are greater than in the social class analysis. That is, changes in unemployment affect the support given to the president by Democrats more than by Republicans, while changes in prices affect the support of Republicans more than Democrats, and these differences are more pronounced than the corresponding class differences (Hibbs *et al.*, 1982b).

In short, while the particular processes that underlie the dynamics of presidential support are not yet clear, there can be no doubt about the general point: that the lessons of history are filtered through the citizen's own individual dispositions. Furthermore, the basic relationship at the aggregate level seems well established. Changes in presidential support are driven by salient and consequential changes in national and international life.

Summary

The sources of Americans' political beliefs are pluralistic. Political beliefs are, in the first place, badges of social membership; I have stressed the allegiances people develop to class and race. Political beliefs also reflect other social characteristics that at certain moments, on certain public questions, become politically relevant: ethnicity (e.g., Greeley, 1975), religion (e.g., Converse, 1966; Lipset, 1963), gender (e.g., Klein, 1983), union membership (e.g., Converse & Campbell, 1968), and more. This list of course does not solve the persistent mystery of how sociological categories are transformed into psychological identifications, or how identifications, once formed, are successfully mobilized. Nor does it make clear the point at which group interest ends and self-interest begins. These are serious problems for future research.

Political beliefs also seem to reflect the values citizens embrace. Underneath Americans' continuing ambivalence toward race, welfare, affirmative action, and income redistribution, is a more fundamental struggle between egalitarianism and individualism. Political beliefs sometimes have still deeper, more personal roots; they may occasionally be resolutions of needs or the symptoms of inner distress. Political ideas of a fundamental sort are also driven by the "lessons of history"; war, recession, and other lesser events leave their imprint on the attachments Americans develop to their parties and their presidents. Finally, for a thin slice of the American public, political beliefs are governed by ideology; they are deductions from elaborate and abstract ideas about the nature of government and society.

When set against all this evidence, the earlier conclusion of ideological innocence must be modified. Americans are not creatures of coherent, wide-ranging ideologies. But their ideas do seem to reflect, in complex ways, preferences of modest scope. They are for some groups, and against others. They desire some values, and oppose others. In this sense, Americans' political beliefs *are* ideological. More generally, American public opinion is of many and diverse pieces, a mosaic of partisan attachments, social relations, values, and personality.

MOVING ON

Twenty years ago, V. O. Key could complain, with considerable justification, that the study of public opinion had been taken over by social psychologists. The result, according to Key, was "a large body of research findings characterized often by methodological virtuosity and on occasion even by theoretical felicity, [but] whose relevance for the workings of government is not always apparent" (1961, p. vii). In this final section I argue on the side of the angels—for methodological virtuosity and especially for theoretical felicity. Unlike Key, I recommend a deeper penetration of public opinion research by psychological concepts. The penetration should proceed along two lines: (1) by exploiting recent developments that emphasize the tacit theories (or "schemas") people hold about their world; and (2) by applying re-

cent work on emotion, under the assumption that the underpinnings of political opinion are not only informational but also affective.

Prototypes, Stereotypes, and Scripts

An honorable and useful tradition in public opinion research is to treat people as if they were collections of discrete opinions. The interesting research puzzles then have to do with the strength and durability of the connections between opinions. People do more than take positions on specific topics, however. One other thing they do is try to understand what is going on, whether it be crisis in the Mideast, revolution in Central America, or recession at home. Trying to understand the persons, events, and circumstances that constitute political life is a noble and, to a certain degree, natural goal on the citizen's part. Understanding how citizens go about this would also seem to be a noble and natural goal for the public opinion analyst.

Those so inclined would be well advised to take advantage of a general theory of understanding being developed in cognitive science (see Anderson & Bower, 1973; Schank & Abelson, 1977). This theory—more precisely, this *family* of theories—takes understanding to be a process whereby new events are interpreted in terms of old knowledge. Happenings are understood to the degree that they are recognized as particular instances of familiar general types. Thus the news that the Reagan administration is stepping up military assistance to El Salvador may be understood by some as one more doomed, imperialist misadventure. Understanding the particular event comes through the eliciting of a general interpretive framework.

In psychological parlance, such frameworks are customarily referred to as "schemas" (Bartlett, 1932; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Schemas are informal, tacit theories people hold about the world—about other people (called "prototypes": Rosch, 1977; Cantor & Mischel, 1979), about groups in society ("stereotypes": Hamilton, 1981), and about sequences of events ("scripts": Abelson, 1981; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Schemas provide the context within which new developments are understood.

In principle, schemas do this efficiently. They serve the average person much as formal, explicit theories serve the scientist. They provide explanations. They clear up ambiguities. They furnish predictions. They supply proposals for intervention and reform.

There is, of course, every reason to expect that the tacit theories of ordinary men and women will be less complete and less internally consistent than the formal theories of professional scientists. The ordinary person's sometimes extraordinary notions about, say, how the economy works, or the meaning of communism, or what a Democratic presidential candidate is likely to believe about energy conservation, may be utterly wrong. And even if not wildly incorrect, schemas are necessarily simpler than the events that evoke them. Nuanced and textured appreciation for a particular event gets sacrificed to the economies that accrue with the event's classification as a general type. Schema-based understanding is efficient, and given the peripheral place of politics for most people, perhaps irresistible, but it has its limitations.

If approaching political understanding from the perspective afforded by

"schema theory" is sensible, then research on the *content* of political schemas is overdue. As Schank and Abelson (1977) put it:

> There is a very long theoretical stride . . . from the idea that highly structured knowledge dominates the understanding process, to the specification of the details of the most appropriate structures. It does not take one very far to say that schemas are important: one must know the content of the schemas. (p. 10)

Jervis (1976) has taken an effective step in this direction in his analysis of foreign policy decision-makers. According to Jervis, the scripts held by diplomats and other experts derive from superficial analysis of cataclysmic historical events (e.g., the "Munich script"). Once learned, such scripts are applied rather indiscriminately. In their interpretation of events, foreign policy decision-makers honor their scripts too much while paying too little attention to the events themselves.

Jervis tells a convincing story about diplomats, but he has nothing to say about ordinary folks. Several recent demonstrations, however, imply the promise of the schema concept for the general public as well. These include studies of the assumptions people make about the attributes of Democratic and Republican candidates, using testing and measurement procedures borrowed from cognitive psychology (Bastedo & Lodge, 1980); the theories ordinary people hold about the relations between economics and politics, which emphasize assumptions both about the causes of economic problems (national and personal) and their solutions (Kinder & Mebane, 1983); computer simulation of ordinary understanding of international events (Carbonell, 1978; also see Abelson, 1963); and the normative prototypes people hold about the characteristics of an ideal president (Kinder, Peters, Abelson, & Fiske, 1981). These results hint that schema may eventually become a standard part of the public opinion analyst's vocabulary.[8]

Opinion and Affect

Another custom in research and writing on public opinion over the last twenty years has been to treat people as if they were accountants. The typical American is portrayed as a bloodless calculator, who arrives at opinions by computation. "Which position advantages my group, promotes my values, reflects my ideology?" Americans ask themselves.

The accountant metaphor has its roots in the general rational tradition in Western thought. It is nourished also by the growing enthusiasm in political science for economic styles of analysis. The style is illustrated best in Downs' (1957) enormously influential *An Economic Theory of Democracy,* which presumes that citizens come to their political choices through a careful calculation of benefits and costs. That is, they approach "every situation with one eye to the gains to be had, the other eye on costs, a delicate ability to balance them, and a strong desire to follow wherever rationality leads" (Downs, 1957, pp. 7-8). The accountant metaphor has been aided and abetted also by what Tompkins (1981) called "cognitive imperialism" in psychol-

ogy, the tendency to reduce all of mental life to the management and processing of information.[9]

The metaphor has its uses, but it is drastically incomplete. It ignores emotion. The underpinnings of opinion are partly informational, but also partly affective. Though perhaps not often, and hardly ever for everyone, politics entails passion: grief, when a president is assassinated; anxiety, when one resigns; hope, when a new president takes office; anger, when an American embassy is overrun; indignation, over racial injustice; fear, at the prospect of nuclear war. Where do such feelings appear in contemporary accounts of public opinion? They scarcely appear at all.

They may appear eventually, however, thanks in part to a renaissance of theorizing about emotion currently underway in social psychology. Particularly provocative in this respect is Zajonc's (1980) allegation that the evaluations people make are determined by two largely independent systems: a crude and fast affective one, and a slower, more detailed, cognitive one. Zajonc suggests further that the affective system may often dominate the cognitive one.

Political events no doubt differ widely in the degree to which they elicit affective response. Affect may be greatest when events bear on group identity and threaten core values. One promising place to investigate the affective underpinnings of public opinion seems therefore to be in the public's reactions to presidential candidates, whose campaigns, after all, attempt to mobilize group identity and exploit core values. Candidate popularity should be based not only on citizens' analysis of the candidate's personal traits and policy positions but also on the affective reactions the candidate evokes. According to several recent national surveys, affective reactions to presidential candidates were in fact widespread; particular candidates elicited distinctive profiles of affective response—Edward Kennedy elicited anger and sadness; Jimmy Carter, frustration and unease. The inclination to report positive feelings for a particular candidate was only faintly related to the failure to report negative feelings (i.e., *mixed* feelings were the norm). Most important, affective reactions were not at all redundant with trait judgments or policy opinions; affect contributed independently and powerfully to overall evaluation (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Kinder & Abelson, 1981; on the last point, for parallel results in a different domain, see Tyler, 1980).

Postscript

The considerable commotion over public opinion reviewed in the preceding pages is usually justified on the assumption that, somehow or other, public opinion influences what government does. As Key (1961) put it, the study of public opinion is "bootless unless the findings about the preferences, aspirations, and prejudices of the public can be connected with the workings of the governmental system" (p. 535). But it might also be said that the study of public opinion will always be bootless if we cannot manage to get the basic findings straight. In this essay I have tried to straighten out our understanding of some findings, to describe where the study of public opinion has been, and to suggest where it might travel next—all this, so that we might be

better equipped to take on, as Key prescribed, the deeper mysteries of citizens and their governments.

FOOTNOTES

1. Chapters 7, 20 and Appendix 2C of the "enlarged edition" of *The Changing American Voter* should not be read without consulting the corrections furnished by Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1981).
2. This conclusion does not go to whether structure is estimated better by the old-style questions or by the new. With Sullivan and his colleagues (1978), I favor the latter, both because they encourage acquiescence less (Jackson, 1979), and because they capture better the essence of classical liberal-conservative debate. Hence Converse's original analysis understated the public's capacity to develop consistent issue positions.
3. Opinion instability may also reflect either real attitude change—citizens may change their minds on matters of public policy—or change in attitude objects—opinions may change when the meaning of the policy changes, as the intrusion of racial busing has changed the meaning of school desegregation. Converse and his critics suppose these changes to be empirically improbable. In the first place, the policy questions under examination reflect long-standing debates between political elites. On issues like federal aid to schools, the basic arguments were stated decades ago and have not much changed. Second, if the sources of instability were to be located in real change—either in attitude or in attitude object—then such change should cumulate. As conservative tides run throughout the country, citizens should move predominantly in a conservative direction across a set of policy questions. But this does not happen. For the periods and policies examined, about as many citizens drift leftward as turn to the right. As a consequence, the robust circulation of opinion at the individual level cancels at the aggregate level. The juxtaposition of the two—stability in the distribution of opinion in the aggregate coupled with substantial shuffling of opinion among individuals—leads to the suspicion that turnover at the individual level should *not* be ascribed to real change.
4. This conclusion is supported by the observation that public opinion is sensitive to the context of opinion elicitation. Opinion varies as a function of question wording (Bennett, 1975, chapter 4; Mueller, 1973, p. 44; Schuman & Presser, 1981; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and question order (Bishop *et al.*, 1982; Sears & Lau, 1983; Schuman & Kalton, 1983; Turner & Kraus, 1978). The sometimes striking susceptibility of public opinion to context implies that Americans often fail to supply their own.
5. Of course, the ideographic approach need not—and has not—relied exclusively on in-depth interviewing. More objective data collection and analysis procedures that still permit a measure of idiosyncracy in belief organizations have also been used, such as individual difference multidimensional scaling (Marcus *et al.*, 1974) and Q-methodology and factor analysis (Bennett, 1975; Brown, 1970, 1980; Conover & Feldman, 1982). These approaches center attention on *personalized* systems of beliefs, trying with some success to demonstrate, as Bennett (1975) put it, that "all people don't make sense of politics in the same way, but most people make sense of politics in some way" (pp. 18-19).
6. One of the embarrassments of this literature is the relentless way social scientists have pursued the neurotic underpinnings of *conservative* beliefs. On the authoritarianism of the left, see Rokeach, 1960.

7. I do not mean to press this too hard, however. Although party identification does respond to political events, it does so sluggishly. It is one thing for Republicans to feel less enthusiastic toward their party after a period of sustained national difficulty presided over by a Republican administration; it is quite another to embrace the opposition. The latter seldom happens. In this respect, the running balance sheet metaphor is quite misleading.
8. To speak of *the public's* prototype or stereotype or script implies a uniformity that I do not intend. Schemas no doubt vary from one citizen to the next in their inferential richness. There are those among us who find intrigue and high drama in even minor political developments. There are many others, who, out of cynicism, apathy, or a preoccupation with other activities, could scarcely care less. Schemas held by the politically expert are likely to be more elaborate, more easily evoked, and put to more sensitive use, than are those held by citizens less enchanted by politics (Fiske & Kinder, 1981).
9. Prototypes, schemas, and scripts of course contribute to cognitive imperialism, and, therefore, indirectly to the metaphor of the accountant.

REFERENCES

Abelson, R. P. Computer simulation of "hot cognition." In S. Tompkins & S. Messick (Eds.), *Computer simulation of personality.* New York: Wiley, 1963.

Abelson, R. P. Social clusters and opinion clusters. In P. W. Holland & S. Leinhardt (Eds.), *Perspectives on social network research.* New York: Academic Press, 1975.

Abelson, R. P. The psychological status of the script concept. *American Psychologist,* 1981, *36,* 715-729.

Abelson, R. P., Kinder, D. R., Peters, M. D., & Fiske, S. T. Affective and semantic components in political person perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 1982, *42,* 619-630.

Aberbach, J. D., Putnam, R. D., & Rockman, B. A. *Bureaucrats and politicians in western democracies.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Abramson, P. R. Generational change in the American electorate. *American Political Science Review,* 1974, *68,* 93-105.

Achen, C. H. Mass political attitudes and the survey response. *American Political Science Review,* 1975, *69,* 1218-1231.

Achen, C. H. Toward theories of political data. In A. W. Finifter (Ed.), *Political science: The state of the discipline.* Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1983.

Adorno, T. W. Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. *The authoritarian personality.* New York: Harper and Row, 1950.

Alford, R. R. *Party and society: The Anglo-American democracies.* Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963.

Allport, G. W. *Pattern and growth in personality.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961.

Anderson, J., & Bower, G. *Human associative memory.* Washington, D.C.: Winston-Wiley, 1973.

Bartlett, F. C. *Remembering.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932.

Barton, A. H., & Parsons, R. W. Measuring belief system structure. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1977, *41,* 159-180.

Bastedo, R. W., & Lodge, M. The meaning of party labels. *Political Behavior,* 1980, *2,* 287-308.

Behr, R. L., & Iyengar, S. Television news, real-world cues, and changes in the public agenda. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Public Opinion Research, Hunt Valley, Maryland, 1982.

Bennett, W. L. *The political mind and the political environment.* Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976.

Bennett, W. L. The growth of knowledge in mass belief studies: An epistemological critique. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1977, *21,* 465-500.

Bishop, G. F., Oldendick, R. W., & Tuchfarber, A. J. Political information processing: Question order and context effects. *Political Behavior,* 1982, *4,* 177-200.

Brody, R. A., & Page, B. I. The impact of events on Presidential popularity: The Johnson and Nixon administrations. In A. Wildavsky (Ed.), *Perspectives on the presidency.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1975.

Brody, R. A., & Sniderman, P. M. From life space to polling place: The relevance of personal concerns for voting behavior. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1977, *7,* 337-360.

Brown, R. *Social psychology.* New York: Free Press, 1965.

Brown, S. R. Consistency and the persistence of ideology: some experimental results. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1970, *34,* 60-68.

Brown, S. R. *Political subjectivity.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.

Butler, D., & Stokes, D. *Political change in Britain* (2nd ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974.

Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. *The American voter.* New York: Wiley, 1960.

Cantor, N., & Mischel, W. Categorization processes in the perception of people. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.). *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 12). New York: Academic Press, 1979.

Carbonell, J. G. POLITICS: Automated ideological reasoning. *Cognitive Science,* 1978, *2,* 27-51.

Centers, R. *The psychology of social classes.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949.

Citrin, J. Comment: The political relevance of trust in government. *American Political Science Review,* 1974, *68,* 973-988.

Conover, P. J., & Feldman, S. Belief system organization in the American electorate: An alternative approach. In J. C. Pierce & J. L. Sullivan (Eds.). *The electorate reconsidered.* Sage: Beverly Hills, 1980.

Conover, P. J., & Feldman, S. The origins and meanings of liberal/conservative self-identifications. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 617-645.

Conover, P. J. & Feldman, S. How people organize the political world: A schematic model. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, CO, 1982.

Converse, P. E. The shifting role of class in political attitudes and behavior. In E. E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb, & E. L. Hartley (Eds.). *Readings in social psychology* (3rd ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winton, 1958.

Converse, P. E. Attitudes and non-attitudes: Continuation of a dialogue. Paper presented at meeting of the International Congress of Psychology, Washington, D.C. Published in 1970 in E. R. Tufte (Ed.). *The quantitative analysis of social problems.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1963.

Converse, P. E. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.). *Ideology and discontent.* New York: Free Press, 1964.

Converse, P. E. Religion and politics: The 1960 election. In A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, & D. E. Stokes. *Elections and the political order.* New York: Wiley, 1966.

Converse, P. E. Comment: The status of nonattitudes. *American Political Science Review,* 1974, *68,* 650-660.

Converse, P. E. Public opinion and voting behavior. In F. Greenstein & N. Polsby

(Eds.). *Handbook of political science* (Vol. 4). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975. (a)

Converse, P. E. Some mass elite contrasts in the perception of political spaces. *Social Science Information,* 1975, *14,* 49-83. (b)

Converse, P. E. Comment: Rejoinder to Judd and Milburn. *American Sociological Review,* 1980, *45,* 644-646.

Converse, P. E., & Campbell, A. Political standards in secondary groups. In D. Cartwright & A. Zander (Eds.). *Group dynamics* (3rd ed.). New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Converse, P. E., Dodson, J., Hoag, W. J., & McGee, W. H. *American social attitudes data sourcebook, 1947-1978.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Converse, P. E., & Markus, G. B. Plus ca change. . . : The new CPS election study panel. *American Political Science Review,* 1979, *73,* 32-49.

Converse, P. E., & Pierce, R. *Political representation in France.* Unpublished manuscript, ISR, University of Michigan, 1983.

Dawson, P. A. The formation and structure of political belief systems. *Political Behavior,* 1979, *1,* 99-122.

Denney, W. M., Hendricks, J. S., & Kinder, D. R. Personal stakes versus symbolic politics. Paper delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Cincinnati, Ohio, May 29-June 3, 1980.

Downs, A. *An economic theory of democracy.* New York: Harper, 1957.

Erikson, R. S. The SRC panel data and mass political attitudes. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *9,* 89-114.

Feagin, J. R. *Subordinating the poor.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1975.

Feldman, S. Economic individualism and mass belief systems. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1983, *11,* 3-29.

Field, J. O., & Anderson, R. E. Ideology in the public's conceptualization of the 1964 election. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1969, *33,* 380-398.

Fiorina, M. P. An outline for a model of party choice. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1977, *21,* 601-626.

Fiorina, M. P. *Retrospective voting in American national elections.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

Fiske, S. T., & Kinder, D. R. Involvement, expertise, and schema use: Evidence from political cognition. In N. Cantor & J. Kihlstrom (Eds.). *Personality, cognition, and social interaction.* Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1981.

Franklin, C. H., & Jackson, J. E. The dynamics of party identification. Unpublished manuscript, Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1981.

Gatlin, D. S., Giles, M. W., & Cataldo, E. F. Policy support within a target group: The case of school desegregation. *American Political Science Review,* 1978, *72,* 985-995.

Goodban, N. A. *Attributions about poverty.* Unpublished thesis, Department of Psychology and Social Relations, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1981.

Greeley, A. M. A model for ethnic political socialization. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1975, *19,* 187-206.

Greeley, A. M., & Sheatsley, P. B. Attitudes toward racial integration. *Scientific American,* 1971, *223,* 13-19.

Greenstein, F. I. Personality and politics. In F. I. Greenstein & N. W. Polsby (Eds.). *Handbook of political science* (Vol. 2): *Theoretical aspects of micropolitics.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975.

Gurin, P., Gurin, G., Lao, R., & Beattie, M. Internal-external control in the motivational dynamics of Negro youth. *Journal of Social Issues,* 1969, *25,* 29-53.

Gurin, P., Gurin, G., & Morrison, B. M. Personal and ideological aspects of internal and external control. *Social Psychology,* 1978, *41,* 275-296.

Hamilton, D. L. (Ed.). *Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup behavior.* Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1981.

Hamilton, R. F. *Class and politics in the United States.* New York: John Wiley, 1972.

Hibbs, D. A., Jr. The mass public and macro-economic performance: The dynamics of public opinion toward unemployment and inflation. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *23,* 705-731.

Hibbs, D. A., Jr., Rivers, R. D., & Vasilatos, N. On the demand for economic outcomes: Macroeconomic performance and mass political support in the United States, Great Britain, and Europe. *Journal of Politics,* 1982, *44,* 426-462. (a)

Hibbs, D. A., Jr., Rivers, R. D., & Vasilatos, N. The dynamics of political support for American presidents among occupational and partisan groups. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1982, *26,* 312-332. (b)

Hochschild, J. L. *What's fair? American beliefs about distributive justice.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Hofstadter, R. *The American political tradition.* New York: Vintage, 1948.

Holm, J. D., & Robinson, J. P. Ideological identification and the American voter. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1978, *42,* 235-246.

Huber, J., & Form, W. H. *Income and ideology.* New York: The Free Press, 1973.

Huntington, S. P. *American politics: The promise of disharmony.* Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1981.

Hyman, H. H. The value systems of different classes. In R. Bendix & S. M. Lipset (Eds.). *Class, status, and power.* Glencoe: Free Press, 1953.

Hyman, H. H., & Sheatsley, P. B. The current status of American public opinion. In D. Katz, D. Cartwright, S. Eldersveld, & A. M. Lee (Eds.). *Public opinion and propaganda.* New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1954.

Inglehart, R. *The silent revolution.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Jackson, J. E. Issues and party alignment. In L. Maisel & P. M. Sacks (Eds.). *The future of political parties.* Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage, 1975. (a)

Jackson, J. E. Issues, party choices, and presidential votes. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1975, *19,* 161-185. (b)

Jackson, J. E. Statistical estimation of possible response bias in close-ended issue questions. *Political Methodology,* 1979, *6,* 393-423.

Jackson, J. E. The systematic beliefs of the mass public: Estimating policy preferences with survey data. Unpublished manuscript, Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1982.

Jervis, R. *Perception and misperception in international politics.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Judd, C. M., & Milburn, M. A. The structure of attitude systems in the general public: Comparisons of a structural equation model. *American Sociological Review,* 1980, *45,* 627-643.

Judd, C. M., Krosnick, J. A., & Milburn, M. A. Political involvement and attitude structure in the general public. *American Sociological Review,* 1981, *46,* 660-669.

Kagay, M. R., & Caldeira, G. A. A "reformed" electorate? Well, at least a changed electorate, 1952-1976. In W. J. Crotty (Ed.). *Paths to political reform.* Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1980.

Katz, D. The functional approach to the study of attitudes. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1960, *24,* 163-204.

Kernell, S. Explaining presidential popularity. *American Political Science Review,* 1978, *72,* 506-522.

Kernell, S., & Hibbs, D. A., Jr. A critical threshold model of presidential popularity. In D. A. Hibbs, Jr., & H. Fassbender (Eds.). *Contemporary political economy.*

Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1981.
Key, V. O., Jr. *Public opinion and American democracy.* New York: Knopf, 1961.
Kinder, D. R. Presidents, prosperity, and public opinion. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1981, *45,* 1-21.
Kinder, D. R., & Abelson, R. P. Appraising presidential candidates: Personality and affect in the 1980 campaign. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1981.
Kinder, D. R., & Kiewiet, D. R. Economic discontent and political behavior: The role of personal grievances and collective economic judgments in Congressional voting. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *23,* 495-527.
Kinder, D. R., & Kiewiet, D. R. Sociotropic politics. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *11,* 129-161.
Kinder, D. R., & Mebane, W. R., Jr. Politics and economics in everyday life. In K. Monroe (Ed.). *The political process and economic change.* New York: Agathon, 1983.
Kinder, D. R., Peters, M. D., Abelson, R. P., & Fiske, S. T. Presidential prototypes. *Political Behavior,* 1980, *2,* 315-337.
Kinder, D. R., & Rhodebeck, L. A. Continuities in support for racial equality, 1972 to 1976. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1982, *46,* 195-215.
Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 1981, *40,* 414-431.
Kinder, D. R. & Sears, D. O. Public opinion and political action. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.). *The handbook of social psychology* (3rd ed.). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1983.
Kirscht, J. P., & Dillehay, R. C. *Dimensions of authoritarianism.* Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1967.
Klein, E. D. *Consciousness and group politics: The rise of the contemporary feminist movement.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming.
Klingemann, H. D. Measuring ideological conceptualizations. In S. H. Barnes & M. Kaase et al., *Political action: Mass participation in five western democracies,* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979.
Klingemann, H. D., & Wright, W. E. Modes of conceptualization and the organization of issue beliefs in mass publics. Paper presented at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Montreal, Canada, 1973.
Knoke, D. *Change and continuity in American politics. The social bases of political parties.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.
Knoke, D. Stratification and the dimensions of American political orientations. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *23,* 772-791.
Ladd, E. C., Jr., & Hadley, C. D. *Transformations of the American party system.* New York: W.W. Norton, 1975.
Ladd, E. C., Jr., & Lipset, S. M. Public opinion and public policy. In P. Duignan & A. Rabushka (Eds.). *The United States in the 1980's.* Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1981.
Lamb, K. A. *As orange goes.* New York: W.W. Norton, 1974.
Lane, R. E. *Political ideology.* New York: The Free Press, 1962.
Lane, R. E. *Political thinking and consciousness. The private life of the political mind.* Chicago: Markham, 1969.
Lane, R. E. Patterns of political belief. In J. Knutson (Ed.). *Handbook of political psychology.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973.
Lau, R. R., Brown, T. A., & Sears, D. O. Self-interest and civilians' attitudes toward the Vietnam War. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1978, *42,* 464-483.

Levitin, T. E., & Miller, W. E. Ideological interpretations of presidential elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1979, *73,* 751-771.

Lippmann, W. *Public opinion.* New York: MacMillan, 1922.

Lipset, S. M. *The first new nation.* New York: Basic Books, 1963.

Lipset, S. M., & Schneider, W. *From discrimination to affirmative action: Public attitudes 1935-1980.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981.

Lowery, D., & Sigelman, L. Understanding the tax revolt: Eight explanations. *American Political Science Review,* 1981, *75,* 963-974.

Lukes, S. *Individualism.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973.

MacKuen, M. B. Social communication and the mass policy agenda. In M. B. MacKuen & S. L. Coombs (Eds.). *More than news: Media power in public affairs.* Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981.

Marcus, G. E., Tabb, D., & Sullivan, J. L. The application of individual differences scaling to the measurement of political ideologies. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1974, *18,* 405-420.

Markus, G. B. The political environment and the dynamics of public attitudes: A panel study. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *23,* 338-359.

Markus, G. B., & Converse, P. E. A dynamic simultaneous equation model of electoral choice. *American Political Science Review,* 1979, *73,* 1055-1070.

Martin, S. S. New methods lead to familiar results. *American Sociological Review,* 1981, *46,* 670-675.

McClosky, H. Consensus and ideology in American politics. *American Political Science Review,* 1964, *58,* 361-382.

McClosky, H., Hoffman, P. J., & O'Hara, R. Issue conflict and consensus among party leaders and followers. *American Political Science Review,* 1960, *54,* 406-427.

McConahay, J. B. Self-interest versus racial attitudes as correlates of anti-busing attitudes in Louisville. *Journal of Politics,* 1982, *4,* 692-720.

McConahay, J. B., & Hough, J. C., Jr. Symbolic racism. *Journal of Social Issues,* 1976, *32,* 23-46.

Merton, R. K. *Social theory and social structure.* New York: The Free Press, 1957.

Milburn, M. A., & Judd, C. M. Interpreting new methods in attitude structure research. *American Sociological Review,* 1981, *46,* 675-677.

Miller, A. H. Political issues and trust in government: 1964-1970. *American Political Science Review,* 1974, *68,* 951-972.

Miller, A. H., & Miller, W. E. Ideology in the 1972 election: Myth or reality? *American Political Science Review,* 1976, *70,* 832-849.

Miller, A. H., & Miller, W. E. Partisanship and performance: "Rational" choice in the 1976 Presidential election. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1977.

Miller, W. E., Miller, A. H., & Schneider, E. J. *American national election studies data sourcebook, 1952-1978.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Mueller, J. E. *War, presidents, and public opinion.* New York: John Wiley, 1973.

Myrdal, G. *An American dilemma.* New York: Harper and Row, 1944.

Nie, N. H., & Andersen, K. Mass belief systems revisited: Political change and attitude structure. *Journal of Politics,* 1974, *36,* 540-591.

Nie, N. H., Verba, S., & Petrocik, J. R. *The changing American voter.* Enlarged edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Nie, N. H., Verba, S., & Petrocik, J. R. Reply. *American Political Science Review,* 1981, *75,* 149-152.

Page, B. I. *Choices and echoes in presidential elections.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

Pierce, J. C. Party identification and the changing role of ideology in American politics. *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 1970, *14,* 25-42.

Pierce, J. C., & Rose, D. D. Nonattitudes and American public opinion. *American Political Science Review,* 1974, *68,* 626-649.

Pierce, J. C., & Hagner, P. R. Conceptualization and party identification: 1956-1976. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1982, *26,* 377-387.

Pole, J. R. *The pursuit of equality in American history.* Berkeley, CA.: University of California, 1978.

Prothro, J. W., & Grigg, C. M. Fundamental principles of democracy: Bases of agreement and disagreement. *Journal of Politics,* 1960, *22,* 276-294.

Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R. & Nanetti, R. Y. Attitude stability among Italian elites. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *23,* 463-494.

Rivers, D. The dynamics of party support in the American electorate, 1952-1976. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. In P. N. Johnson-Laird & P. C. Wason (Eds.). *Thinking.* Cambridge, MA:

Rokeach, M. *The open and closed mind: Investigations into the nature of belief systems and personality systems.* New York: Basic Books, 1960.

Rokeach, M. *The nature of human values.* New York: The Free Press, 1973.

Rosch, E. Classification of real-world objects: Origins and representations in cognition. In P. N. Johnson-Laird & P. C. Wason (Eds.). *Thinking.* Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Rosenberg, M. J. Hedonism, inauthenticity, and other goads toward expansion of consistency theory. In R. P. Abelson *et al.* (Eds.). *Theories of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968.

Ryan, W. *Blaming the victim.* New York: Random House, 1971.

Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. *Scripts, plans, goals and understanding.* Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977.

Schlozman, K. L., & Verba, S. *Injury to insult.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Schuman, H. Two sources of antiwar sentiment in America. *American Journal of Sociology,* 1973, *78,* 513-536.

Schuman, H. & Kalton, G. Survey methods and interviewing. In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (Eds.). *The handbook of social psychology* (3rd ed.). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1983.

Schuman, H., & Presser, S. *Questions and answers in attitude surveys. Experiments on question form, wording, and context.* New York: Academic Press, 1981.

Sears, D. O., & Citrin, J. *Tax revolt: Something for nothing in California.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Sears, D. O., Hensler, C. P., & Speer, L. K. Whites' opposition to "busing": Self-interest or symbolic racism? *American Political Science Review,* 1979, *73,* 369-384.

Sears, D. O., & Kinder, D. R. Racial tensions and voting in Los Angeles. In Werner Z. Hirsch (Ed.). *Los Angeles: Viability and prospects for metropolitan leadership.* New York: Praeger, 1971.

Sears, D. O., Lau, R. R., Tyler, T., & Allen, H. M., Jr. Self-interest versus symbolic *American Journal of Political Science,* forthcoming.

Sears, D. O., Lau, R. R., Tyler, T., & Allen, A. M., Jr. Self-interest versus symbolic politics in policy attitudes and Presidential voting. *American Political Science Review,* 1980, *74,* 670-684.

Sears, D. O., Tyler, T., Citrin, J., & Kinder, D. R. Political system support and public response to the energy crisis. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *22,* 56-82.

Sennett, R., & Cobb, J. *The hidden injuries of class.* New York: Vintage, 1972.

Smith, E. R. A. N. The levels of conceptualization: False measures of ideological sophistication. *American Political Science Review,* 1980, *74,* 685-696.

Smith, M. B., Bruner, J. S., & White, R. W. *Opinions and personality.* New York: Wiley, 1956.

Sniderman, P. M., & Brody, R. A. Coping: The ethic of self-reliance. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1977, *21,* 501-522.

Stimson, J. A. Belief systems: Constraint, complexity, and the 1972 election. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1975, *19,* 393-418.

Stokes, D. E. Some dynamic elements of contests for the presidency. *American Political Science Review,* 1966, *60,* 19-28.

Strumpel, B. Economic life styles, values, and subjective welfare. In B. Strumpel (Ed.). *Economic means for human needs.* Ann Arbor, MI.: Institute for Social Research, 1976.

Sullivan, J. L., Marcus, G. E., Feldman, S., & Piereson, J. E. The sources of political tolerance: A multivariate analysis. *American Political Science Review,* 1981, *75,* 92-106.

Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J. E., & Marcus, G. E. Ideological constraint in the mass public: A methodological critique and some new findings. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *22,* 233-249.

Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J. E., Marcus, G. E., & Feldman, S. The more things change, the more they stay the same: The stability of mass belief systems. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *23,* 176-186.

Taylor, D. G., Sheatsley, P. B., & Greeley, A. M. Attitudes toward racial integration. *Scientific American,* 1978, *238,* 42-49.

Taylor, S. E., & Crocker, J. Schematic bases of social information processing. In E. T. Higgins, C. A. Herman, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.). *Social cognition.* Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1981.

Tomkins, S. S. The quest for primary motives: Biography and autobiography of an idea. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 1981, *41,* 306-329.

Turner, C. F., & Kraus, E. Fallible indicators of the subjective state of the nation. *American Psychologist,* 1978, *33,* 456-470.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. *Science,* 1981, *211,* 453-458.

Tyler, T. Impact of directly and indirectly experienced events. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 1980, *39,* 13-28.

Verba, S., Orren, G. R., & Ferree, D. Influence, income and equality: A study of elite attitudes. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1981.

Ward, D. Genetic epistemology and the structure of belief systems. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, CO, 1982.

Weisberg, H. A multidimensional conceptualization of party identification. *Political Behavior,* 1980, *2,* 33-60.

Wilson, G. D. *The psychology of conservatism.* London and New York: Academic Press, 1973.

Zajonc, R. B. Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. *American Psychologist,* 1980, *39,* 151-175.

MICROPOLITICAL BEHAVIOR: AMERICAN AND COMPARATIVE

14
Changing Paradigms in Comparative Political Behavior*

Ronald Inglehart

I. OVERVIEW

Two waves of major developments in comparative political research have taken place since World War II. With each new wave the shift in perspective has been so great that one could speak of a paradigm change. At first glance, the overall trend may appear curvilinear; on closer examination it seems more like a spiral.

Starting from a traditional focus on political institutions, research first moved toward a micro-analytic emphasis; and then back again, so that today some of the most exciting current research again emphasizes structural factors. But it treats them in a more sophisticated fashion than it did before, striving to integrate macro and micro level variables into dynamic models of political behavior. While political science in general has shown similar trends, they are particularly evident in comparative research.

Until the post-war period, comparative politics focused almost exclusively on the role of political institutions. Since reliable measurements of individual-level factors were not available, they almost necessarily were ignored or assumed to be constant. The prevailing concepts of representative democracy were based on the optimistic assumption that all citizens would, or should, behave according to a rational-activist model, in which informed citizens considered the issues and candidates, and selected representatives who supported their position on the key issues. The fact that similar institutions functioned differently in different societies was not ignored, but prior to the development of such concepts as political culture, and the development of techniques to gather the relevant empirical data, researchers fell back on static stereotypes like "national character" to explain such phenomena.

*I am indebted to Paul Abramson, Robert Jackman, Joseph LaPalombara and Robert Putnam for helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter; and to an anonymous panel of specialists who responded to a questionnaire on key developments in the field.

The behavioral revolution brought fundamental changes in the prevailing concepts of how political systems operate. Three landmark volumes published in the 1960s had a profound impact on the study of comparative politics, each of them stimulating an entire school of research: *Political Man* (1960), *The American Voter* (1960), and *The Civic Culture* (1963). The development and application of new techniques such as survey research and computer analysis provided fresh and sometimes startling insights into the ways in which individuals actually behave politically; micro-analytic research became the central focus of political science.

But the behavioral revolution entailed a still more profound change: argumentation shifted from a given author's impressions and insights, supported by anecdotal illustrations, to testable hypotheses supported or disproven by quantitative empirical data. Thus, while some of the key research —on the social requisites of democracy, for example—continued to focus on the macro-political level, it increasingly utilized quantitative indicators.

The empirical findings posed a severe challenge to the rational-activist model of representative democracy. In a cross-national perspective, viable democracy seemed to be linked with—and to a large extent *limited* to—nations having relatively high levels of economic development. And at the individual level, participation proved to be the exception, not the rule; moreover participation was shown to be highly skewed according to education and income. Furthermore, the typical citizen proved to be dismayingly ill-informed about political issues and the candidates' positions on them. Few citizens took part in politics in any way other than voting; and voting itself seemed to be shaped mainly by group loyalties, such as social class, religion, ethnic affiliations, and above all, by party identification.

Political behavior seemed to be determined more by the milieu into which one was born and by one's early socialization, than by the individual's rational assessment of current issues. To be sure, the political alignments prevailing in a given society could usually be traced back to earlier religious, class or regional conflicts, but to a large extent, the cleavages that prevailed when mass political parties were established seemed to become "frozen" and were transmitted to the individual either by intergenerational political socialization (Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Converse & Dupeux, 1962) or by organizational networks—which, in turn, seemed to be determined by the person's milieu more than by individual choice. Comparative political behavior came to emphasize the study of political socialization, more than the study of issue conflicts. The analysis of political behavior as an issue-free process reached an extreme case with Converse's (1969) model of the development of the strength of party identification, interpreted as the result of intergenerational transmission, plus the amount of time one had voted in free elections. The model was remarkably elegant but it pushed parsimony to its limits, explaining a major aspect of political alignment as virtually parthenogenic.

A new wave of research in comparative political behavior emerged in the 1970s. Stimulated by evidence that the impact of social class, religion, and political party identification was declining, while the importance of issue voting was growing, this research emphasized the role of political leadership,

political institutions, and economic events.

It was not simply a return to a macropolitical focus, however. The frontier where critical new insights are most apt to be found now seems to be in the analysis of the linkages between macropolitical and micropolitical phenomena. This shift of focus was facilitated by the fact that in the 1970s, for the first time, adequate time series data became available to permit dynamic analyses of these interactions. While in the 1960s, one could rarely go beyond impressionistic speculation about relationships between structural variables and individual behavior, in the 1980s it is becoming feasible to test hypotheses about these interactions, using dynamic quantitative models.

The renewed emphasis on societal level variables has been accompanied by renewed interest in rational choice models, and attempts to resurrect the rational-activist model. The credibility of this approach seems enhanced by findings that rising levels of education and improved communications technology are conducive to the development of better informed, more issue-oriented publics. But its appeal also seems strengthened by the fact that the world tends to look more rational when viewed from a macro perspective.

One of the most impact-laden findings of the 1960s was the discovery of remarkably low levels of constraint or ideological coherence in the belief systems of mass publics (Converse, 1964). The correlations between attitudes, or between attitudes and reported behavior among mass publics, tend to be low; unless inflated by methods effects—such as a long series of similar questions in a similar format—relatively "strong" product moment correlations in survey research generally fall in the .3 to .4 range; most correlations are far below this. But at the aggregate level, relatively "strong" correlations generally fall in the .6 to .9 range. Frequently, one can explain several times as much variance in a given set of variables by simply aggregating them from the individual to the group level; doing this eliminates the idiosyncratic variance of individuals around the group mean. Whether this variance is due to non-attitudes among a large share of the public, or to error in measurement in survey research, the result is a much clearer structure at the aggregate level. This clarity is not a misrepresentation. Groups *do* behave more rationally—or, at least, more predictably—than individuals. The tendency for rationality to be more evident at the macrosocietal level may be further enhanced by the fact that groups are guided by elites—and at the elite level, one frequently *does* find well organized ideological views. In survey research based on elites, correlations among attitudes often fall in the .4 to .7 range (Aberbach *et al.*, 1981, pp. 125-134).

Now, as earlier, we are the prisoners of our data base. Much of the available macrolevel time series data is economic data, and the current models tend to emphasize economic variables. This is useful, but it is not enough. For the results of recent behavioral research suggest that, while economic and institutional factors play a significant part in shaping political behavior, their effects are conditioned by values and skills that can only be measured directly at the individual level. Similarly, voting statistics or reported voting intentions are the political variable for which data are most readily available, and some of the most fruitful recent models have focused on the relationship between economic variables and voting patterns (Kramer,

1971; Tufte, 1975, 1978; Hibbs, 1977; Alt, 1979; Hibbs & Vasilatos, 1982). But recent research indicates that voting is a relatively poor indicator of one's propensity to participate in other forms of political action, such as campaign activity or political protest; furthermore, quite different causal processes underlie the various types of political action (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978; Barnes, Kaase *et al.*, 1979). Nevertheless, current macro-level research tends to focus on voting behavior and party support, in part simply because few other variables offer a long-term data base.

The research agenda calls for the development of interactive models. We will need to gather comparative time series data at both the individual level and the societal level, in order to understand not only voting behavior, but issue-oriented participation, and unconventional or violent political action. This is an ambitious goal, but its attainment seems essential if we are to move toward a more rational and effective steering process through which democratic systems can cope with economic, social and political change. Its success is seriously jeopardized by recent cutbacks in the funding of social research by both public and private agencies.

* * * * *

In recent years major contributions have been made toward increasing our understanding of political life through comparative analysis of political behavior. Having taken a brief overview of major trends, let us examine some of the specific findings. The literature has grown immensely; it is an impossible task to survey it all in one essay. I will focus, therefore, on three streams of research relating to three key variables: (1) participation, (2) cleavages, and (3) linkages between individual political behavior and societal level variables.

Participation is, in a sense, the first question of political science. One of the most basic characteristics of any political system is the extent to which decisions are shaped by a narrow elite stratum, or by input from a large share of the population. The related question, what *kind* of input, it also crucial for mass participation may range from purely symbolic actions, controlled and stimulated by elites, to actions originating among the public itself, designed to force elites to change their plans. Elite-challenging actions tend to be at least mildly disruptive; but if they become too disruptive or too violent, political institutions may be unable to function; differentiating between various kinds of political participation is vital.

If "who governs?"—or "who participates, and how?"—is the first political question, the second is "why?" This question is central to another distinct stream of research that we will call the research on political cleavages. Assuming that people *do* participate, what social ties, goals and values motivate them to do so?

Finally we will deal with the ways in which structural factors—above all the political and economic institutions of a given society—shape political behavior and outcomes. We are now at a stage where research on the interactions between structural and individual level variables is critical for advancing our understanding of comparative political behavior. The examination of some recent findings in the first two areas will demonstrate this point.

II. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The central question facing comparative political research in the post-war era was: What are the conditions under which democracy can survive and flourish?

Traditional research had focused on the role of institutions, with an implicit assumption that democracy was essentially a question of having the right type of constitution. But the cataclysmic failure after World War I of efforts to implant democracy in those European nations that had been governed by authoritarian regimes indicated that constitutional engineering by itself was not enough. The Weimar Republic had been an ideal democracy—on paper. But it failed to survive—partly, it seemed, because its democratic institutions were inconsistent with an underlying authoritarian political culture.

The Civic Culture (Almond & Verba, 1963) analyzed data from five nations: two established democracies, Britain and the United States; two previously fascist nations with new democratic institutions, Germany and Italy; and one developing country, Mexico, that was officially committed to democracy, but placed severe restrictions on opposition parties. It was a landmark research effort that applied concepts drawn from sociology, social psychology and psychological anthropology, and utilized survey research techniques in a cross-national analysis addressing the central research question of its time. And it suggested an answer: democracy failed in Germany and Italy, in large part, because they lacked a participant political culture.

Literally hundreds of subsequent studies have criticized virtually every aspect of *The Civic Culture,* from theory to methodology (an excellent overview appears in Almond & Verba, Eds., 1980). The criticism *The Civic Culture* engendered is a testimony to its fruitfulness; in the 1980s, it remains one of the most frequently cited works in comparative political behavior.

Two concepts were central to the "civic culture." First, the idea that political opposition must be acceptable; it could be tolerated, provided there was an underlying sense of trust bridging political cleavages. This outlook was found to be considerably more widespread in the two long-established democracies than in the other countries. This specific empirical finding—as well as some others—have become outdated by subsequent developments; one of the major phenomena of later years was the dramatic decline of trust in government in the United States (Miller, 1974; Abramson, 1983) and (apparently) in Great Britain (Marsh, 1977). On the other hand, political satisfaction and pride in political institutions has become markedly stronger in Germany (Baker *et al.*, 1981); political trust, however, remains very low in Italy (Inglehart & Rabier, 1982). These contrasting developments appear to be linked with the relative effectiveness of governmental performance in the respective systems. But, while specific findings have become outdated, the basic idea that a linkage existed seems to have been correct.

The second key concept emphasized "subjective political competence" as a major factor facilitating democratic politics; only in so far as the citizen feels that he or she is capable of influencing political decision makers, is he or she apt to play a participant role rather than that of an obedient "subject" or a politically irrelevant "parochial." The authors trace the development of this

outlook in great detail. Among other things, they find that more educated persons are likelier to have a sense of "subjective political competence" and, therefore, to be political participants. Numerous other studies in various countries have established this point: citizens of higher socioeconomic status are more apt to participate in politics. (A useful overview of these findings is provided by Milbrath & Goel, 1977.)

But is this relationship due to the fact that higher education is linked with higher social status, or to the fact that education is conducive to the development of cognitive skills—a process that has been referred to as cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1977; Dalton, 1982)? Are those of higher status likelier to take part in politics (1) because of their greater capacity to process political information and their better knowledge of how to press their demands; *or* (2) because they have better social connections, more money, and because officials defer to the upper classes?

It seems clear that wealth and personal connections are relevant. But if we are interested in long-term changes, cognitive variables are particularly interesting. By definition, there will always be upper, middle, and lower socioeconomic strata. But pronounced changes have occurred in *absolute* levels of education, information, and political sophistication, and they may be changing the nature of the political process. Nie, Powell, and Prewitt (1969) argue that economic development leads to higher rates of political participation, but it does so chiefly because of its impact on a society's class structure and organizational infrastructure. Economic development increases the size of the middle class, which in turn leads to higher rates of membership in formal organizations. The middle class also tends to have civic attitudes (like "subjective political competence") which encourage participation.

Verba and Nie (1972) conclude that those with higher socioeconomic status are relatively likely to participate in politics—partly because they tend to have a particular set of "civic orientations." These orientations include a sense of efficacy, attentiveness to politics, and high levels of political information. The impact of social status *per se* is modest. Although the two tend to go together, when we take both into account, "civic orientations" explain *eight times* as much of the variance in overall political activity as does social status. Political skills seem more crucial than social class *per se*.

Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) carry this analysis farther, linking it with institutional factors in seven nations. Their central question is: Why is the relationship between socioeconomic status strong in some nations, but relatively weak in others? The authors develop two key analytic distinctions. First, they differentiate between individual propensities to participate, and institutional constraints on participation. Secondly, they distinguish between "easy" types of activities such as voting, and "difficult" ones, such as campaigning or cooperating with others to solve local problems. They find that political parties and voluntary associations can increase the participation rates of their members; and that they have their greatest impact on those lacking the personal motivation or skills for participation that education and economic resources provide—a fact which tends to equalize participation rates across socioeconomic strata. But the impact of institutional mobilization is considerably greater in relation to voting than to the "difficult" modes of par-

ticipation. Variation in the amount of institutional affiliation by itself does not account for cross-national differences in the strength of the relationship between socioeconomic status and participation; for example, the proportion that is strongly affiliated is relatively high in the United States, but this is largely offset by the absence of clearly articulated conflict between social groups that are closely linked to specific political parties and voluntary associations—the importance of which is confirmed by the aggregate-level findings of Powell (1981). As Rokkan (1970) demonstrated earlier, lower classes participate more where class conflict is intense, and where specifically class-oriented parties exist.

Verba, Nie and Kim conclude, somewhat optimistically, that members of the lower socioeconomic strata can become participants by joining organizations even without changes in basic attitudes or skills. This is true in a sense, but it depends on what *kind* of participation one has in mind. Organizational membership, for the most part, seems to encourage *elite-directed,* rather than *elite-challenging,* forms of participation. It may not reflect the translation of public preferences into elite decisions so much as the effective mobilization of the public *by* elites in pursuit of goals largely chosen by the latter. As DiPalma (1970) pointed out, Italy consistently shows extremely high rates of voting turnout, but a *low* rate of participation in the more difficult, or elite-challenging, forms of action. Their electoral turnout of over 90 percent does *not* ensure that Italians get what they want out of politics; quite the contrary, Italians consistently show the lowest rate of satisfaction with the way their political system is functioning of any European Community public (Rabier, 1981).

Inglehart and Klingemann (1979) argue that participation springs from two fundamentally different processes, one being an older elite-directed mode of political participation, the other a newer elite-challenging mode. The institutions that mobilized mass political participation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century—labor union, church, and mass political party—were hierarchical bureaucratic organizations in which a small number of leaders led masses of disciplined troops. They were effective in bringing large numbers of newly enfranchised citizens to the polls in an era when universal compulsory education had just taken root and the average citizen had a low level of political skills. But while these organizations could mobilize large numbers, they usually produced a relatively low qualitative level of participation—generally not going much beyond voting.

The predominance of elite-directed mass participation in politics reached extremes in the Soviet Union under Stalin, and in Nazi Germany. In both cases, voting rates, participation in rallies, and organizational membership rates were extremely high. But this sometimes frenzied participation was almost completely controlled from above, reflecting the effective mobilization of the masses to support the goals of a small, disciplined elite group, rather than the input of political influence from the masses. These were extreme cases, however. Skilling and Griffiths (1971), Hough (1972, 1976) and Friedgut (1979) argue that in the post-Stalinist era, various interest groups have attained increasing autonomy and exert a certain amount of independent influence on the policy process in the USSR. Bunce (1976, 1980) concludes that

top Soviet leaders are relatively responsive to public preferences when they first come to power—at which point they emphasize consumer goods—in order to build public support. Gitelman (1982) finds that Soviet citizens have little or no opportunity to influence policy *making,* but do have some influence on policy *application,* and concentrate their efforts on the latter. On the other hand, La Palombara (1975, 1974) takes a skeptical view about the comparability of political participation between political systems as different as Western democracies and the Soviet bloc. Voting rates, for example, are extremely high throughout the Soviet sphere, but the highest rates tend to be found in the most authoritarian and *least* pluralistic states.

Elite-challenging participation is capable of expressing the individual's preferences more effectively and with far greater precision than are elite-directed modes of participation. It is a more issue-oriented form of participation, less likely to be based on established bureaucratic organizations than on *ad hoc* groups. It aims at attaining specific policy changes, rather than simply supporting the leaders identified with a given group. And, partly because it is issue-specific, this mode of participation requires relatively high levels of cognitive skills.

The "new" mode of political participation tends to be far more issue-specific and is likelier to function at the higher thresholds of participation than was true of traditional elite-directed politics. It is new in that it relies less heavily on a permanent—and hence relatively rigid—organizational infrastructure. It is new in that it is apt to employ relatively disruptive "unconventional" forms of political participation. It is new in that it depends on exceptionally high levels of ideological conceptualization among mass publics. And it is new in that it reflects emerging "Post-materialist" value orientations which accord top priority to self-expression and the quality of life, rather than to economic and physical security (Inglehart, 1977).

Like Verba, Nie and Kim (1978), Barnes, Kaase *et al.* (1979) conclude that there is a basic distinction between voting and the more "difficult" forms of political participation. But they also differentiate between conventional and unconventional (strongly elite-challenging) political participation. Comparing their cross-national data with earlier results from Almond and Verba (1963), Barnes, Kaase *et al.* (1979) find that there has been a substantial increase in the prevalence of unconventional political action. This form of participation is linked with the presence of relatively high levels of cognitive skills, and with Post-Materialist values, rather than high socioeconomic status *per se.* It does *not* seem to reflect a sense of relative deprivation, as hypothesized earlier by Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970). Barnes, Kaase *et al.* (1979) converge with Groffman and Muller (1978), Muller (1979), and Kinder and Sears (1983) in finding no support for the relative deprivation explanation of political protest. On the contrary, those with steadily rising expectations show the *highest* protest potential; they not only rank higher than those whose expectations are falling, but also higher than those whose expectations rose and then fell.

Moreover, an underlying potential for elite-challenging political action seems to be increasing gradually. Summing up the findings of the *Political Action* study (Barnes, Kaase *et al.,* 1979), Kaase and Barnes conclude: "We

interpret this increase in potential for protest to be a lasting characteristic of democratic mass publics and not just a sudden surge in political involvement bound to fade away as time goes by. . . . The dependence of unconventional political behavior on education, cognitive skills and Post-Materialism displays too much of a structural component, and therefore permanence, to be considered just a fad of the young" (p. 524).

This was a rather bold conclusion in the late 1970s when reports of political protest had virtually disappeared from the newspapers. But in the 1980s, massive numbers of demonstrators are again on the march in Western Europe, protesting against nuclear power plants, airport construction, installation of nuclear missiles in Europe and other targets. Current political activism seems more widespread in Europe than in the United States. But even here, evidence from a second wave of panel interviews in the *Political Action* study indicates that there was a significant *increase* in protest potential among the American public from 1974 to 1981. Evidence based on macro-events is a useful but, by itself, inadequate guide for the analysis and forecasting of political behavior. It needs to be supplemented by investigations of underlying propensities, values and skills.

III. POLITICAL CLEAVAGES

The cleavage structures underlying politics in Western nations have changed profoundly during the past few decades.

Political cleavages can be viewed as relatively stable patterns of polarization in which given groups support given policies or parties, while other groups support opposing policies or parties. For almost a generation the nature of both the groups and the policy issues connected with support for change have been changing.

According to the classic model of industrial society, political polarization is a direct reflection of social class conflict. The working class is considered the natural base of support for the Left—that is, of support for change in an egalitarian direction. And the key issue underlying the Left-Right polarization is conflict over ownership of the means of production and the distribution of income.

As industrializing society gives way to advanced industrial society, there is a growing tendency for politics to polarize along a new dimension that cuts across the conventional Left-Right axis. Increasingly, support for social change comes from a segment of the modern middle class. This group has raised a new set of issues that tend to dominate the contemporary political agenda. The environmentalist movement, the opposition to nuclear power, the peace movement, the women's movement, the limits to growth movement, the consumer advocacy movement, all of these are manifestations of a political cleavage dimension that is only remotely related to conflict over ownership of the means of production and traditional social class conflict. The fact that these movements have taken the center of the stage in contemporary politics seems to reflect a long-term shift in the basic motivations of Western publics.

Thus far, this new axis of polarization has had only a limited impact on *voting* behavior; long-established political party loyalties, reinforced by party organizations and institutional linkages with labor unions and churches, are highly resistant to change. People continue to vote for the parties prevailing in their milieu that their parents or even grandparents may have supported. To a considerable degree, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were correct in speaking of a freezing of party alignments dating back to the era when modern mass party systems were first established. But although deep-rooted political party alignments continue to shape voting behavior in many countries, they generally do not reflect the dynamics of the new politics. Voting is highly institutionalized and, in most countries, is constrained by party systems that were established many decades ago. The new axis of conflict is more likely to give rise to active protest and support for change than the older axis based on social class and religion. Hence, elite-challenging behavior is far more likely to reflect current political issues, than is electoral behavior.

This disparity between traditional political party alignments and the dynamics of contemporary issue-polarization places existing party systems under chronic stress. For extended periods of time, the traditional party systems may appear to be in business as usual, until suddenly a basic restructuring occurs. Sometimes the change manifests itself in the emergence of new political parties, as has recently happened in a number of West European countries. But established voting patterns and established organizations are not discarded lightly. Consequently, party alignments tend to lag behind social change—sometimes until the major ideological cleavage cuts almost orthogonally across established party spaces. When this happens, the alternatives are Realignment or Dealignment; the parties must either reorient themselves, risk being split, or suffer a gradual erosion of partisan loyalties. In many Western nations, that situation prevails today (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck, Eds., 1984).

The idea that politics is a struggle between rich and poor can be traced back to Plato. But unquestionably the most influential modern version of this idea is Karl Marx's argument that throughout industrial society, social class conflict is inevitably the central fact of political life, and the major mechanism by which society changes, with the proletariat constituting the base for change in industrial society.

The idea that politics in industrial societies is a class struggle has received strong support in the findings of empirical social research. Thus, in his classic and immensely influential work, *Political Man,* Lipset (1960) concludes that "The most important single fact about political party support is that in virtually every economically developed country the lower income groups vote mainly for the parties of the Left, while the higher income groups vote mainly for the parties of the Right" (pp. 223-224).

In another influential study based on data from four English-speaking democracies, Alford (1963) found that in virtually every available survey, manual workers were more likely to vote for parties of the Left than non-manual workers. Calculating a "class-voting index" (obtained by subtracting the percentage of non-manual respondents voting for the Left from the percentage of manual respondents voting for the Left) Alford found a mean in-

dex of +16 for the United States, and one of +40 for Great Britain.

The electoral impact of social class has been demonstrated in more countries than that of any other variable, although it may be dominated by ethnic cleavages such as religion, language or race when they are present (de Jong, 1956; Rose & Urwin, 1969; Lijphart, 1971, 1979; Rose (Ed.), 1974; Sidjanski *et al.*, 1975). Nevertheless, there were grounds for believing that the paramount role of social class voting was not an immutable fact of political life. Campbell *et al.* (1960) argued that class voting in the United States, to a considerable extent, reflected a cohort effect: it was most pronounced among the generation that came of age during the Great Depression, and weaker among both older and younger groups. They speculated that class voting may vary inversely with prosperity, with substantial time lags due to cohort effects. Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1981) carried this line of reasoning farther, presenting evidence of a pervasive intergenerational shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist value priorities among the publics of advanced industrial society. The Post-Materialist outlook is linked with having spent one's formative years in conditions of economical and physical security; hence it is far more prevalent among the post-war generation than among older cohorts in Western nations; and it tends to be concentrated among the more prosperous strata of any given age group. Since the original investigation, studies by numerous other investigators have produced and analyzed evidence of an intergenerational shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist values in 16 different West European countries together with Poland, Hungary, the United States, Japan, Turkey, Israel and Australia (see Ike, 1973; Kerr & Handley, 1974; March, 1975, 1977; Kmieciak, 1976; Lafferty, 1975; Knutsen, 1982; Hildebrandt & Dalton, 1978; Zetterberg, 1977; Watanuki, 1979; Kaase & Klingemann, 1979; Jennings, Allerbeck & Rosenmayr, 1979; Pesonen & Sankiaho, 1979; Kemp, 1979; Flanagan, 1979, 1980, 1982; Nardi, 1980; Baker, Dalton & Hildebrandt, 1981; Leonardi, 1983; Fietkau & Kessel, Eds., forthcoming).

The political implications are significant and at first seem paradoxical. Post-Materialists give top priority to such goals as a sense of community and the non-material quality of life, but they live in societies that have traditionally emphasized economic gains above all. Hence, although they tend to come from relatively privileged backgrounds, they tend to be dissatisfied with their society, and relatively favorable to social change. Though recruited from the higher income groups that have traditionally supported the parties of the Right, they themselves tend to support the parties of the Left.

Conversely, when Post-Materialist issues (such as environmentalism, the women's movement, unilateral disarmament, opposition to nuclear power, etc.) become central, they may stimulate a Materialist reaction in which much of the working class sides with the Right to reassert the traditional Materialist emphasis on economic growth, military security and domestic law and order.

The rise of Post-Materialist issues, therefore, tends to neutralize political polarization based on social class. Although long-established party loyalties and institutional ties link the working class to the Left and the middle class to the Right, the social basis of *new* support for the parties and policies of the

Left tends to come disproportionally from middle class sources. But, at the same time, the Left parties become vulnerable to a potential split between their Post-Materialist Left, and their traditional Materialist constituency.

In 1972, this phenomenon temporarily split the Democratic Party in the United States, when a Post-Materialist wing captured the Presidential nomination. Throughout the past decade, a somewhat similar cleavage threatened to split the West German Social Democratic Party, torn between a Post-Materialist "Young Socialist" wing, and the labor-oriented main body. In The Netherlands, Scandinavia and Italy this phenomenon had already given rise to small but influential Post-Materialist parties in the 1970s (Lijphart, 1981; Leonardi, 1981). In West Germany, similar parties were unable to break through the 5 percent barrier at the national level until the 1983 elections. Leftist and Environmentalist in policy orientation, their electorate is largely middle class and heavily Post-Materialist (Burklin, 1981; Muller-Rommel, 1982). The environmental activists and political elites are even *more* heavily Post-Materialist than their electorate (Wildenmann *et al.*, 1982; Fietkau & Kessel, 1982; cf. Cotgrove & Duff, 1980, 1981).

After a lull in the middle 1970s, West European politics again show widespread political upheaval. And despite the economic difficulties of the present period, Post-Materialist issues continue to play a major role. Major recent political demonstrations have generally *not* been concerned with wages, unemployment or other economic issues; most of them have aimed at preventing the construction of nuclear power plants, highways, airports, military installations, hydroelectric dams and other projects that might provide jobs. Labor continues to be concerned with unemployment, wages, and inflation, but current political activism reflects mainly Post-Materialist concerns. Recent economic uncertainty seems to have slowed the growth of Post-Materialism in Western Europe but not stopped it: a Post-Materialist value type was more widespread at the end of the 1970s than at the start of that decade, and had shifted from being predominantly a student phenomenon, to being an important influence among young elites (Inglehart, 1981).

Our hypotheses concerning the emergence of a Post-Materialist Left imply a long-term decline in social class voting. Has it taken place? Alford (1963) examined this possibility himself, and concluded that "There had been no substantial shift in the class bases of American politics since the 1930's, despite the prosperity since World War II and despite the shifts to the Right during the Eisenhower era" (p. 226).

Alford seems to have been correct in his interpretation of the evidence he examined; indeed, social class voting in the United States actually *rose* during the period he dealt with, peaking about 1948 as the generation of the New Deal matured. A roughly similar pattern may apply to Western Europe; although reliable survey data for the years prior to 1948 are rare or nonexistent for most countries, it seems that European electorates—newly enfranchised, in large part—were relatively volatile in the first decades of this century, with high levels of class voting coming *later*. But more recent studies by Glenn (1973), Abramson (1975, 1978b), Books and Reynolds (1975), Inglehart (1977), Pedersen (1979b), Borre (1980), Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt (1981), Barnes, Kaase *et al.* (1979), Sani (1981), Stephens (1981),

Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt (1977), Crewe and Sarlvik (1982), Rose (1980, 1982), Capdevielle *et al.* (1981) and Lancelot (forthcoming) support the conclusion that during the past few decades there has been a secular decline in social class voting, not only in the United States but throughout much of the Western world.

There is not a unanimous consensus on this point. Franklin and Mughan (1978) argue that the decline of class voting in Britain has been exaggerated. And Hibbs with Vasilatos (1982) conclude that British class polarization has not declined at all, but has merely had cyclical ups and down in response to current economic conditions. Their diverging conclusion partly reflects the fact that Hibbs and Vasilatos use 1962 as their starting point; this happened to be the low ebb of British class voting from 1950 to 1969, which minimizes subsequent decline. Moreover, instead of measuring class polarization with the Alford Class Voting Index, they use other indicators, some of which seem less straightforward—the most dubious one lumps support for the Liberals together with support for Labour. Nevertheless, this ingenious analysis demonstrates that the evidence can, plausibly, be interpreted in alternative ways. In the same vein, Jackman and Jackman (1982) find that, while political polarization between manual and non-manual occupations may have declined, this dichotomy is only a poor indicator of *subjective* feelings of social class identity, which remain strong for most Americans. However, if we are content to use the simple but straightforward and relatively objective Alford Index as our indicator, it seems clear that class voting has been declining in many countries during the past few decades.

This tendency is probabilistic, not deterministic. A variety of factors affect the voters' choice: long-term party loyalties—sometimes transmitted from one generation to the next—religious and other group ties, the personalities of given candidates, the current economic situation and the relative positions of the various parties on key issues among others. These factors can cause large fluctuations in class voting from one election to the next within a given nation, and help account for wide variations in class voting between countries. But a growing body of evidence points to the conclusion that, underlying these fluctuations and cross-national differences, a long-term decline in class voting took place from 1950 to 1980. Thus, in the revised edition of *Political Man* Lipset (1981) updates his own earlier conclusions about social class voting with a new chapter discussing the evidence shown in Figure 1. This figure is limited to four nations for which particularly reliable time-series data exist (Abramson *et al.*, 1982; Books & Reynolds, 1975; Finer, 1980; Stephens, 1981; Zetterberg, 1983; Baker, Dalton & Hildebrandt, 1981; Dalton, 1984), but available evidence from other advanced industrial societies tends to be similar.

The fluctuations we see in Figure 1 are substantial, but the overall downward trend is unmistakable and seems to have continued despite recent economic setbacks. As Figure 1 demonstrates, class voting in the United States fell from a peak in 1948, to a low point in 1972 when the McGovernites captured the Democratic Presidential nomination, mobilizing the Post-Materialist constituency but engendering a massive desertion of working-class voters. Many of the latter returned to their traditional party allegiance under



FIGURE 1

The Trend in Class Voting in Four Western Democracies, 1948-1983

Adapted from Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (second edition). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 505. Updated with results from last two Swedish and German elections by present author. Sources: British data, Books and Reynolds (1975), Finer (1980), class voting in 1983 British election estimated by author from Euro-Barometer 19 data (April, 1983); Swedish data, Stephens (1981), Zetterberg (1983); German data, Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt (1981), Dalton (1984); American data, based on whites only, Abramson *et al.* (1982).

a centrist candidate in 1976, but class voting in the United States remains low —and even this modest level largely reflects its persistence among older voters: A generation ago, Campbell *et al.* (1960) found that social class voting was strongest among the "generation of the New Deal" (then about 40 years old) and weaker among younger and older groups. Today, social class voting is strong only among the older cohorts. Among the youngest American age cohorts, it is close to zero (Abramson, 1978a). West European data show a similar pattern (Butler & Stokes, 1974; Baker, Dalton & Hildebrandt, 1981; Inglehart, 1984): for the nine European Community countries as a whole, during 1976-1979 the class-voting index for those more than 54 years old was +24; for those aged 18-34, it was only +15. The phenomenon seems to reflect a gradual intergenerational change.

If social class voting has been declining, one might expect a similar decline in religious voting since church attendance has been falling in most Western countries. This, together with other evidence of an intergenerational decline in the strength of religious ties (Schmidtchen, 1972, 1979; Barnes, 1974) would lead one to expect that the electoral impact of religion is decaying. But the evidence on this point is surprisingly mixed. A general decline in the place of the church and religious faith in people's daily lives *did* precede the dramatic weakening of religious voting which took place in The Netherlands in the 1970s (Miller & Southard, 1975; Dutter, 1978). The collapse came suddenly; voting for Confessional parties had been high for decades, with 63 percent of the Dutch electorate voting for Confessional parties as recently as 1963. By the 1972 elections, it had dropped to 36 percent. In Belgium, the vote for the Social Christians showed a similar decline, from 47 percent in 1958 to 34 percent in 1974. The underlying individual-level basis of religious voting may gradually decay, for a long time, before it becomes manifest at the institutional level.

Church attendance rates have also been falling in Germany and Italy—both of which are characterized by strong and remarkably persistent religious voting. In a multivariate analysis of West German electoral data from 1953 to 1976, Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt (1981) find no weakening of religious voting; they conclude that social determinism is diminishing and issues are becoming more important, but the weakening of social determinism is mainly due to an intergenerational decline in social class voting. In Italy, a general secularization of society is manifest (Barnes, 1974, 1981; LaPalombara, 1982). The church seems to have lost its influence on how the Italian electorate votes on issues like divorce and abortion. But religion remains the dominant cleavage, and the Christian Democrats actually made modest gains in the 1979 elections. One factor in the persistence of strong linkage between religious affiliations and electoral behavior may be the fact that the rise of Post-Materialist politics has an inherent tendency to neutralize class-based political cleavages, but it does *not* have that effect on religious cleavages; on the contrary, conflict over cultural issues may even give them a new lease on life (Inglehart, 1977, pp. 217-222). In the long run, the decline of religiosity tends to undermine the individual-level basis of religious voting. But the rise or fall of any given political party can not be explained through reference to individual-level data alone; it requires the interactive mode of analysis that is now developing.

The decay of social determinism has stimulated revived interest in rational-activist models of voting. From this perspective, the decline of political party identification is even more crucial than the weakening of social class and religious voting. For political parties can acquire an independent influence on politics, even if their original role was determined by social structure. In the absence of clear and enduring class or religious voting, party identification may take on major importance as a determinant of electoral choice and of political behavior in general.

The pioneering empirical voting studies showed that a majority of voters made up their minds long before an election campaign began; these studies interpreted such long-standing decisions as largely determined by social struc-

ture—in particular, religion, occupation and urban-rural residence (Lazarsfeld *et al.*, 1948; Berelson *et al.*, 1954). These writers tended to discount the independent influence of candidates and issues, emphasizing the extent to which voters assimilated candidates' issue stands in ways that were consistent with their own preferences. But social background variables seemed inadequate to account for the long-term continuities in voting patterns found in subsequent research.

The concept of party identification was developed by Campbell *et al.* (1954, 1960) as a tool to distinguish between the short-term effects of the campaign itself (candidates and issues) and long-term factors (social background and, above all, party identification). Party identification was seen as a long-lasting, emotionally-rooted psychological membership in a political party, often transmitted from one generation to the next. The concept implied that, although the voter's choice in a given election may be influenced by issues and candidate preferences, in the long run most voters would tend to support the party with which they identified. Analysis of American data supported these assumptions, revealing party identification to be an extremely powerful explanatory variable. Moreover, it seemed to be learned at an early age (Greenstein, 1965; Easton & Dennis, 1969; Langton, 1967), and the correlation between parents' and childrens' party identification was on the order of .5 (Jennings & Niemi, 1968).

Serious doubts were expressed about the applicability of party identification to other countries, but Butler and Stokes (1974) and Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt (1977) demonstrated its usefulness for the interpretation of British politics. Similarly, early investigations suggested that stable, long-standing partisan affiliations were uncommon in West Germany (Kaase, 1967; Pappi, 1976); but more recent analyses tend to support its applicability to the West German setting, although they utilize modified measurement techniques (Norpoth, 1978; Baker *et al.*, 1981; Falter & Rattinger, 1982). Borre and Katz (1973) found party identification to be an important factor in Norwegian politics, and Sani (1977) concludes that party identification is a key variable in Italian politics, provided it is interpreted in the context of a broader Left-Right orientation. Analyzing data from nine countries, Budge and Farlie (1976) find that party identification is a much stronger predictor of vote than any of the standard socioeconomic variables such as occupation, income, education, religion, age, sex, region or urban-rural residence.

It seems equally clear, however, that party identification is a declining influence in many settings, including the country where it was discovered. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, about 75 percent of the American electorate identified with one of the two major parties as measured by the SRC/CPS election studies. This figure declined to 63 percent by 1972; moreover, among younger voters (under 25 years of age) only about half said they identified with one of the major parties, suggesting the possibility of intergenerational change. Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976) and Miller and Levitin (1976) found widespread changes in the social correlates of party identification with a decline of regional, religious and class-based cleavages, and a rising importance of race.

From 1960 to 1980, the American electorate became much more likely to

mention issues, rather than party ties, when asked to evaluate what they liked or disliked about the presidential candidates (Verba, Nie & Petrocik, 1976; Eldersveld, 1982). Moreover, the National Election Study data also seem to indicate that the public's attitudes toward politics have become more salient and more strongly linked to voting behavior (Nie & Andersen, 1974; Verba, Nie & Petrocik, 1976, chapter 7; Pomper, 1972; Boyd, 1972; Brody & Page, 1972; Kessel, 1972; RePass, 1976; Jackson, 1975; Miller, *et al.*, 1976). These findings have been disputed (Niemi & Weisberg, 1976; Margolis, 1977; Sullivan *et al.*, 1978; Bishop *et al.*, 1978). Carmines and Stimson (1980) resolve an important part of this debate by distinguishing between "easy" and "hard" issues; only the latter demand high levels of cognitive skills and information in order to have an impact on one's political behavior. While the ideological sophistication of the electorate changes only gradually, through an "education-driven" process (Converse, 1972), rapid increases in issue voting can occur, provided the choices are simplistic. Carmines and Stimson conclude that issue voting *has* been increasing, but most of the sudden increase that occurred in the early 1960s was based on the growing salience of racial issues—an "easy" issue, in their terms. But rising levels of education imply that, in the long run, issues will tend to play a more important role in shaping political behavior, and, accordingly, that long-term partisan loyalties will decline relatively.

Butler and Stokes (1974) and Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt (1977) demonstrated that partisan dealignment has been taking place in Great Britain also —a finding that foreshadowed the splitting of the Labour Party and the founding of the Social Democratic Party in 1981. At the 1964 general election, 40 percent of the British electorate "very strongly" identified with one of the two major parties; by the 1979 election, this figure had fallen to 20 percent (King, 1982). This phenomenon seems linked with a long-term weakening of the class alignment, leading to declining public support for the traditional class-based issue positions of both major political parties, aggravated by their failure to solve economic problems (Butler & Stokes, 1974; King, 1982; Rose, 1982). As Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt (1977) put it, "The electorate was well aware of the return to the politics of class conflict—and did not like it" (p. 172).

Thomasson (1976) found partisan identification to be less stable than voting preference in The Netherlands in the early 1970s, a finding that he traces to the breakdown of religious attachments as a cue to political choice during that period. Evidence can be found in numerous other countries of growing electoral volatility (Pederson, 1979a) and of partisan dealignment (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck, Eds., forthcoming). Understandably, there has been a growing interest in rational choice models of electoral behavior (Goldberg, 1969; Riker & Ordeshook, 1973; Fiorina, 1981; Himmelweit *et al.*, 1981).

Himmelweit *et al.* (1981) illustrate the difficulties involved. Drawing on a panel survey of English respondents interviewed repeatedly from 1959 to 1974, they provide convincing support for the view that attitudes do influence electoral behavior. Those whose political attitudes didn't match their original electoral choice were relatively likely to change their voting behavior on sub-

sequent occasions; those whose attitudes changed during the course of the study were relatively likely to change their subsequent voting behavior, bringing it in line with their issue preferences. Interpreting voting as a process of rational choice, based on calculations about which party upholds one's issue position better than others, the authors demonstrate that political attitudes not only predict voting behavior far better than social class or religion, they even predict it better than party identification or past vote. At the same time, the authors go to extreme lengths in discounting the importance of party loyalties.

It is clear that political party identification has declined in Britain. But rumors of its death seem greatly exaggerated. For one thing, the sample used by Himmelweit *et al.* (1981) is skewed in ways that tend to favor their conclusions; a panel consisting mainly of well-educated, middle class males living in the capital seems relatively apt to vote according to issues, rather than social background or party identification. But, even in this sample, there is evidence of important long-term party identification effects. When the respondents were first interviewed in 1951, among those whose parents reportedly voted Conservative, more than 60 percent said that they themselves would vote for that party. Twenty-three years later, in 1974, more than 50 percent of this group reported that they actually had voted Conservative in the last election —rather than abstaining or voting for Labour, the Liberals, or some other party.

Evidence from other countries indicates that the decline of political party identification is by no means a universal tendency. In the United States, the decline has not reversed itself, but it seems to have leveled off; in the 1980 National Election Study, 64 percent of those interviewed identified themselves as Republicans or Democrats—about the same figure as in 1972. In West Germany, Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt (1981) found an *increase* in the distribution of partisanship from 1961 to 1976, with a growing proportion of partisans who reported that they always voted for the same party. Similarly, Cameron (1972) and Inglehart and Hochstein (1972) found rising levels of party identification in France from 1958 to 1968, largely attributable to the growth of attachment to the newly-established Gaullist party. In keeping with these findings, Pedersen (1979a) reports that, while electoral volatility increased from 1948-59 to 1970-77 in many European party systems (including those of Great Britain, The Netherlands and Scandinavia), it decreased dramatically—falling to less than half its former level—in both West Germany and France.

The decline of long-term party loyalties is not inevitable. It seems to reflect an interaction between the issue preferences of electorates, and the issues emphasized by party elites. In a situation of "strong ideological focus" (Stokes, 1966), where one issue dimension is dominant *and* party distances correspond to this dimension, voters can be mobilized to form party attachments. This situation seems to have existed in France, during the Gaullist era (Inglehart & Hochstein, 1972). But if the dominant issue dimension cuts across the main dimension of party space, voters have less motivation to identify with existing parties, and may be attracted to new parties or split away from old ones. This situation seems to have prevailed recently in the United

States (Weisberg & Rusk, 1970; Rusk & Weisberg, 1972); and in Great Britain (Crewe, Sarlvik & Alt, 1977; King, 1982; Rose, 1982).

In the long run, party elites have strong incentives to adapt their strategies to the preferences of their electorates; otherwise, they may lose their voters, or be replaced by more responsive leaders. Thus, as the educational levels of electorates continue to rise, we can probably anticipate a gradual rise in issue voting and a diminishing dependence on party loyalties; for as Dalton (1982) demonstrates, cognitive mobilization seems conducive to partisan dealignment. But there is no reason to expect that party spaces will remain permanently incongruent with issue dimensions. The long-established party systems of Britain and the United States did so for many years, and experienced a decline in party identification. But the newer party systems of West Germany and France reflected contemporary issues more closely, and party identification seems to have risen there in the past few decades. Long-term political party loyalties will probably continue to be a major factor in voting for the foreseeable future.

This poses a serious problem for rational choice theorists since one of the crucial assumptions of rational choice models is that the parties are free to maneuver in policy space (Ordeshook, 1976). The party identification continuum from "strong Democrat" to "strong Republican" does *not* constitute such a space; it is defined by the parties themselves in such a way that the Republicans are not free to move to the "strong Democrat" position. Superficially, a Left-Right continuum based on party preferences might seem to resemble Downs' (1957) policy space, but it, too, is bounded by the parties themselves; even the content-free Left-Right ideological scale frequently used in mass surveys proves to reflect political party loyalties at least as much as policy preferences (Deutsch, Lindon & Weill, 1966; Barnes & Pierce, 1971; Converse & Pierce, 1973; Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Sani, 1977; Pierce, 1981). This dimension can be useful in predicting the parties to which given voters are likely to transfer their votes, or which coalitions are most feasible, but it does not constitute the sort of policy space required by formal models of rational choice.

Insofar as long-term commitments to political parties remain a major factor in electoral behavior, this behavior cannot be explained adequately by rational choice alone. Less formal—but more realistic—models have attempted to take this factor into account by introducing party identification as one dimension of a multi-dimensional policy space (Robertson, 1976), or by using a party-defined space that is capable of measuring *both* long-term predispositions such as party identification, and short-term influences, such as issue and candidate preferences (Budge & Farlie, 1976, 1982; Feldman & Zuckerman, 1982). Although Feldman and Zuckerman (1982) eliminate "party identification" from their analysis, they reintroduce a modified version of it that is similar to the partisan-affect scale used by Converse (1974) and Baker *et al.* (1981). This modification seems an improvement, both in its applicability to a wider range of political systems and in its accuracy of measurement. But it remains an indicator of attachments to given political parties that seem quite stable over time (Baker *et al.*, 1981, pp. 199-208). From a normative standpoint, it is attractive to interpret political behavior as purely

a matter of rational policy choice. Empirically, it is difficult to do so without taking into account long-term influences that may have very little to do with immediate policy options.

Current issues definitely do count, and they may count for more in the future. In an innovative study based on content analysis of the issues emphasized in authoritative accounts of election campaigns, together with voting statistics, Budge (1982) makes a quantitative estimate of the net shifts in voting produced by the issues emphasized by political parties in 23 democracies. He concludes that they account for a net shift of 1 to 3 percent of the vote in most Western nations, and about 2 to 6 percent in the United States. These results converge with earlier estimates by Kramer (1971) that a "large" change in real income produces a 4 to 5 percent change in American electoral results, and by Tufte (1975, 1978) that it produces a change of approximately 6 percent for the incumbent party in off-year elections. Moreover, Budge's results for Britain approximate estimates by Studlar (1978) that the immigration issue—the key electoral issue in the early 1970s—produced a net shift of about 2.5 percent. In the long term, cumulative shifts of this size can have structural consequences; even in the short run they may be enough to win or lose an election. But there seems to be far more continuity than change in electoral behavior in most established democracies.

Concepts dealing with long-term orientations, such as party identification or political culture, will continue to be an essential part of any adequate explanation of political behavior. One can emphasize rational interpretations of those concepts, as has been done in an interesting and effective manner by Rogowski (1976), Fiorina (1981), and Katz (1981). Clearly, an important rational component is involved. But this component may reflect the rational responses one made a decade or two ago; it may even reflect the rational evaluations made by one's parents or grandparents, for the evidence of generational effects on political behavior, and intergenerational transmission of some orientations is too massive to ignore (Jennings & Niemi, 1974, 1981; Butler & Stokes, 1974; Richardson, 1974; Abramson, 1975, 1983; Inglehart, 1971, 1977, 1981, forthcoming; Barnes, Kaase *et al.*, 1979; Dalton, 1977, 1980, 1981; Baker, Dalton & Hildebrandt, 1981; Conradt, 1980; Kaase & Klingemann, 1979; Aberbach *et al.*, 1981; Szabo, Ed., 1983).

IV. ELITES AND MASS PUBLICS

Empirical elite research has produced a vast and varied literature. Herein, as with the research on mass publics, we will not attempt a comprehensive review, but will simply focus on the findings that are most relevant to our two key questions: Who participates?; and Why: what values and loyalties influence them?

Traditionally, the first of these questions has dominated elite research. Until rather recently, elite research concentrated overwhelmingly on the analysis of elite social background, with the implicit assumption that it determined elite attitudes and behavior, and that these, in turn, determined political outputs. Hence, if one knew the social background of a given system's elites, one could predict how that system operated. Today, a massive

body of empirical findings converge in making two basic conclusions rather clear: (1) The classic social background factors, together with some psychological variables, *do* strongly influence elite recruitment; and (2) Social background does *not* determine elite attitudes or behavior.

The first of these findings parallels the findings on mass participation; everywhere—East and West, in industrial nations and in developing ones—elites are recruited disproportionately from the upper strata of society. This is even more true of administrative elites than of political elites, and truer still of business elites. Moreover, the higher the elite role, the more heavily the upper strata are overrepresented (Brzezinski & Huntington, 1964; Bonilla, 1970; Barton, Denitch & Kadushin, 1973; Putnam, 1976; Wildenmann, 1971, 1973; Friedgut, 1979; Aberbach *et al.*, 1981).

Although all elites tend to come from the more privileged strata of society, there are significant developmental differences, with the importance of family ties declining and that of education rising as a society becomes economically and technologically more developed (Dogan & Scheffer-Van der Veen, 1957-1958; Dogan, 1961; Clubok, Berghorn & Wilensky, 1969).

The second set of findings is more recent, intuitively less obvious, and runs counter to early expectations; nevertheless it now rests on a solid empirical base: the social background of elites has only a limited impact on their attitudes, issue preferences and behavior. This holds true partly, but only partly, because selective recruitment constrains the variation in social background, reducing its potential explanatory power. Knowledge of elite social background is essential in order to assess equality of opportunity in a given society, but it does not go very far toward explaining a nation's decision-making processes (Edinger & Searing, 1967; Prewitt, Eulau & Zisk, 1966-1967; Searing, 1969; Lodge, 1969, 1973; Barton, 1973; Wellhofer, 1974; Suleiman, 1974; Putnam, 1973, 1976; Aberbach *et al.*, 1981; Von Beyme, 1982). For example, a recent study of elites in Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, France, The Netherlands and the United States, found path coefficients between the respondent's social class and ideological position of only .10 among politicians, and .03 among bureaucrats (Aberbach *et al.*, 1981, pp. 161-164). Analyzing governmental decisions in the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 to 1976, Von Beyme (1982) concludes that changes in the social composition of the parliaments do not explain variations in governmental output. These findings imply that the relative weight of adult role socialization, as compared with early political socialization, is greater for elites than for the general public—where family background *is* an important influence. This is not entirely surprising; elites receive far more adult political socialization in their roles as officials or politicians than does the general public.

One of the most basic features of modernization has been a long-term shift from role recruitment based on ascriptive characteristics toward an increasing emphasis on achievement (Almond & Coleman, 1961). The declining importance of family ties and the rising emphasis on education noted above seems to be part of this broad trend; but elites are distinctive in possessing a wide variety of skills, with technical expertise becoming increasingly prominent as a society becomes technologically more advanced (Dogan, 1961;

Blondel, 1963; Prewitt, 1970; Quandt, 1970; Bell, 1973; Rose, 1974; Putnam, 1973, 1976).

Elites tend to be much more politicized than non-elites. They are not only more educated and better informed about politics, but their political belief systems are more constrained and ideologically consistent than those of mass publics (Converse, 1964; Budge *et al.*, 1972; Putnam, 1976).

Elites are, by definition, politically more influential than the average member of the general public. But the question of *how* much impact they have, and why, is one of the major areas demanding further research. Far too little is known about the linkages between masses, elites, and political outcomes. Elite analysts tend to avoid dealing with the difficult question of linkages by implicitly assuming that (1) elite behavior is not greatly influenced by mass pressures; but (2) elite preferences *do* determine political outcomes.

An extreme example of elite determinism is provided by Nordlinger (1981), who argues that public officials are largely autonomous from societal pressures, and are able to impose their own goals upon nominally democratic societies. Another example is Field and Higley's (1982) provocative interpretation of political change as almost completely due to the degree to which a nation's elites are unified or disunified. At the opposite extreme, aggregate analyses by Schmidt (1982) suggest that it doesn't make much difference what type of elite governs a society. Elite determinism remains an empirical question that has not been answered.

With most everyday issues elites, no doubt, do enjoy a great deal of freedom from mass pressures. But the exceptions tend to be crucial, as the Civil Rights movement, the opposition to the war in Vietnam, the anti-nuclear power movement and the current Peace Movement in Western Europe all suggest. Moreover, there are indications that the potential for more active mass political intervention has been increasing (Barnes, Kaase *et al.*, 1979). Empirical analysis of elite-mass linkages is difficult, complex and expensive. But it is crucial to understanding the political process. To date, only a few studies have been completed (Miller & Stokes, 1963; Converse & Pierce, forthcoming). The findings indicate that constituencies do shape their representatives' views, but the extent to which this is true varies a good deal from issue to issue. Miller and Stokes (1963) found that, with foreign policy and social welfare issues, elite-mass linkages were weak; but in the area of civil rights, American Congressmen voted according to their perception of constituency attitudes—and these perceptions were pretty accurate.

Analyzing whether electorates influence the policy positions taken by their party, Inglehart (1984) examines data based on interviews with candidates for the European Parliament, from 66 different parties in France, Italy, Britain, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and Ireland. These candidates' positions indicate the issue positions taken by their parties, not only in the European Parliament but also in the respective national parliaments—in which many of them also hold seats. Analysis of these elite-level data, together with the results from samples of their electorates, reveals substantial correlations between the issue preferences of political elites and those of their electorates, many of them falling in the .5 to .7 range. We must bear in mind that these correlations are based on aggre-

gated data (using the party as the unit of analysis); however, the strength of these correlations tends to support a rationalist interpretation of political behavior. But the *direction* of the causal linkages is unclear; does this close fit between the policy preferences of elites and electorates reflect the influence of the electorates on political leaders, or vice versa, or both? Or could these correlations be, in part, the joint result of some antecedent variable?

It is difficult to determine the direction of causality in the relationship between these elite and mass issue preferences. But we also have measures of constituency characteristics—such as the social class composition or the church attendance rate of a given electorate—that are *antecedent* to the issue positions taken by both elites and electorates. Here, the causal direction is relatively clear. One can plausibly argue that political elites take a "Left" policy position because their electorate is predominantly working class, or predominantly non-religious, or that a given social group supports a given party because its candidates take the Left position on given issues—each of which implies a different type of constituency influence. But one can *not* plausibly argue that a given electorate became working class, or ceased attending church, because its candidates favored the Left issue position. Similarly, Materialist or Post-Materialist value priorities tend to be long-term characteristics of given groups (Inglehart, forthcoming); it seems more plausible to view them as an influence on candidates' issue positions, than as caused by them.

Figure 2 shows the mean product moment correlations between constituency characteristics and elite policy preferences on two types of issues: (1) a set of three economic issues—concerning attitudes toward further nationalization of industry, a greater government role in the economy, and more equal distribution of income; and (2) a set of three non-economic issues—concerning support for building nuclear power plants, increased defense expenditures, and more severe measures against terrorism.

The social class composition of the electorate is linked with elite positions on economic issues in the expected direction: candidates of parties with a relatively high proportion of manual workers are relatively favorable to nationalization of industry, a greater government role in the economy, and more equal distribution of income. But the strength of these correlations is far weaker than the relationship with church attendance rates; elites whose electorates attend church frequently are very likely to support the conservative position on these issues. Moreover the social class composition of the electorate seems to have virtually no effect whatever on non-economic issues. These findings reinforce the individual-level evidence cited above that social class is no longer the dominant influence on political behavior. Conversely, the relatively powerful correlation between the religious orientations of the electorates and the issue positions of the candidates supports survey-based findings that religion remains a surprisingly strong political variable. However, the fact that the church, generally speaking, ceased intervening on economic issues some decades ago, suggests that much of the mass-elite issue congruence reflects the persisting influence of distinctive political cultures. Throughout most of Western Europe, church attendance is part of a long-standing political culture of the Right. Its effects seem remarkably pervasive



FIGURE 2

Correlates of Issue Positions Taken by Candidates of 66 Parties from Nine West European Countries

Source: Issue battery included in survey of 742 candidates to European Parliament interviewed in spring, 1979 (see Inglehart *et al.*, 1980); and data on electorates from cumulative results of Euro-barometer surveys 3-12.

and durable; it outweighs the impact of social class, even on specifically economic issues.

The distribution of Materialist/Post-Materialist values among the electorate ranks far behind religion in its apparent impact on elite positions on economic issues. But with regard to the non-economic issues, the electorates' value priorities are the strongest predictor of all. Theoretically, Post-Materialism has emerged as an important political force only recently; and the empirical evidence supports this assumption. Political elites whose electorates include high proportions of Post-Materialists, tend to take the "Left" position on both types of issues, but the linkage is far stronger with the relatively new non-economic issues, than with the traditional Left-Right economic issues. The newness of the values cleavage, together with the newness of the noneconomic issues as they are formulated today, suggests that the elite-mass linkage found here does *not* simply reflect a long-standing political culture shared by elites and mass—such as the relationship between mass church attendance and elite issue positions. Current influences must be invoked to account for the correspondence between elite policy positions and the values of their electorates.

The strength of these linkages reinforces the interpretation that constituency preferences *do* influence elite policy positions. It may be that the relatively modest findings to date concerning the impact of mass policy preferences are partly due to the fact that we have been looking at only part of the picture. The analyses carried out so far have, of necessity, usually focused on voting, and have tended to use economic indicators as the independent variables. This does not reflect a blind spot on the part of the investigators; it is simply a consequence of the fact that other types of data have not been readily available. The findings presented here suggest that we would uncover stronger evidence of rationality in mass behavior if: (1) we were to examine dependent variables other than voting—which is far more heavily constrained by institutionalized party loyalties than is true of issue preferences or elite-challenging political behavior; and (2) we were to focus on the *new* issues that tend to be central to political controversy today, rather than the traditional Left-Right economic issues that remain important but are now deeply embedded in the political culture and party loyalties of industrial societies.

It is easier to propose such a research strategy than to carry it out. For if our interpretation is correct, we are *not* data-rich; we are suffering from a serious lack of certain types of data—above all, data on non-electoral cleavages at both the elite and mass levels. In the long run, information on individual attitudes and behavior must be incorporated in models that integrate both individual characteristics, and institutional and macroeconomic variables. In order to capture a maximum amount of institutional variation, these models should utilize cross-national time-series data. Many of the conceptual tools exist; we have only begun to gather the data.

V. TOWARD INTERACTIVE ANALYSIS

One of the central questions of comparative political behavior has been, "Who participates in politics?" But this question, itself, is meaningful only if

we assume that political action has an impact—that those who participate most, are most likely to get what they want. Both mass and elite research are built on the assumption that they do.

This is the ultimate "So What?" question; Does political participation make any difference? Does it result in a higher share of the national income, or a higher life expectancy for the given group? Does it influence public policy, bringing it closer to the given group's goals? These are questions that individual-level research—whether it focuses on publics or elites—is ill-equipped to answer. In order to answer, one must be able to treat relative shares of income and other public policy outputs as variables—over time or cross-nationally; the dependent variable is a macro-phenomenon. Measuring the impact of given groups' values, preferences and skills on political outputs, requires the integration of micro- and macro-level data for aggregate-level data and individual-level data have complementary strengths and weaknesses. Using the latter alone, one can only assume that individual actions have an impact on systemic outputs; while using the former alone, one can only assume that values, goals and skills are monolithic and unchanging attributes of given groups. Neither set of assumptions is justifiable a priori.

One-shot survey research has rightly been criticized on the grounds that it takes the "So What?" question for granted. It could turn out that the behavior it studies does not have any real impact on one's standard of living, life expectancy, personal freedom, quality of life, or the other goals that people seek to attain through political action. In one of the few analyses that integrates survey data with policy measures, Page and Shapiro (1983) find that changes in American public opinion from 1935 to 1979 usually were followed by changes in public policy, and that public opinion seemed to influence policy more than policy influenced opinion. Nevertheless, the impact of public opinion has not yet been demonstrated in any conclusive manner.

But it is equally clear that most of the macro-level research undertaken so far, tends to take the "Why?" question for granted: it assumes that everyone is, and always has been, attempting to maximize the same utilities—with the implicit assumption usually being that they are maximizing personal economic gains. The research on values cited above indicates that (1) this is true of many, but by no means all people—with the exceptions being disproportionately active politically; and (2) it is much less true today than it was a few decades ago.

Thus far, aggregate-level studies have shown a good fit between macro-economic conditions and election outcomes (Kramer, 1971; Tufte, 1975; Fair, 1978), but survey-based research has found only weak linkages between the two at the level of the individual voter (Fiorina, 1978; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979). Kinder and Kiewiet interpret this disparity as resulting from "sociotropic" behavior on the part of many voters: their choice is determined, not by how well they have done personally, but by how well they think the nation has fared. Rejecting this idea, Kramer (1983) argues that the disparity exists because individual-level data are heavily contaminated with exogenous influences that should be disregarded because they are politically irrelevant. Hence, in this case, individual-level behavior (voting) is best investigated with aggregate-level data.

Kramer, no doubt, is correct in concluding that individual-level behavior has a large idiosyncratic component. In part, the disparity between findings from the two levels reflects the inherent tendency, noted above, for behavior to seem more rational (i.e., explainable) when viewed at the aggregate level than at the individual level. However, the poor fit may also reflect the fact that personal economic gains are not necessarily the dominant influence on political behavior, although one *is* influenced by one's perceptions of how society as a whole is doing. Moreover, economic determinism seems to have been declining. If so, individual-level analysis based on recent surveys would show relatively little evidence of it—although its impact would still be large in macroeconomic analyses based on a long time series.

Both micro and macro analysis provide essential information. Economic rationality seems to have a significant impact on elections, as macroeconomic analyses indicate. But to view human motivations as a constant, and disregard individual-level evidence concerning them, seems unwise and unwarranted.

Does political participation tend to get the participants what they want, or what they are assumed to want? Some of the most significant recent research has addressed this question using aggregate-level data. The answer is not yet clear. Analyses by such scholars as Hewitt (1977), Cameron (1978), and Hibbs (1977) indicate that political participation *does* make a difference —a conclusion that is disputed by Parkin (1971), Jackman (1975, 1980) and Schmidt (1982).

A relatively small but growing set of comparative behavioral analyses have continued to focus on structural variables when the key innovations seemed to be emerging from individual level analysis. Gurr (1970) pioneered in the empirical analysis of political violence, elaborating a typology of domestic and external violence and attempting to explain it in terms of economic and institutional factors. In subsequent work, Gurr and Duvall (1973) and Gurr and Lichbach (1979) have developed a formal model with an impressive capacity to explain the magnitude and properties of civil conflict at the national level.

Lipset (1960) addressed the same basic question that concerned Almond and Verba (1963)—the social conditions favorable to democracy—but approached it through the analysis of aggregate statistical data and historical materials. He concluded that stable democracy requires a reasonably high level of economic development, plus legitimacy (the belief that the existing institutions are appropriate) and effective performance. Subsequent research has extended the scope of the original study and introduced far more sophisticated techniques, including time series analysis. But Lipset's basic findings have largely been upheld. Although Lipset tended to ignore the distinction between how *democratic* a nation is, and how *stable* a democracy is (Bollen, 1980), economic development does seem conducive to stable democracy (Cutwright, 1967; Dahl, 1971; Jackman, 1975; Hewitt, 1977). The extent to which democratic practices prevail in a country is linked with its per capita wealth and level of industrialization (Adelman & Morris, 1967; Jackman, 1973; Bollen, 1979). Also concerned with the preconditions of democracy, but focusing on communication variables, McCrone and Cnudde (1967) con-

cluded that urbanization leads to the spread of education; education in turn leads to the development of communications networks; these in turn are conducive to the emergence of democratic government—perhaps as a consequence of processes similar to those *The Civic Culture* emphasizes.

The foregoing studies take it for granted that democracy is a good thing. But does it make any difference, in terms of economic equality, or might democracy be interpreted as a sham, from a purely materialistic viewpoint? Jackman (1975) finds that democracy is positively associated with income equality, but that this relationship is spurious. For there is a strong linkage between economic development and income equality, and between economic development and the presence of democracy; the association between democracy and equality disappears when the level of economic development is taken into account. Adelman and Morris (1973), Paukert (1973) and Wilensky (1975) reach similar conclusions. Hewitt (1977) develops this analysis farther, finding that while democracy, in itself, has only limited impact on income equality, government by social democratic parties *does* have a significant effect.

Similarly, Kramer (1971), Nordhaus (1975), Hibbs (1976, 1977), and Tufte (1975, 1978) analyze the impact of elections on macroeconomic policies and outcomes, such as economic growth, employment rates, and inflation rates. Moving beyond simple economic determinism, these investigators find that electoral behavior not only *responds* to economic events, it is also a major *influence* on them. Their results indicate, for example, that when parties of the Left are in office, they tend to emphasize full employment at the cost of higher inflation. In the same vein, Cameron (1978) finds that the more a nation has been governed by Social Democratic parties, the greater is the rate of growth in the public sector of the economy—although dependence on foreign trade is an even stronger predictor.

In striking contradiction to these authors, however, Jackman (1975, 1980) and Schmidt (1982) conclude that the partisanship of the government has little or no impact on the policy outputs of Western democracies. Reexamining the hypothesis that Socialist governments tend to reduce income inequality, Jackman (1980) notes that Hewitt (1977) included in his analysis an extreme outlier, South Africa; this country has (1) nearly twice as much income inequality as any other of the 15 nations analyzed, and (2) no significant socialist party. Removing this one outlier reduces the correlation between socialism and income equality from an impressive level to an insignificant one. This, and other considerations, lead Jackman to conclude that overall, social democratic governments do not produce greater income equality than more conservative regimes.

Schmidt (1982) broadens this argument. Reanalyzing Hibbs' (1977), evidence that social democratic governments reduce unemployment at the cost of higher inflation, he *adds* several deviant cases: relatively socialistic nations with high unemployment (such as Israel) or low inflation (Austria and Switzerland); or nations rarely or never governed by socialists, with low unemployment (Japan and New Zealand). This expanded data base shows a much weaker correlation between socialist participation in government and economic outcomes. Applying a similar critique to the findings of Cameron

(1978), Schmidt (1982) finds strikingly different correlations for the period 1960-1975, as compared with 1950-1959. He concludes that social democratic parties *per se* have little impact on the policy outcomes of capitalist societies. Only when a number of other preconditions are present—such as a strong, unified labor movement and a divided Right—do social democratic regimes reduce unemployment and expand the public sector of the economy; otherwise, they make little difference.

If Schmidt's basic conclusions are correct, the implications are far-reaching. From one perspective, they could be taken as evidence that democracy is largely meaningless in a capitalist society; the capitalist economic system dominates politics so totally that social democratic parties are either co-opted or rendered ineffectual (Offe, 1972). Full employment and full economic equality can only be attained by rejecting capitalism altogether.

Another interpretation is that the surprisingly small long-term differences between the economic outputs of socialist and conservative governments could reflect a tendency for market-oriented advanced industrial societies to move toward a predictable equilibrium point in the compromise between labor and capital (Przeworski & Wallerstein, 1982). In the most advanced societies, even those elites and publics that were once most favorably disposed toward egalitarian social policies become less and less change-oriented as they approach this point. Thus, although they helped develop one of the world's most advanced social welfare systems, Sweden's Social Democratic bureaucrats and politicians today are among the *least* change-oriented elites in the Western world (Anton, 1980; Aberbach, *et al.*, 1981). Similarly, the Danish public has supported the emergence of a highly developed welfare state, but today shows relatively little desire to expand it farther (Inglehart, 1984). Nevertheless, even if advanced welfare societies like Sweden and Denmark have experienced diminishing polarization on economic issues, we would *not* expect policy conflict between political parties to disappear; instead, it would show an increasing tendency to focus on emerging non-economic issues.

The controversy seems far from settled, however. Analysis of the relationship between economic outputs and the political parties in power has produced some fascinating and provocative interpretations; it has not yet come up with definitive answers. One reason for the diverging results obtained so far is a problem inherent in using the nation as a unit of analysis: the small number of cases. If one is analyzing the importance of partisanship in industrialized democracies, for example, one has at *best* two to three dozen cases—assuming generous definitions of "industrialized" and "democracy." As we have seen, the addition or subtraction of a few cases—because of defensibly different interpretations of how a given case should be classified—can change the overall pattern dramatically. In order to alleviate this problem—and because the basis of political conflict or consensus seems to change over time—it is likely that research on this topic will increasingly utilize time series analysis. The third, updated edition of the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (Taylor & Jodice, 1983) should be of great value to this enterprise.

In a particularly interesting analysis that integrates macro-level and

micro-level data, Powell (1981, 1982) examines the social, economic and political roots of effective democratic political performance. He concludes that performance has three distinct dimensions: (1) citizen participation, (2) stable government, and (3) political order. Each of these dimensions reflects different causal processes, shaped by different independent variables. Multivariate analysis of data from 29 democracies indicates that: nations with small populations tend to have low per capita rates of rioting and deaths from political violence; the level of economic development—though not economic growth rates—affects voting participation and death rates; ethnic homogeneity affects executive stability and deaths; and the type of party system affects voting rates, executive stability and deaths. On the whole, Powell's findings indicate that political factors—particularly party system characteristics and cleavage structures—are more important than economic influences on governmental performance.

In summation, after an era of relative quiescence, the macroanalysis of political phenomena has re-emerged with a vengeance. It has brought renewed attention to some of the most basic and significant aspects of political life, seeking answers to questions about the ultimate societal consequences of individual-level behavior. Its models are more complex than those commonly used in the analysis of individual-level data; they almost invariably explain a much higher proportion of variance in the data. Though they are still rare, the most fruitful studies combine data or insights from the macroanalytic and microanalytic level in interactive fashion, examining the linkages between political culture, political institutions, economic and social phenomena.

Recent trends place renewed emphasis on structural factors, and it has redressed the balance fruitfully, because institutions always were and still are important. But much of the research done so far reflects an unexamined assumption that economic variables are either the dominant influence on political behavior, or the only indicator worth considering for whether political action has significant consequences. Behavioral research has made the primacy of economics increasingly dubious.

While economics is an important factor in politics, it is by no means the only one. Some of the most significant other variables seem to be individual-level orientations and skills that we have only begun to measure in a standardized form suitable for quantitative comparative analysis. We must move farther in this direction. For the wave of the future does not seem to be a one-sided reliance on either macro-level analysis or individual-level analysis alone, but in the task of integrating both in more complex but more adequate models of politics.

REFERENCES

Aberbach, Joel D., *et al. Bureaucrats and politicians in western democracies.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Abramson, Paul R. *Generational change in American politics.* Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1975.

Abramson, Paul R. Class voting in the 1976 election. *Journal of Politics,* 1978, *40,* 1066-1072. (a)

Abramson, Paul R. Generational replacement and partisan dealignment in Britain and the United States. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *8,* 505-509. (b)

Abramson, Paul R. *Political attitudes in America: Formation and change.* San Francisco: Freeman, 1983.

Abramson, Paul R., Aldrich, John H. & Rohde, David. *Change and continuity in the 1980 elections.* Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982.

Adelman, Irma & Morris, Cynthia Taft. *Economic growth and social equity in developing countries.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973.

Alford, Robert R. *Party and society: The Anglo-American democracies.* Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1963.

Almond, G., & Coleman, J. (Eds.). *The politics of the developing areas.* Princeton Princeton University Press, 1961.

Almond, Gabriel A. & Verba, Sidney. *The civic culture.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Almond, G. A. & Verba, S. (Eds.). *The civic culture revisited.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1980.

Alt, James E. *The politics of economic decline: Economic management and political behavior in Britain since 1964.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Anton, Thomas. *Administered politics: Elite political culture in Sweden.* New York: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980.

Baker, Kendall L., Dalton, Russell & Hildebrandt, Kai. *Germany transformed.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Barnes, Samuel. Religion and class in Italian electoral behavior. In Richard Rose (Ed.). *Electoral behavior: A comparative handbook.* New York: Free Press, 1974.

Barnes, Samuel. Elections and Italian democracy: An evaluation. In Howard Penniman (Ed.). *Italy at the polls, 1979.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981.

Barnes, Samuel, Kaase, Max, *et al. Political action: Mass participation in five western democracies.* Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979.

Barnes, Samuel & Pierce, Roy. Public opinion and political preferences in France and Italy. *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 1971, *15,* 643-660.

Barton, Allen H. Determinants of leadership attitudes in a socialist society. In Allen H. Barton, Bogdan Denitch, & Charles Kadushin (Eds.). *Opinion-making elites in Yugoslavia.* New York: Praeger, 1973.

Barton, Allen H., Denitch, Bogdan & Kadushin, Charles (Eds.). *Opinion-making elites in Yugoslavia.* New York: Praeger, 1973.

Beck, Paul & Jennings, M. Kent. Political periods and political participation. *American Political Science Review,* 1979, *73,* 737-750.

Bell, Daniel. *The coming of post-industrial society: A venture in social forecasting.* New York: Basic Books, 1973.

Berelson, Bernard R. *et al. Voting—A study of opinion formation in a presidential campaign.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954.

Berger, Manfred *et al.* Die bundestagswahl 1976: Politik und sozialstruktur. *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen,* 1977, *8,* 197-231.

Bishop, George F. *et al.* Change in the structure of American political attitudes: The nagging question of question wording. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *22,* 250-269.

Blondel, Jean. *Voters, parties, and leaders: The social fabric of British politics.* Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1963.

Bollen, K. A. Political democracy and the timing of development. *American Sociological Review,* 1979, *44,* 572-587.

Bollen, K. A. Issues in the comparative measurement of political democracy. *American Sociological Review,* 1980, *45,* 370-390.

Bonilla, Frank. *The failure of elites.* Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1970.

Books, John W. & Reynolds, JoAnn B. A note on class voting in Great Britain and the United States. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1975, *8,* 360-375.

Borre, Ole & Katz, Daniel. Party identification and its motivational base in a multiparty system. *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 1973, *8,* 69-111.

Borre, Ole. The social bases of Danish electoral behavior. In Richard Rose (Ed.). *Electoral participation: A comparative analysis.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980.

Boyd, Richard W. Popular control of public policy: A normal vote analysis of the 1968 election. *American Political Science Review,* 1972, *66,* 429-449.

Brody, Richard A. & Page, Benjamin I. Comment: The assessment of policy voting. *American Political Science Review,* 1972, *66,* 450-458.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew & Huntington, Samuel. *Political power: USA/USSR.* New York: Viking, 1964.

Budge, Ian. *Agreement and the stability of democracy.* Chicago: Markham, 1970.

Budge, Ian, Brand, J. A., Margolis, Michael, & Smith, A. L. M. *Political stratification and democracy.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.

Budge, Ian. Electoral volatility: Issue effects and basic change in 23 postwar democracies. Unpublished paper, University of Essex, 1982.

Budge, Ian & Farlie, Dennis. A comparative analysis of factors correlated with turnout and voting choice. In Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe & Dennis Farlie (Eds.). *Party identification and beyond.* London: Wiley, 1976.

Budge, Ian & Farlie, Dennis. *Voting and party competition: A spatial synthesis and a critique of existing approaches applied to surveys from ten democracies.* London and New York: Wiley, 1982.

Bunce, Valerie. Elite succession, petrification, and policy innovation in communist states: An empirical assessment. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1976, *9,* 3-42.

Bunce, Valerie. The succession connection. *American Political Science Review,* 1980, *74,* 966-977.

Bürklin, Wilhelm. Determinanten der wahlentscheidung fur die 'Grünen.' *Politische Vierteljahresschrift,* 1981, *22,* 4.

Butler, David & Stokes, Donald. *Political change in Britain* (2nd ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974.

Cameron, David R. Stability and change in patterns of French partisanshp: A cohort analysis. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1972, *31,* 19-30.

Cameron, David R. The expansion of the public economy: A comparative analysis. *American Political Science Review,* 1978, *72,* 1243-1261.

Campbell, Angus, Gurin, Gerald & Miller, Warren E. *The voter decides.* Evanston/White Plains: Row, Peterson,1954.

Campbell, Angus *et al. The American voter.* New York: John Wiley, 1960.

Capdevielle, Jacques *et al. France de Gauche vote à droite.* Paris: Fondation nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1981.

Carmines, Edward G. & Stimson, James A. Two faces of issue voting. *American Political Science Review,* 1980, *74,* 78-91.

Clubok, Alfred, Berghorn, Forrest, & Wilensky, Norman. Family relationships, congressional recruitment and political modernization. *Journal of Politics,* 1969, *31,* 1035-1062.

Coleman, James S. The political systems of the developing areas. In Gabriel A. Almond & James S. Coleman (Eds.). *The politics of the developing areas.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Conradt, David P. Changing German political culture. In Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba (Eds.). *The civic culture revisited.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1980.

Converse, Philip E. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In David E. Apter (Ed.). *Ideology and discontent.* New York: The Free Press, 1964.

Converse, Philip E. Of time and partisan stability. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1969, *2,* 139-171.

Converse, Philip E. Change in the American electorate. In Angus E. Campbell & Philip E. Converse (Eds.). *The human meaning of social change.* New York: Russell Sage, 1972.

Converse, Philip E. Some priority variables in comparative electoral research. In Richard Rose (Ed.). *Electoral behavior: A comparative handbook.* New York: Free Press, 1974.

Converse, Philip E. *Political representation in France.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming.

Converse, Philip E. & Dupeux, Georges. Politicization of the electorate in France and the United States. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1962, *26,* 1-23.

Converse, Philip E. & Pierce, Roy. Die mai-unruhen in Frankreich: Ausmass und konsequenzen. In Klaus Allerbeck & Leopold Rosenmayr (Eds.). *Aufstand der Jugend?* Munich: Juventa, 1971.

Cotgrove, Stephen & Duff, Andrew. Environmentalism, middle class radicalism and politics. *Sociological Review,* 1980, *28,* 333-351.

Cotgrove, Stephen & Duff, Andrew. Environmentalism, values and social change. *British Journal of Sociology,* 1981, *32,* 92-110.

Crewe, Ivor, Sarlvik, Bo, & Alt, James. Partisan dealignment in Britain 1964-1974. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1977, *7,* 129-190.

Crewe, Ivor, Sarlvik, Bo, & Alt, James. Reply to Abramson. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *8.*

Crewe, Ivor & Sarlvik, Bo. *Voting in Britain.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Cutwright, Phillips. Inequality: A cross-national analysis. *American Sociological Review,* 1967, *32,* 562-578.

Dahl, Robert A. *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971.

Dalton, Russell J. Was there a revolution? *Comparative Political Studies,* 1977, *9,* 459-473.

Dalton, Russell J. Reassessing parental socialization: Indicator unreliability versus generational transfer. *American Political Science Review,* 1980, *74,* 421-431.

Dalton, Russell J. The persistence of values and life cycle changes. In Hans Klingemann & Max Kaase (Eds.). *Politische psychologie,* special issue of *Politische Vierteljahresschrift,* 1981, *12,* 189-207.

Dalton, Russell J. Partisan dealignment and cognitive mobilization in advanced industrial democracies. Presented at the ECPR Workshop on Problems of Party Government, Aarhus, Denmark, March 29-April 3, 1982.

Dalton, Russell J. The German party system: Between two ages. In Russell Dalton, Scott Flanagan & Paul Beck (Eds.). *Electoral change: Realignment and dealignment in industrial societies,* forthcoming.

Dalton, Russell J., Flanagan, Scott & Beck, Paul (Eds.). *Electoral change realignment and dealignment in advanced industrial democracies.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.

Davies, James C. Toward a theory of revolution. *American Sociological Review,* 1962, *27,* 5-18.

deJong, J. J. *Overheid en onderdaan.* Wageningen: Zomer en Keunings, 1956.

Deutsch, Emeric *et al. Les familles politiques aujourd'hui en France.* Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1966.

Dogan, Mattei. Political ascent in a class society: French deputies 1870-1958. In

Dwaine Marvick (Ed.). *Political decision-makers.* New York: Free Press, 1961.
Dogan, Mattei & Scheffer-van der Veen, Maria. Le personnel ministeriel Hollandais (1848-1958). *L'annee sociologique* (3rd ser.). 1957-58, 95-125.
Downs, Anthony. *An economic theory of democracy.* New York: Random House, 1957.
Dutter, Lee E. The Netherlands as a plural society. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1978, *10,* 555-588.
Easton, David A. & Dennis, Jack. *Children in the political system.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969.
Edinger, Lewis J. & Searing, Donald D. Social background in elite analysis: A methodological inquiry. *American Political Science Review,* 1967, *61,* 428-445.
Eldersveld, Samuel J. *Political parties in American society.* New York: Basic Books, 1982.
Fair, R. C. The effects of economic events on vote for president. *Review of Economics and Statistics,* 1978, *60,* 159-175.
Falter, Jurgen W. & Rattinger, Hans. Parteien, kandidaten und politische streitfragen bei der bundestagswahl 1980: Moglichkeiten und grenzen der normal-vote analyse. In Max Kaase & Hans D. Klingemann (Eds.). *Wahlen und politische kultur: Studien zur bundestagswahl 1980.* Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982.
Feldman, Stanley & Zuckerman, Alan S. Moving beyond party identification. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1982, *15,* 197-222.
Field, G. Lowell & Higley, John. The states of national elites and the stability of political institutions in 81 nations, 1950-1982. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, CO, 1982.
Fietkau, Hans-Joachim & Kessel, Hans (Eds.). *Die gruene zukunft.* Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, forthcoming.
Fietkau, Hans-Joachim & Tischler, Wolfgang. *Umwelt im spiegel der offentlichen meinung.* Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1982.
Finer, Samuel E. *The changing British party system, 1945-1979.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980.
Fiorina, Morris P. *Representatives, roll calls, and constituencies.* Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1974.
Fiorina, Morris P. *Retrospective voting in American national elections.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981.
Fiorina, Morris P. Economic retrospective voting in American national elections: A micro-analysis. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *22,* 426-443.
Flanagan, Scott C. Value change and partisan change in Japan: The silent revolution revisited. *Comparative Politics,* 1979, *11,* 253-278.
Flanagan, Scott C. Value cleavages, economic cleavages, and the Japanese voter. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1980, *24,* 177-206.
Flanagan, Scott C. Changing values in advanced industrial society. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1982, *14,* 403-444.
Franklin, Mark N., & Mughan, Anthony. The decline of class voting in Britain: Problems of analysis and interpretation. *American Political Science Review,* 1978, *72,* 523-534.
Friedgut, Theodore. *Political participation in the U.S.S.R.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Gitelman, Zvi. Politics on the output side: Citizen-bureaucrat interaction in the U.S.S.R. Paper presented at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, CO, 1982.
Glenn, Norval D. Class and party support in the United States: Recent and emerging trends. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1973, *33,* 17-33.
Goldberg, Arthur S. Discerning a causal pattern among data on voting behavior.

American Political Science Review, 1969, *60,* 913-922.

Greenstein, Fred. *Children and politics.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965.

Groffman, Bernard & Muller, Edward N. The strange case of relative gratification and potential for political violence: The V-curve hypothesis. *American Political Science Review,* 1973, *67,* 514-529.

Gurr, Ted R. *Why men rebel.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

Gurr, Ted R. & Duvall, R. Civil conflict in the 1960s: A reciprocal theoretical system with parameter estimates. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1973, *6,* 135-170.

Gurr, Ted R. & Lichbach, M. I. Forecasting domestic political conflict. In Michael D. Wallace & J. David Singer (Eds.). *To augur well.* Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979.

Hewitt, Christopher J. The effect of political democracy and social democracy on equality in industrial societies. *American Sociological Review,* 1977, *42,* 450-464.

Hibbs, Douglas A. *Mass political violence.* New York: John Wiley, 1973.

Hibbs, Douglas A. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. *American Political Science Review,* 1977, *71,* 467-487.

Hibbs, Douglas A. On the political economy of long-run trends in strike activity. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *8,* 153-175.

Hibbs, Douglas A. with Nicholas Vasilatos. Economic outcomes and political support for British governments among occupational classes: A dynamic analysis. *American Political Science Review,* 1982, *76,* 259-279.

Hibbs, Douglas A., Rivers, Douglas & Vasilatos, Nicholas. The dynamics of political support for American presidents among occupational and partisan groups. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1982, *26.*

Hildebrandt, Kai & Dalton, Russell J. The new politics: Political change or sunshine politics? In Max Kaase & Klaus von Beyme (Eds.). *Elections and parties: Socio-political change and participation in the West German federal election of 1976.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1978.

Himmelweit, Hilde *et al. How voters decide.* London and New York: Academic Press, 1981.

Hofferbert, Richard I. *The study of public policy.* Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974.

Hough, Jerry. The Soviet system: Petrification or pluralism? *Problems of Communism,* 1972, *21,* 24-45.

Hough, Jerry. Political participation in the Soviet Union. *Soviet Studies,* 1976, *28,* 3-20.

Ike, Nobutaka. Economic growth and intergenerational change in Japan. *American Political Science Review,* 1973, *67,* 1194-1203.

Inglehart, Ronald. The silent revolution in Europe: Intergenerational change in post-industrial societies. *American Political Science Review,* 1971, *65,* 991-1017.

Inglehart, Ronald. The silent revolution: Changing values and political styles among western publics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Inglehart, Ronald. Post-materialism in an environment of insecurity. *American Political Science Review,* 1981, *75,* 880-900.

Inglehart, Ronald. The changing structure of political cleavages in western society. In Russell J. Dalton, Scott Flanagan & Paul Beck (Eds.). *Electoral change: Realignment and dealignment in advanced industrial societies.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Inglehart, Ronald. Stability change and constraint in mass belief systems: The level of analysis paradox. Forthcoming.

Inglehart, Ronald, Gordon, Ian, Rabier, Jacques-René, & Sorensen, Carsten. Broader powers for the European parliament? The attitudes of candidates. *European Journal of Political Research,* 1980, *8,* 113-132.

Inglehart, Ronald & Hochstein, Avram. Alignment and dealignment of the electorate in France and the United States. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1972, *5,* 343-372.

Inglehart, Ronald & Klingemann, Hans. Party identification, ideological preference and the left-right dimension among western mass publics. In I. Budge, I. Crewe & D. Farlie. *Party identification and beyond.* New York: Wiley, 1976.

Inglehart, Ronald & Klingemann, Hans. Ideological conceptualization and value priorities. In Samuel Barnes, Max Kaase *et al. Political action: Mass participation in five western democracies.* Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979.

Inglehart, Ronald & Rabier, Jacques-René. Trust between nationalities. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Political Science Association, Rio de Janeiro, August, 1982.

Inglehart, Ronald & Sidjanski, Dusan. The left, the right, the establishment and the Swiss electorate. In I. Budge, I. Crewe & D. Farlie. *Party identification and beyond.* New York: Wiley, 1976.

Jackman, Mary R. & Jackman, Robert W. *Class awareness in the United States.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.

Jackman, Robert W. On the relation of economic development to democratic performance. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1973, *17,* 611-621.

Jackman, Robert W. *Politics and social equality: A comparative analysis.* New York: Wiley, 1975.

Jackman, Robert W. The predictability of coups d'etat. *American Political Science Review,* 1978, *72,* 1262-1275.

Jackman, Robert W. Socialist parties and income inequality in western industrial societies. *Journal of Politics,* 1980, *42,* 135-149.

Jackson, John E. Issues, party choices and presidential votes. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1975, *19,* 161-185.

Jennings, M. Kent & Niemi, Richard G. The transmission of political values from parent to child. *American Political Science Review,* 1968, *62,* 169-184.

Jennings, M. Kent & Niemi, Richard G. *The political character of adolescence* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.

Jennings, M. Kent and Niemi, Richard G. *Generations and politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Jennings, M. Kent, Allerbeck, Klaus & Rosenmayr, Leopold. Generations and families: General orientations. In Samuel Barnes, Max Kaase *et al. Political action.* Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979.

Kaase, Max. *Wechsel von parteipräferenzen.* Meisenheim: Anton Hain, 1967.

Kaase, Max & Klingemann, Hans D. Sozialstruktur, wertorientierung und parteiensysteme. In Joachim Matthes (Ed.). *Sozialer wandel in Westeuropa.* Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1979.

Katz, Richard. *A theory of parties and electoral systems.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

Kemp, David A. The Australian electorate. In Howard Penniman (Ed.). *The Australian national elections of 1977.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979.

Kerr, Henry & Handley, David. Conflits des générations et politique étrangère en Suisse. *Annuaire Suisse de Science Politique,* 1974, 127-155.

Kessel, John H. Comment. *American Political Science Review,* 1972, *71,* 459-465.

Kinder, Donald R. & Kiewiet, D. R. Sociotropic politics: The American case. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1979, 11, 129-161.

Kinder, Donald R. & Sears, David O. Public opinion and political action. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.). *The handbook of social psychology* (3rd ed.). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1983.

King, Anthony. Whatever is happening to the British party system? *PS,* 1982, *15,* 10-17.

Klingemann, Hans. Issue-kompetenz und wahlentscheidung. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift,* 1973, *14,* 227-256.

Kmieciak, Peter. *Wertstrukturen und wertwandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.* Gottingen: Schwartz, 1976.

Knutsen, Oddbjorn. *Materialisme og post-materialisme i Norge.* Oslo: Institutt for Samfunnsforskning, 1982.

Kramer, Gerald H. Short-term fluctuations in U.S. voting behavior, 1896-1964. *American Political Science Review,* 1971, *65,* 131-143.

Kramer, Gerald H. The ecological fallacy revisited: Aggregate versus individual-level findings on economics and elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1983, *77,* 92-111.

Lafferty, William M. Basic needs and political values: Some perspectives from Norway on Europe's 'silent revolution.' *Acta Sociologica,* 1975, *19,* 117-136.

Lancelot, Alain. *Les classes moyennes et la politique.* Forthcoming.

Langton, Kenneth P. Peer group and school and the political socialization process. *American Political Science Review,* 1967, *61,* 751-758.

LaPalombara, Joseph. *Politics within nations.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974.

LaPalombara, Joseph. Monoliths and plural systems. *Studies in Comparative Communism.* 1975.

LaPalombara, Joseph. Socialist alternatives: The Italian variant. *Foreign Affairs,* 1982, *60,* 924-942.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. *et al. The people's choice.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1948.

Leonardi, Franco. Valori o stereotipie etico-sociali? Riflessioni sulla 'nuova sinistra' di Ronald Inglehart. *Sociologia.* Forthcoming.

Leonardi, Robert. The Italian parliament in the 1979 elections. In Howard R. Penniman (Ed.). *Italy at the polls, 1979.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981.

Lijphart, Arend. *Class and religious voting in the European democracies.* Occasional paper No. 8, Survey Research Center, University of Strathclyde, 1971.

Lijphart, Arend. Religion vs. linguistic vs. class voting: The 'crucial experiment' of comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland. *American Political Science Review,* 1979, 442-458.

Lijphart, Arend. Political parties: Ideologies and programs. In David Butler *et al.* (Eds.). *Democracy at the polls: A comparative study of competitive national elections.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political man: The social bases of politics.* Garden City: Doubleday, 1960.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. The changing class structure and contemporary European politics. *Daedalus,* 1964, *93,* 271-303.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political man: The social bases of politics* (2nd ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

Lipset, Seymour Martin & Rokkan, Stein. Introduction. In S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (Eds.). *Party systems and voter alignments.* New York: Macmillan, 1967.

Lodge, Milton. *Social elite attitudes since Stalin.* Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1969.

Lodge, Milton. Attitudinal cleavages within the Soviet leadership since Stalin. In Carl Beck *et al.* (Eds.). *Comparative communist political leadership.* New York: David McKay, 1973.

Margolis, Michael. From confusion to confusion: Issues and the American voter (1956-1972). *American Political Science Review,* 1977, *71,* 31-43.

Marsh, Alan. The silent revolution, value priorities, and the quality of life in Britain. *American Political Science Review,* 1975, *69,* 1-30.

Marsh, Alan. *Protest and political consciousness.* Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1977.

McCrone, Donald J. & Cnudde, Charles F. Toward a communications theory of democratic political development: A causal model. *American Political Science Review,* 1967, *61,* 72-79.

Michelat, Guy & Simon, M. Classe, religion et comportement politique. Paris: Editions Sociales, 1977.

Milbrath, Lester W. *Political participation.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.

Milbrath, Lester W. & Goel, M. L. *Political participation* (2nd ed.). Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977.

Miller, Arthur H. Political issues and trust in government: 1964-1970. *American Political Science Review,* 1974, *68,* 951-972.

Miller, Arthur H., Miller, Warren E., Raine, Alden S. & Brown, Thad A. A majority party in disarray: Policy polarization in the 1972 election. *American Political Science Review,* 1976, *70,* 753-778.

Miller, Warren E. & Stokes, Donald E. Constituency influences in Congress. *American Political Science Review,* 1963, *57,* 45-56.

Miller, Warren E. & Southard, Philip C. Confessional attachment and electoral behavior in The Netherlands. *European Journal of Political Research,* 1975, *3,* 219-258.

Miller, Warren E. & Levitin, Teresa E. *Leadership and change: The new politics and the American electorate.* Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1976.

Muller, Edward N. *Aggressive political participation.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand. Ecology parties in Western Europe. *West European Politics,* 1982, *1,* 68-74.

Nardi, Rafaella. Sono le condizioni economiche a influenzare I valori? Un conrollo dell'ipotesi di Inglehart. *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica,* 1980, *10,* 293-315.

Nie, Norman & Andersen, Kristi. Mass belief systems revisited: Political change and attitude structure. *Journal of Politics,* 1974, *36,* 540-591.

Nie, Norman H., Powell, G. Bingham & Prewitt, Kenneth. Social structure and political participation: Developmental relationships, Parts 1 and 2. *American Political Science Review,* 1969, *63,* 361-378, 808-832.

Nie, Norman, Verba, Sidney & Petrocik, John R. *The changing American voter.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.

Nordhaus, William D. The political business cycle. *Review of Economic Studies,* 1975, *42,* 160-190.

Nordlinger, Eric A. *On the autonomy of the democratic state.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Norpoth, Helmut. Party identification in West Germany: Tracing an elusive concept. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1978, *11,* 36-61.

Offe, Claus. *Struktur probleme des kapitalistischen staates.* Frankfurt, 1972.

Ordeshook, Peter C. The spatial theory of elections: A review and a critique. In Ian Budge *et al. Party identification and beyond.* London and New York: Wiley, 1976.

Page, Benjamin I. & Shapiro, Robert Y. Effects of public opinion on policy. *American Political Science Review,* 1983, *77,* 175-190.

Palma, Giuseppe di *Apathy and participation.* New York: The Free Press, 1970.

Pappi, Franz Urban. Sozialstruktur und politische konflikte in der Bundesrepublik. Cologne: Habilitationsschrift, 1976.

Parkin, Frank. *Class, inequality and political order.* London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1971.

Paukert, Felix. Income distribution at different levels of development. *International*

Labor Review, 1973, *108,* 97-125.
Pedersen, Mogens N. The dynamics of European party systems: Changing patterns of electoral volatility. *European Journal of Political Research,* 1979, *7,* 1-26. (a)
Pedersen, Mogens N. Denmark: The breakdown of a working multiparty system. Unpublished paper, Odense University, 1979. (b)
Pesonen, Pertti & Sankiaho, Risto. Kansalaiset ja Kan sanvalta: Suommalaisten kasityksia poliittisesta toiminnasta. Helsinki: Werner Soderstrom, 1979.
Pierce, Roy. Left-right perceptions, partisan preferences, electoral participation and partisan choice in France. *Political Behavior,* 1981, *3,* 117-136.
Pomper, Gerald M. From confusion to clarity. *American Political Science Review,* 1972, *66,* 415-420.
Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. Party systems and political system performance: Participation, stability and violence in contemporary democracies. *American Political Science Review,* 1981, *75,* 861-879.
Powell, G. Bingham. *Political performance in contemporary democracies.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Prewitt, Kenneth. *The recruitment of political leaders: A study of citizen-politicians.* New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970.
Prewitt, Kenneth, Eulau, Heinz & Zisk, Betty. Political socialization and political roles. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1966-67, *30,* 569-582.
Przeworski, Adam & Sprague, John. Final analyses: Electoral socialism project. Unpublished manuscript, Washington University, St. Louis, 1981.
Przeworski, A. & Wallerstein, Michael. The structure of class conflict in democratic capitalist societies. *American Political Science Review,* 1982, *76,* 215-238.
Putnam, Robert D. *The beliefs of politicians: Ideology, conflict, and democracy in Britain and Italy.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973.
Putnam, Robert D. *The comparative study of political elites.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976.
Putnam, Robert D., Leonardi, Robert & Nanetti, Raffaella Y. Polarization and depolarization in Italian politics. Paper delivered at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September, 1981.
Quandt, William B. *The comparative study of political elites.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, vol. 1, no. 01-004, 1970.
Rabier, Jacques-René. Opinions et attitudes des Européens: Dix années de recherches internationales comparatives. *Futuribles,* 1981, 3-20.
RePass, David. Comment: Political methodologies in disarray: Issues and American voters, 1956-1968. *American Political Science Review,* 1976, *70,* 814-831.
Richardson, Bradley M. *The political culture of Japan.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974.
Riker, William & Ordeshook, Peter C. *Positive political theory.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973.
Robertson, David. *A theory of party competition.* London and New York: Wiley, 1976. (a)
Robertson, David. Surrogates for party identification in the rational choice framework. In I. Budge, I. Crewe & D. Farlie (Eds.). *Party identification and beyond.* New York: Wiley, 1976. (b)
Rogowski, Ronald. *A rational theory of legitimacy.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Rokkan, Stein. *Citizens, elections and parties.* New York: David McKay, 1970.
Rose, Richard. *Electoral behavior: A comparative handbook.* New York: Free Press, 1974.
Rose, Richard. Class does not equal party: The decline of a model of British voting. *Studies in Public Policy No. 74.* Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1980.

Rose, Richard. From simple determinism to interactive models of voting. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1982, *15,* 145-169.

Rose, Richard & Urwin, Derek. Social cohesion, political parties and strains in regimes. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1969, 7-67.

Rusk, Jerrold G. & Weisberg, Herbert F. Perceptions of presidential candidates: Implications for electoral change. *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 1972, *16,* 388-410.

Sani, Giacomo. The Italian electorate in the mid-1970s: Beyond tradition? In Howard R. Penniman (Ed.). *Italy at the polls: The parliamentary elections of 1976.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977.

Sani, Giacomo. Italian voters, 1976-1979. In Howard Penniman (Ed.). *Italy at the polls, 1979.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981.

Sartori, Giovanni. *Parties and party systems.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Schmidt, Manfred. *Wohlfahrtstaatliche politik unter bürgerlichen und sozialdemokratischen regierungen.* Frankfurt: Campus, 1982.

Schmidtchen, Gerhard. *Zwischen kirche und gesellschaft.* Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1972.

Schmidtchen, Gerhard. *Was den deutschen heilig is.* Munich: Kosel Verlag, 1979.

Searing, Donald D. The comparative study of elite socialization. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1969, *1,* 471-500.

Sidjanski, Dusan *et al. Les Suisses et la politique.* Berne and Frankfurt: Lang, 1975.

Skilling, H. Gordon & Griffiths, Franklyn. *Interest groups in Soviet politics.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Stephens, John D. The changing Swedish electorate: Class voting, contextual effects, and voter volatility. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1981, *14.*

Stokes, Donald E. Spatial models of party competition. In Angus Campbell *et al. Elections and the political order.* New York: Wiley, 1966.

Studlar, Donley T. Policy voting in Britain: The colored immigration issue in the 1964, 1966 and 1970 general elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1978, *72,* 46-64.

Suleiman, Ezra H. *Politics, power, and bureaucracy in France: The administrative elite.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974.

Sullivan, John *et al.* Ideological constraint in the mass public: A methodological critique and some new findings. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *22,* 233-240.

Szabo, Stephen F. *The successor generation: International perspectives of postwar Europeans.* London: Butterworth, 1983.

Taylor, Charles & Jodice, David A. *World handbook of political and social indicators: III.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983.

Thomas, John C. Ideological trends in western political parties. In Peter Merkl (Ed.). *Western European party systems: Trends and prospects.* New York and London, 1980.

Thomassen, Jacques. Party identification as a cross-national concept: Its meaning in The Netherlands. In Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, & Dennis Farlie (Eds.). *Party identification and beyond: Representations of voting and party competition.* New York: Wiley, 1976.

Tufte, Edward. Determinants of the outcome of midterm congressional elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1975, *69,* 812-826.

Tufte, Edward. *Political control of the economy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Van Deth, Jan. Value change in The Netherlands: A test of Inglehart's theory of the silent revolution. *European Journal of Political Research,* 1983, *11.*

Verba, Sidney & Nie, Norman. *Participation in America: Social equality and political democracy.* New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

Verba, Sidney, Nie, Norman, & Kim, Jae-on. *Participation and political equality.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Verba, Sidney, Nie, Norman, & Petrocik, John. *The changing American voter.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.

Von Beyme, Klaus. Elite input and policy output: The case of Germany. In Moshe Czudnowski (Ed.). *Does who governs matter?* DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1982.

Watanuki, Joji. *Politics in postwar Japanese society.* Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979.

Weisberg, Herbert F. & Rusk, Jerrold G. Dimensions of candidate evaluation. *American Political Science Review,* 1970, *64,* 1167-1185.

Wellhofer, E. Spencer. Political parties as 'communities of fate': Tests with Argentine party elites. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1974, *18,* 347-363.

Wildenmann, Rudolf. Germany 1930/1970: The empirical findings. In Rudolf Wildenmann (Ed.). *Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch fur Politik* (vol. 2). Munich: Gunter Olzog, 1971.

Wildenmann, Rudolf. Towards a socio-political model of the German Federal Republic. Paper read at the Ninth Meeting of the International Political Science Association, Montreal, Canada, August 1973.

Wildenmann, Rudolf *et al. Fuhrungsschicht in der Bundesrepublic Deutschland.* Mannheim: University of Mannheim, 1982.

Wilensky, Harold L. *The welfare state and equality: Structural and ideological roots of public expenditures.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

Zetterberg, Hans. *Arbete, livsstil och motivation.* Stockholm: Svenska Arbetsgivareforeningen, 1977.

Zetterberg, Hans. Class voting in Sweden, 1979-1982. Stockholm: personal communication, 1983.

Zuckerman, Alan S. New approaches to political cleavage. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1982, *15,* 131-144.

Zuckerman, Alan S. & Lichbach, M. I. Stability and change in European electorates. *World Politics,* 1977, *29,* 523-551.

15

The Elusive Paradigm Gender, Politics and Political Behavior: The State of the Art

Marianne Githens

With the exceptions of Sophonisba Breckinridge's study (1933) of American women's political, social and economic activities, Maurice Duverger's treatise (1955) on women and politics and *The American Voter* (1960) which deals at some length with women's voting behavior, there was little systematic research on women and politics prior to the late 1960s. Although an extensive body of literature on political behavior had emerged by that time, the variable of sex had been largely ignored.[1] When studies did touch on the role of women in politics, they either simply confirmed or justified the limited participation of women (Lane, 1959; Barber, 1965). Otherwise, all that existed were a number of earlier, highly emotional, polemic pieces arguing the merits of women's suffrage. As a consequence, little was really known about modes of female political participation or the factors that might explain them.

This situation has substantially changed. A number of studies have appeared over the past decade and a half, and some have been highly praised in political science journals (Freeman, 1974; Kirkpatrick, 1974; Jaquette, 1974; Githens & Prestage, 1977; Diamond, 1977; Boles, 1979; Baxter & Lansing, 1980). This essay will attempt to review some of the contemporary research, examine its contribution to an understanding of the role of American women in politics—particularly in terms of their political behavior—and evaluate its implications for the discipline of political science. The kinds of research that have been done will be examined, and the problems shared by much of this gender related research will be identified. Then, the relationship of this research to the discipline of political science will be discussed, and recommendations will be made with regard to the future interface between gender related research and the discipline as a whole.

Two sets of propositions are offered to clarify the focus of this essay. The first set deals with gender related research itself, while the second set is concerned with the relationship between gender research and the discipline of political science.

The first set of propositions relating to the nature of gender related research itself are:

1. Since so little attention had been paid to the topic of women and politics, and since the prevailing assumptions about women's political behavior were largely drawn from conventional wisdom rather than from empirically tested hypotheses, the first gender related studies were devoted to filling in "information gaps" about the distinctive political behavior of women and were, as a consequence, primarily descriptive in nature rather than analytical.

2. Although at the present time a greater emphasis is being placed on public policy (Freeman, 1974; Gelb & Palley, 1982), the role of the women's movement in shaping women's political behavior and policy concerns (Boles, 1979; Evans, 1980; Rossi, 1983), and the interface of feminist theory and political philosophy (Orkin, 1979; Elshtain, 1981; Hartsock, 1981), gender related research has focused primarily on identifying the characteristics of women or the characteristics of the political system that have affected patterns of traditional political participation.

3. In more recent research where analysis has been attempted, findings have often been interpreted within existing frameworks and conceptualizations that were developed prior to the emergence of gender related research. The use of existing definitions, conceptualizations and frameworks to explain women's political behavior often obfuscates more than it illuminates; furthermore, it has circumscribed the research by measuring women's political participation and performance against norms predicated on male behavior (Berenice Carroll, 1979; Diamond & Hartsock, 1981). For example, initial efforts at analysis of women's political behavior drew heavily upon the concept of political socialization that is based on traditional, male definitions of the public, or political, sphere; they measured women against essentially male norms and found them wanting. Although studies of the political socialization of women and minority groups, such as blacks, have led to a more sophisticated understanding of the political socialization process, the norms for defining the public sphere on which political socialization research is based remain virtually unchanged. Using the definitions and conceptualizations formulated in order to identify men in the political elite, female political elite studies have focused on women holding traditional elective or appointive public office, rather than on women wielding some influence and power by virtue of their positions in social movements. As a consequence, the parameters of the female elite are artificially narrowed. Comparisons of women with men in the traditional political elite did give rise to some experimentation with analytic frameworks such as marginality, sex stratification and measurement of status, but the basis for comparison remains the majority male. Even studies dealing with issues closely linked to social movements, such as the ERA, are examined in terms of various existing conflict models.

4. Since financial support for research on women and politics has been limited, much of the empirical research dealing with women has tended to use relatively small subsets of women both in the political elite and at the citizen level. Much of the data about women in the political elite, for example, is drawn from a particular local community or state. Similarly, research

on behavioral and attitudinal characteristics has tended to use relatively small, unrepresentative subsets of adult and preadult women. Because studies of women and politics have often dealt with small subsets, conclusions about women's behavior in general are open to question. Conflicting and confusing results reported in different studies cannot be easily reconciled.

5. Problems in evaluating research findings are further complicated by the fact that the research has been done within a relatively short time span. Consequently, the relationship between a particular time frame or the characteristics of the general political environment of a period and specific patterns of women's political behavior is unclear. Thus, despite the conclusions reached in some of the research, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine characteristics universal to women as a group over time.

The second set of propositions deals with the present interface between gender related research and political science itself. These propositions are:

1. The basic problems and flaws in gender related research are intensified by, and to a large extent the product of, the orientation of political science itself which has tended to view gender related research as an addendum to the discipline and to interpret women's political behavior within a broadly defined conceptual framework of deviance.

2. The norms against which women's political behavior are compared are not generic, but male specific. The second point requires some elaboration. In two essays, "Das Relative und das Absolute im Geschlechterproblem" and "Weibliche Kultur," Georg Simmel asserted that:

> The requirements of art, patriotism, morality in general and social ideas in particular, correctness in practical judgment and objectivity in theoretical knowledge . . . all these are categories which belong as it were in their form and their claims to humanity in general, but in their actual historical configuration they are masculine throughout. (1919, as quoted in Horney, 1935.)[2]

He then went on to note that values are "not neutral, arising out of the difference of the sexes, but in themselves essentially masculine." Further, he claimed "inadequate achievements are contemptuously called feminine, while distinguishing achievements on the part of women are called 'masculine' as an expression of praise." Parenthetically, one might add that in the case of American political science at least, masculine must be construed as white male, for the treatment of racial and ethnic research is similar to that of gender related research.

The problems posed for gender related research by the male norms and the models and standards based upon them have been noted previously (Berenice Carroll, 1979; Hartsock & Diamond, 1981). In her review essay of American politics and political behavior Carroll observed that:

> If it seemed in 1974 that the women's movement had introduced "possibilities for profound changes in the way in which the discipline studies women and the way in which it defines political activity," five years later there is little evidence that these possibilities have been realized or, indeed, pursued. The hopeful, if cautious, tone of earlier reviewers now seem (sic) largely premature, and their efforts to delineate the kinds of research and theoretical developments needed appear to have fallen on deaf ears. (p. 289)

The problem, as Carroll sees it, stems from a tendency to accept existing premises and theoretical frameworks that take neither women nor sex into account, failure to look more closely at the private sphere and instead to focus on the conventionally defined "public" or political sphere, and to force the analyses of issues such as the ERA into preformulated models. As a result, Carroll argues, women's efforts and struggles within their own contexts are ignored.

Diamond and Hartsock also point out the problems imposed on the study of women and politics by the approaches of political science. In their response to Sapiro's article (1981), "When Are Interests Interesting?" they write:

> Though Sapiro clearly holds that the state is not neutral vis-a-vis women, her conceptual tools do not permit her to develop this insight. . . .
>
> In sum, we are not saying, as Sapiro does, that recent scholarship in women's studies can show that political science has been studying the actions of only half of humanity, and that the subject matter of political science should be expanded. Instead, we are suggesting that the focus on the activity of only half of humanity is fundamental to what has been understood as political life for the last 2500 years. To include women's concerns, to represent women in the public life of our society might well lead to a profound redefinition of the nature of public life itself. (pp. 720, 721)

Taking into account the issues raised by Carroll and Diamond and Hartsock, this essay will attempt to show that although there are, in fact, a number of specific problems with gender related research to date, it is the equation, "objective = masculine" (Simmel, 1919), that condemns much gender related scholarship to oblivion by trivializing its findings, limiting its conceptual framework and restricting its potential contribution to a better understanding of politics and political life.

CONTEMPORARY GENDER RELATED RESEARCH[3]

There are a number of equally valid ways of dividing gender related research dealing with the political behavior of women. Efforts to explain particular patterns of female political participation have generally dwelt on categories of constraints: differential political socialization; biological and life cycle characteristics; unequal access to resources, especially educational, professional and financial; lack of prestige associated with traditional employment fields for women both within the home and outside; role strain and conflict stemming from interior-exterior orientations; and institutional sexism and discrimination. It is certainly possible to classify the literature this way, although other schemes for classification are probably equally valid. However, a division of the research into three categories—socialization, women's political behavior at the citizen level, and women in the political elite—seems more straightforward and useful for this essay.

Socialization

Since political socialization studies of the late fifties and early sixties suggested important sex differences, they provided a base for many of the initial studies of women and politics. Indeed, political socialization dominated discussion of women's role in politics for almost a decade. Therefore, it seems most logical to begin a survey of the literature with a review of the socialization studies.

In 1959 Herbert Hyman offered data suggesting that boys showed greater interest in politics than did girls. Fred Greenstein (1965) subsequently presented findings along similar lines. He found that boys were more political than girls, scored higher on political information, were better able to name news stories and were more interested in national news. In addition, his data showed boys to be more likely than girls to select a public figure whom they most admired. Finally, both boys and girls in his study tended to prefer their fathers as sources of political advice.[4] Sex differences were also reported by Easton and Dennis (1969). The Hess and Torney study (1967), which is perhaps the most comprehensive of all the socialization studies in terms of sample size and the diversity in SES and racial background of its respondents, reported that girls were more attached to personal figures in the political system and had a higher level of trust and reliance on the inherent goodness of the political system than boys who were more inclined to be task oriented and to see benefits in conflict and disagreement. Lynn Iglitzen (1974) in a much smaller study of the political socialization of Seattle school children found boys to be oriented more toward economic issues, while girls were more interested in peace, honesty and integrity. She also found that although girls were as likely as boys to want to be President, a sizable number of the boys wanted to be mayor; not a single girl chose this position. Instead, popular choices for girls were the school board and the judiciary.

More general studies of socialization tend to support these findings. Bardwick and Douvan (1971) found different processes and behavior norms existed for boys and girls. Studies using psychoanalytic theory, as well as identification theories based on it (Mussen, 1969; Kagan & Moss, 1962; Biller, 1971), have reported sex differences, although the findings of these and other studies have raised questions about the theoretical assumptions undergirding the research. Studies utilizing learning theory have also noted sex differences (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974, 1975; Parsons *et al.*, 1976; Lambert *et al.*, 1971; Block, 1977; Hartley, 1960, 1964; Dweck, 1975; Etaugh, Collins & Gerson, 1975; Frueh & McGhee, 1975). Cognitive developmental theories, too, confirm the existence of gender differences (Liebert, McCalland, Hanratty, 1971; Perry & Perry, 1975). These cognitive development studies, in particular, tend to support the idea of the acquisition of sex role and of sex role appropriate behavior in children. Even more recent studies, such as Bearison's (1979) and Kelly and Boutilier's (1978) have continued to find sex linked patterns of socialization important.

The research on learning sex roles and sex role appropriate behavior in children, in combination with observed gender related differences noted in the earlier literature on the political socialization of chidren, was initially ac-

cepted as an explanation for differences in adult female political behavior at both the citizen and elite level. Indeed, one researcher attempted to identify the particular childhood socialization experiences of women in the political elite that differentiated them from women in general (Rosenberg, 1972).

Several basic problems have emerged, however, that open to question the usefulness of socialization theory as an explanation for women's political behavior. The first, and perhaps most serious, is that several of the more recent studies of political socialization have found gender differences to be insignificant, minor or relatively limited. Merelman (1971), for example, found few large or consistent differences between girls and boys. Similarly, Orum, Cohen, Grasmuck and Orum (1974) reported only minor differences between girls and boys. In Jennings and Niemi's study of high school students (1974) little appreciable differences between the sexes were found, although in a subsequent study they found more sex differentiation among their respondents than had existed earlier.[5] Some studies of political socialization in other countries (see, for example, Keller, 1978) report no gender related differences, while others (Jennings, 1982) suggest that socialization has an impact on the sixteen through twenty year age group in eight nations.

On the other hand, Rapoport (1981) reported substantial gender differences with females exhibiting lower levels of political information. Citing the Jennings and Niemi research (1978) that found a high correlation for the political knowledge of respondents of both sexes over time, Rapoport suggests that adolescent gender differences in political information are indeed important. Linking political knowledge with attitude expression and political persuasion, Rapoport argues that "increasing political knowledge among adolescents would increase levels of attitude-holding and lessen sex differences" (p. 44). Differences in political information have also been noted by others, especially Duncan and Duncan (1978) who examined sex role changes over time.

Given the items used to measure political information (the length of the term of a U.S. senator and representative, for example) in studies such as Duncan and Duncan (1978), one wonders, however, just how significant this information gap really is and whether or not the inferences drawn from such measures are warranted. Even more fundamentally at issue is the current distinction between the public, or political, and the private sphere. By continuing to use traditional definitions of the public, or political, sphere and then testing the respondent's knowledge about that political sphere, an understanding of the scope of girls' and women's knowledge about a somewhat differently defined public sphere may be obscured. In turn, conclusions drawn about the likelihood for political action by women based upon their knowledge of the traditionally defined political sphere may well be incorrect. Indeed, the discrepancies in research findings about women's political participation in one area, and lack of it in another—discussed more extensively below—may well stem from invalid initial assumptions about what constitutes political information and political activity for women.

Recent studies that reported minor, insignificant or limited gender differences weakened the initial supposition that women's political behavior could be explained by differential socialization alone. Furthermore, the relationship of early socialization to adult behavior has come under more critical

scrutiny. A number of studies suggest that the linkage between the two is not as clear as was once assumed. In fact, some research indicates that childhood socialization to a given set of norms may be modified by learning experiences occurring later in the life cycle and by subsequent situational factors (Corbett, Rudoni & Frederickson, 1981; Fischer & Narus, 1981; Hall & Frederickson, 1979). The findings of this research, however, are challenged by other studies. Kelly and Boutilier (1978) argue on the basis of their analysis of women in a variety of political and private roles that "mother's occupation, education, income status and behavior directly affected the political socialization of the daughter" (p. 442).

A variety of explanations have been offered for the conflicting findings of studies dealing with socialization, as well as speculations on the relationship of socialization to behavior. Baer (1978) argues that while the sexism of the 1950s may be a factor in explaining the differences in the findings of the earlier and later political socialization studies, there is also considerably "different interpretations given to similar levels of gender linked differences" (p. 18). She goes on to say that "while the evidence does suggest some early learning of gender roles, for the most part, it is assimilated in an inconsistent fashion" (p. 18). Continuing, Baer contends:

> The social context within which gender role learning takes place is not nearly so uniform as adult notions of logical consistency would suggest. The socialization process is, instead, fundamentally an ambiguous and an ambivalent one. (p. 18)

Going still further, Welch (1977) questioned the value of socialization as an explanation of women's political behavior and characterized it as "irrelevant." Indeed, she concluded: "we . . . see little to support the socialization explanation. . . . Why many political scientists favor childhood political socialization explanation as reason for so much of adult political behavior is unclear" (p. 728).

Yet despite the position taken by Welch and others, some socialization research does continue to find gender differences. How can such divergent conclusions be explained? In a few cases the data base is extremely narrow, and the findings, therefore, are suspect. The time at which the study was done may also explain differences between some of the earlier and later findings. In still other instances, conflicting conclusions about the extent of gender differential socialization may be attributed to the interpretation given the data. Certainly Greenstein's work has been criticized on these grounds. In some other studies contradictory findings and conclusions may be the result, at least in part, of a failure to distinguish political socialization clearly enough from overall socialization, socialization to sex role and socialization to sex role appropriate behavior and to spell out the specific relationship of one to the others.

It is not easy to account for contradictions reported in other studies, however. Here, perhaps the concept of socialization itself offers some clue. The concept of socialization is predicated on the existence within a given society of universal norms transmitted to all. At the same time, the existence of group specific norms is acknowledged by the concept of majority/minority and the

notion of a subculture wherein a group internalizes some but not all of the societal norms.

It is perfectly legitimate to investigate the extent to which minorities or subcultures have internalized dominant norms. However, it must be clearly understood that a dominant norm is one held by the majority or dominant group, whereas a universal norm is one shared by all groups in a society. It is crucial to recognize the distinction between the two because not all dominant norms are universal, although all universal norms are, of course, incorporated into dominant as well as minority or subcultural norms. This means that if dominant norms are the standard against which a minority or subculture is being measured, it is very likely that universal norms but not minority or subculture specific norms will surface in the research. Furthermore, an approach focusing on dominant norms as the standard says something about the social distance of the minority or subculture from the majority or dominant group but nothing about the desirability or appropriateness of dominant norms for the particular subculture or minority. Indeed, conditions springing from minority status or the environment of the subculture may make it highly undesirable for members of the minority group or subculture to internalize certain dominant norms.

In socialization research a problem often arises when empirically tested universal norms relevant to the political order are not specifically identified. Instead, majority or dominant norms based on the concept of the ideal citizen as *he* has been defined by political philosophers or on norms prevalent among males are assumed to be universal. Therefore, some discrepancies reported in the findings may be explained by the fact that some studies that find little gender differentiation in socialization are emphasizing norms that are universal while others reporting differences are tapping dominant norms. Similarly, women's unexpected involvement in certain kinds of political activity may reflect their socialization to group specific norms that have not been identified by approaches focusing on dominant norms. Such an explanation for the contradictions in socialization research findings is clearly speculative, but it may well be one that deserves further investigation.

Women's Political Participation at the Citizen Level

Early studies of political participation at the citizen level were devoted almost exclusively to voting or to behavior directly related to voting, such as party identification, political attitudes and their implications for voting behavior, and the effects of political trust, efficacy, cynicism and alienation on voting patterns. Verba and Nie (1972) in their study of political participation suggested a rather broad range of activities that might legitimately fall within the proper scope of political behavior. Following the lead of the discipline, early studies of women's behavior focused heavily on female voting behavior and related issues. With some exceptions (Stewart, 1980; Reid, 1977; Boneparth, 1978) most studies have accepted as the parameters of citizen participation traditional political activity, e.g., voting, party identification, political attitudes, etc. Early studies of women's voting behavior all noted different overall turnout rates for males and females (Campbell, Con-

verse, Miller & Stokes, 1960). More recent studies, however, report a narrowing in the voting gap between men and women (Stucker, 1977; Cavanagh, 1981) or point to the fact that for a number of reasons, including decreased voter participation by men, a majority of voters are now women (Baxter & Lansing, 1980). Cavanagh (1981) in his study of voting turnout between 1964 and 1976 also notes the increased voting participation by women and goes on to observe:

> Gender was once a potent determinant of turnout, but its impact has all but vanished with the passage of time. The sex differential stood at 4.9 percent in 1964 Census Bureau survey on turnout, by 1976 it was negligible .8 percent. (p. 61)

In contrast, the voting participation of black female voters has equalled that of black males since 1964, and in 1976 they voted at slightly higher rates (Baxter & Lansing, 1980; Lansing, 1977). Pierce, Avery and Carey's study of black political participation and beliefs (1977) also found minimal gender differences in participation. Where there were differences, lower income black women were both more likely to participate and to be involved in both traditional and nontraditional politics than lower income black men. Furthermore, in terms of political beliefs black women were not more likely than black men to look favorably on people in politics, although they were less likely to feel politically efficacious than their male counterparts.

A number of studies have offered explanations for female voting. Primarily they have centered around the effects of the variables of age, education, region, occupation and income (Baxter & Lansing, 1980; Stucker, 1977; Verba & Nie, 1972; Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Soule & McGrath, 1977; Andersen, 1975; Scott, 1970). In fact, *The American Voter* (1960) itself found these variables to affect voting turnout rates. Certainly there is adequate documentation to confirm the importance of these variables on female voting behavior; in the case of voting turnout of college educated women in the professions, participation has been consistently high since 1952. Cavanagh's data (1981) shows similar turnout levels for males and females within given occupational categories in both 1964 and 1976. As Baxter and Lansing have concluded about recent voting behavior data: "Simply looking at gender as the determinant of turnout is unwise" (p. 38).

From the beginning of research touching on women and politics, limited female participation in areas of traditional political activity other than voting has been noted. Attempting to account for gender differences in participation, many studies have suggested that situational factors constrain female political participation. One often cited situation variable is the demands of motherhood. Both Campbell *et al.* (1960) and Lynn and Flora (1974) viewed the role of home and family, especially in the case of women with younger children, as affecting political participation. Jennings (1979), like Lynn and Flora (1974), found that parenthood, and particularly motherhood, affected interest in school politics. On the other hand, Jennings also found in this same study that parenthood, including motherhood, had little effect on national political participation.

Other situational factors including education, socioeconomic status and

employment have also been advanced as an explanation for women's limited participation. *The American Voter* (1960) points out that voting participation differences between college educated fathers and mothers with young children are small, that the dip in participation among mothers of small children does not appear to be matched by a slackened political involvement, and that there are no gender differences in intensity of party loyalty, nor in sense of citizen duty. Elsewhere the authors report that "women are somewhat less likely to express a sense of involvement in the current situation. This discrepancy is clearest at the lowest levels of education, being fairly well obliterated or reversed among college educated men and women" (p. 261). In her study, Lee (1977) points to socioeconomic status as more critical to political participation than motherhood. She found that more affluent mothers who could afford things like baby-sitters were more likely to participate than mothers who lacked these resources. Flora (1977) found employment outside the home as well as socioeconomic status affected patterns of participation. Other studies (such as Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978; Jennings & Farah, 1981, that will be discussed below), although questioning the ability of situational factors alone to explain women's patterns of political participation, have noted that these factors do have some measurable effect on it.

Using SRC data for 1952, 1964 and 1972, Welch (1977) contends that there are in fact no systematic differences in political participation that cannot be attributed to situation variables. She writes:

> Our analysis has shown that the stereotype of the politically passive woman simply is untrue. Women as a whole participate as much as men when structural and situational factors are considered. . . . Women participate in the aggregate less than men not because of some belief they hold about the role of women in politics, but largely because they are less likely to be found in the categories of people who participate in politics; the employed and highly educated in particular. . . . (p. 726)

It is interesting to note that somewhat similar conclusions about the effects of education and income are reached by Ross and Thadani (1980) who in their study of political participation in Kenya concluded that inequalities between the sexes increase as males attain higher education and income.

On the other hand, some other recent studies have raised serious questions about the importance of situational variables. For example, in Verba, Nie and Kim's cross-cultural study (1978) even when situational factors were taken into consideration, women's interest in politics did not translate into the same level of political activity as men's did. Similarly, Jennings and Farah (1980) in their cross-cultural study of the effects of gender on political ideologues found differences between men and women, especially in the case of Germany, that, they contend, cannot be explained by situational variables.

Much attention has been directed to the issue of women's interest in politics. Until recently a number of stereotypes dominated all discussion of women's political activity. Generally speaking, women were described as essentially conservative in their outlook, more likely to vote Republican, more irrational in their reasons for choosing a candidate to vote for—for example, women are influenced by a candidate's good looks—and more likely to follow

their husbands' lead in their voting behavior. Furthermore, women were depicted as having low levels of political efficacy, and less knowledge about politics. Campbell *et al.* (1964) describing women's political interest and knowledge wrote:

> The wife who votes but otherwise pays little attention to politics not only tends to leave the sifting of information up to her husband but abides by his ultimate decision about the direction of the vote as well. . . .
>
> The dependence of a wife's vote upon her husband's partisan predispositions appears to be one reason why the entrance of women into the electorate has tended to make little visible difference in the partisan distribution of the electoral vote. (p. 260)

This conception of the passive, submissive woman is reiterated in a much later study by Rapoport (1981) who maintains that while gender differences have decreased in terms of electoral participation, "women remain more passive in their voting behavior in that they are less likely to persuade others how to vote than are men" (p. 46).

Research on party identification has also tended to reinforce the idea of the passive woman who follows the lead of her husband. Robinson (1976), Beck and Jennings (1975) and Weiner (1978) conclude that husbands still influence their wives' party identification more than wives do their husbands'. However, De Fronzo (1981) found that although working wives describe their social status in terms of their husbands, their occupational attainment did have an independent effect on party identification.

The findings reported by De Fronzo are especially interesting in that they implicitly raise questions about the importance of shared socioeconomic status for husbands' and wives' party identification. It may well be that studies that have found husbands' and wives' party identification to be the same are really reflecting the congruent socioeconomic interests of both spouses. Perhaps some wives, especially those not employed outside the home, see their socioeconomic interests as identical to those of their husbands and, therefore, choose the same party as their husbands because of those shared socioeconomic interests. On the other hand, working women, although continuing to identify with the social status of their husbands, may develop special interests resulting from their employment outside the home that do not mesh with those of their husbands. As a consequence, working women whose employment outside the home is inconsistent with the socioeconomic interests of their husbands may adopt a party identification different from that of their husbands. Despite the considerable methodological problems in looking at husbands' and wives' socioeconomic status separately, some research on party identification that takes the socioeconomic interests of both spouses into account is probably now needed.

Although the linkage of ideological political orientations to gender has been widely assumed, research findings suggest a more varied relationship than has been previously believed. For example, Hershey and Sullivan (1977) have sought to clarify the relationship of masculine, androgynous and feminine sex role identity to political ideology. While their findings suggest that people who identify primarily with characteristics considered "appropriate"

for members of their biological sex also tend to be more conservative in their political attitudes, the pattern is somewhat mixed. Corbett, Frankland and Rudoni (1976) found a relationship between sexism and political attitudes in males, but traditional females were not as tender hearted as they hypothesized. While Soule and McGrath (1977) found women in the political elite to be much more liberal than their male counterparts, their data also show women at the citizen level to be slightly more conservative than similarly situated males. However, the lack of extensive gender differences at the citizen level requires a reconsideration of their attachment of the label "conservative" to women.

Perhaps the most ambitious of all scholarly efforts to sort through the conflicting research on women's political participation at the citizen level is that of Baxter and Lansing (1980). In looking at their data they contend that although women trail men in a sense of political efficacy, women's lower sense "may be a more perceptive assessment of the political process" (p. 51). In terms of attitudinal differences on policy issues, they point out that the data show women to have a greater interest in peace and claim that women's support of Eisenhower reflected their approval of his position on the Korean War rather than their emotional response to his personality and charisma as is so often claimed. They also find that women are more wary of "extremist" candidates than men. At the same time, they argue that the data indicate a growing politicization of women and that "in terms of the attitudes known to be predictive of political behavior, women and men show little differences. . ." (p. 181).

In their research on male/female candidate evaluation, Shabad and Andersen (1979) found that there was little evidence that women were more personality and less issue oriented than men. They report that both sexes view and evaluate candidates by much more multidimensional criteria than previous research "by virtue of its conceptual framework" had suggested. They further argue that by lumping together a wide range of variables extending from looks and life style to leadership capabilities and by classifying all of these as personality characteristics, important dimensions of leadership are implicitly relegated to the category of trivial and politically irrelevant; this impoverishes an understanding of the interaction of the masses and the elite.

With the exceptions of Baxter and Lansing (1980) and Pomper (1975) who noted that gender affects attitudes on war and peace, scant attention has been paid to differences in public opinion between men and women. Indeed, until very recently the possibility of such differences existing over time was rejected (Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 1954; Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Pomper, 1975), but polling data gathered over the past two years suggest the existence of a "gender gap." Writing on the "gender gap," Frankovic (1982) has pointed to opinion differences; the disparities between men and women in candidate preference in the 1980 election and in the subsequent evaluations of Reagan's performance reported in a number of public opinion polls have been widely discussed and hotly debated in the mass media.

Women's negative assessment of Reagan and his performance and their apparent preference for the Democratic Party have, of course, received the greatest popular attention. From the perspective of the study of women's political behavior, however, what is more interesting is that on traditionally

defined women's issues gender differences are not great. Rather, it appears that it is a configuration of peace, the environment, Reaganomics, social issues and a general sense of fair play that distinguishes women's preferences and opinions from those of men. It is too early to determine the effect of this "gender gap" on election outcomes and to tell whether or not specific political interests on the part of women will be translated into effective political activity. Nevertheless, the apparent lack of articulated gender differentiation on traditionally defined women's issues and the configuration of issues that distinguishes women's positions from those of men may indicate that women's views of what constitutes critical policy questions are somewhat different than was previously believed. Here again, some research on what women themselves consider to be important issues and what they believe to be the appropriate role of the political order is now needed. Perhaps if this area were investigated more fully, there would be a better understanding of the dimensions of women's political activity.

If women's views of the political order are somewhat different than the research to date suggests, it may also indicate the degree to which their interest in school and local politics reflects only situational constraints. This might also shed some light on research findings which show that, in spite of the reported political passivity of women, adults as well as adolescents are more often in agreement with their mothers than their fathers in terms of party identification (Jennings & Langton, 1969; Jennings & Niemi, 1974).

The differences that appear between the political activity of white males and females do not hold in most respect for the political behavior of black Americans. Perhaps a reason for this is that for black Americans there are common minority norms that cross gender lines. In the case of white males and females there is a less comprehensive set of shared norms. Until specific norms for the behavior prevalent among white women are identified and matched against norms for white males, however, black/white gender differences must remain an enigma.

In conclusion, it would seem that a major problem with research on women's political participation to date is the fact that the norms for judging and measuring effective political participation at the citizen level are based on dominant, male norms. By defining political activity more broadly and taking into account non-traditional political behavior—not just protest politics, but involvement in groups concerned with community affairs as well—a rather different picture of women's political participation might well emerge.

Women in the Political Elite

All research has pointed to one glaring, undisputed gender difference. Women are minimally represented in the political elite. Underlying almost all research on women in the political elite is an effort to account for that absence. Broadly speaking, the literature on this topic has focused on the characteristics of women in the elite: personal, demographic and attitudinal-situational factors affecting these women, consequent role strain or role conflict, and their performance. Moreover, research on this topic has tended

to be quite adventuresome in trying to develop or utilize theoretical approaches or frameworks to explain the position of women in the elite (Kirkpatrick, 1974; Diamond, 1977; Githens & Prestage, 1977; Kelly & Boutilier, 1977).

Before proceeding with an overview of the research, however, a few words should be said about the term "political elite" itself. Political elite is, used in its narrowest sense, the holding of some elective or appointive political office. At the outside, political elite may be extended to include an important, independent, political influential, but such latitude in the use of the term is rare. When the research speaks of the paucity of women in the political elite, it is referring to their lack of representation in elective or appointive governmental or party office.

Empirical research on the characteristics of women in the political elite is fairly extensive (Werner, 1966, 1968; Werner & Bachtold, 1974; Gruberg, 1968; Costantini & Craik, 1972; Githens, 1977; Soule & McGrath, 1977; Bullock & Heys, 1972; King, 1977; Githens & Prestage, 1978, 1979; Jennings & Thomas, 1968; Kirkpatrick, 1974, 1976; Jennings & Farah, 1981; Johnson & Stanwick, 1976; Johnson & Carroll, 1978). All these studies note certain basic similarities in the kind of women recruited to the political elite. At the same time, each explores particular facets of these characteristics, such as background, personality, skill areas, etc. Based on the data these studies present, a picture of the woman recruited to the political elite emerges. She is recruited in her forties, is most likely to be married and to have children, is middle class and is drawn from a somewhat different range of occupations, including that of employment within the home, than is her male counterpart. In addition, she is more likely than women at the citizen level to possess a configuration of "masculine" personality characteristics. This means that she is more liberal in her attitudes, more unconventional and more adventuresome than women in the general public. While she does share some values with women at the citizen level, she is, nonetheless, different in the extent of her liberalism and adventuresomeness. In these characteristics she resembles more her male peers.

Some recent research, however, raises questions about the accuracy of this description of women in the political elite. Jennings and Farah (1981) using survey data on Michigan delegates to national party conventions found sex differences dwindling with regard to social background, political status, political careers and perceptions of the political process, although they do report differences in terms of ambition and aspirations. Using survey data on women state legislators, Githens and Prestage (1981) found these women to have less distinctive characteristics and attitudes than earlier studies suggested. The women seemed neither particularly unconventional nor adventuresome as a group. Indeed, the only characteristic they seemed to exhibit as a group was an acceptance of fatalism as opposed to a belief in personal efficacy.

Much of the discussion of women's limited participation in the political elite has centered around the multiple role demands that confront women in politics. A number of explanations are based on notions of role strain and role conflict which arise from the emphasis given by women in the political elite to

their roles of wife and mother, and from the barriers to their political participation that arise from societal definitions of the obligation of these roles (Lee, 1977; Lynn & Flora, 1977; Githens & Prestage, 1977, 1978, 1979; Curry, 1977; National Women's Education Fund Survey, 1981; Kirkpatrick, 1974, 1976; Mandel, 1981; Sapiro, 1982). In fact, the application of the theory of marginality to women in politics initially focused rather heavily on the strains created by the role of politician on the one hand and the role of wife and mother on the other.

Subsequent research, however, seems to suggest that the conclusions drawn earlier about the effects of role strain may be overblown. Recent analyses of data testing the hypothesis of marginality (Githens & Prestage, 1980, 1981, 1982) indicate that the strains female legislators experience may be much more dependent on their aspirations to be accepted as unhyphenated politicians by their male peers and their perceptions of their male colleagues as continuing to see them as a distinctive and unequal subgroup than on strains arising from the conflicting demands of the roles of wife/mother and politician. Taking a somewhat different tack, Stoper (1977) argues that the conflicting roles of politician and parent/spouse may not be sex specific. Survey data gathered recently supports Stoper's interpretation by showing that the dual demands of home and politics may effect heavy costs on men as well as women.

Research on women in the political elite has also focused on the structural constraints on participation. Diamond (1976, 1977) has pointed out that women are more likely to be successful in those states where political offices are viewed as relatively less desirable by men, where they are associated with low pay and considered less professional. Interestingly, in a study of women mayors in Brazil, Blay (1979) comes to a similar conclusion; her findings show that women are most likely to be elected in the poorest, least industrialized and least urbanized states. MacManus (1976), Kirkpatrick (1974), Githens (1977), Githens and Prestage (1980) and Welch (1977) have all pointed to differences in skill areas as a constraint on the full participation of women in the political elite. A predilection of women to choose the amateur as opposed to professional role in politics has been suggested by Lynn and Flora (1977) as another form of constraint, although they argue that the choice of this role is motivated by perceptions of societal punishment for political participation.

In an examination of the relationship of gender role and party role, Fowlkes, Perkins and Rinehart (1979) found gender differences in ambition and activity among party members but did not see these as a constraint imposed on women by the political party. Rather, they conclude:

> According to our research, men are more ambitious than women, an expressive/instrumental differential that comports well with recent evidence that the under-representation of women in elective office is more a result of a paucity of women candidates than discrimination against them at the polls. (p. 7)

Similarly, Darcy and Schramm (1977) found sex to have no effect on election outcome, except in the case of Democratic incumbent women who do significantly better than their male counterparts.

Sapiro and Farah (1980) have also looked at the issue of gender dif-

ferences in ambition. Their data suggests that the development of political ambition in women is dependent upon a variety of factors: home, family, employment roles and feminism. They conclude that "women's lives shape the type of ambition women develop and the style of activism women pursue" (p. 33). Exploring the issue of volunteerism, they believe that traditional female roles in combination with gender ideology may mean that women move into political roles that are consistent with their orientation to service and civic responsibility.

Like the preceeding research on women in the political elite discussed above, the findings and conclusions drawn about structural constraints are contradictory. As was shown, Fowlkes *et al.* and Darcy and Schramm basically argue against constraints stemming from the political party and the electorate. Rinehart (1978) does not find women more likely than men to be clustered in amateur or semiprofessional roles. Githens and Prestage (1980) find women lawyers to be the most disadvantaged of all female state legislators in terms of office held in their legislative chamber and in their party organization in the legislature. In fact, after controlling for length of time in the legislature their findings show that women with high school diplomas hold more offices within their legislatures than more highly educated women. Welch (1978) in her analysis of the recruitment of women to public office concludes that:

> While women do not yet possess the same educational and occupational levels as men, their overall achievements in these areas would lead one to expect a greater percentage of female legislators than actually exists. Thus, if this were a "sex blind" but occupation and education sensitive process, about one quarter of the legislators would be female. Thus, structural characteristics are an important set of factors keeping women out of this kind of public office. (p. 379)

She does, however, go on to suggest, as Fowlkes and others have, that political socialization accompanied by active discrimination may reduce the number of female candidates.

Similarly, findings on the role and performance of women holding public office do not permit general conclusions to be drawn. Gehlen (1977) and Gruhl and Welch (1981) have found no gender differences, Kincaid (1976) found few differences between Congresswomen appointed to succeed their deceased spouses and those elected initially in their own right. Bers (1978) asserts that although there are differences in what stimulates males and females to seek membership on school boards—women rely more heavily on their own initiative—differences in male/female orientations to community service, and differences in perceived contributions to board activity, individual women behave in various ways and cannot be grouped on any basis other than sex. Bartol and Wortman (1979) conclude that there are few differences between male and female leaders in behavior, organizational outcomes or job performance.

Some research on women judges, however, indicates that although there are few gender differences in terms of personality characteristics, there are some other important differentiations. For example, Cook (1977) found that in simulated cases male and female Democratic judges expressed similar views

toward the women's movement, but their behavior differed. She concluded that "women voters can vote for women candidates with as much profit as men have voted for party" (p. 237). Elsewhere Cook (1980) found women judges to be conscious of institutional constraints and more favorably disposed toward new social roles for women who demand them than are women in the general population.

At the same time, Deaux's study (1979) of differences in managers shows that men perceive their jobs as more difficult than women and that men report both more approval for their work and better relations with their coworkers and subordinates. If these findings extend to other occupations and professions, one wonders about their ramifications for women in political positions. Furthermore, research on sex stratification indicates the possibility of other gender related differences affecting the role and performance of women in politics. Broadly speaking, studies on sex stratification have found that low status people gain legitimacy by being assigned to leadership positions or proving their interest in a group's welfare (Meeker & Weitzell-O'Neill, 1977). This interest in the group's welfare is manifested by providing approval and encouragement to others. Indeed, women holding public office so often allude to the importance of this that it is tempting to believe that it may be a crucial component of their behavior. If this is true, the apparent absence of gender related differences may simply represent women's efforts to legitimize themselves and, in fact, confirm important gender differences in terms of access to power.

The validity of research findings on sex stratification seems to be supported elsewhere. In "Sex and Games," Sapiro (1979) reviews the literature on single and mixed sex dyads playing the prisoner's dilemma game. She points to the role that oppression plays in the strategies used by women both in games played with other women and with men. In mixed sex dyads cooperation rather than competition, she notes, results from a combination of female deference and male chivalry. She concludes:

> The theories and evidence . . . show that the psychological dependence instilled in an oppressive relationship may make rational actors turn against themselves and help maintain their low status. 'Happiness' is the act of choosing against themselves in an attempt to choose for themselves. . . .
>
> [O]ppression of women and female dependence are so ubiquitous they appear natural to women and men alike. (p. 406)

Finally, there is a body of research dealing with women in the political elite and feminism. Perkins and Fowlkes (1980) found attitudes of group and gender role to be

> of secondary importance in the choice between the men and women. The attitudes toward the legitimacy of groups in the political process is related only to the choice between the sexes. . . . Attitude toward gender roles is washed out in the fact of a choice between the sexes that activates instead an attitude about the legitimacy of groups in the political process. (p. 101)

At the same time, in Sapiro's view the public perceives an alliance between women and the young who are seen as more egalitarian in their at-

titudes than the older generation. From this she concludes that although there will be a struggle for more than incremental change, the public is prepared for a future in which there is greater equality between the sexes. Miller *et al.* (1981), on the other hand, distinguish between group identification and group consciousness. Their exploration leads them to conclude that when group consciousness is politicized it motivates its members to bring about change through participation in traditional types of political activities. Speculation about the development of a woman's voting block (Baxter & Lansing, 1980; MacManus, 1976) is largely based on assumptions about growing group consciousness among women, although Fulenwider (1979) does not see this as the case for black women.

At the same time, the mere presence of women in public office is seen as no guarantee of support for women's issues (Mezey, 1976, 1977; Carver, 1979). Almost all data collected on the subject indicates that women in the political elite give little priority to feminist issues over any others; do not define themselves as primarily representing the interests of women; and refrain from running as a feminist. Carroll (1979), on the other hand, has argued that it is elite politics that gives rise to this appearance and forces women to stay in the closet; Cook's work suggests that despite constraints, women in the judiciary, whether feminist or not, are more responsive than their male peers to issues of concern to women.

Research on women in the traditional political elite has, without doubt, not only provided useful information but also empirically tested many of the assumptions about women and their behavior drawn from conventional wisdom. What has emerged from the numerous studies is a picture of women not radically different from their male colleagues in terms of many "personality" characteristics. At the same time, research has depicted women as a group subjected to a variety of structural, situational and socialization constraints that have affected patterns of recruitment, performance and advancement. Continued research is obviously needed. More important though is the development of new approaches to the study of performance. Could it be, for example, that the findings on women judges' responsiveness to women's concerns are a function of the power of an individual judge to determine an outcome? Are elected women officials because they are a part of a much larger group more restricted in what they can do, as some research suggests? (Frieze & Ramsey, 1976; Ruble & Higgins, 1976). Does the number of women holding an elective office in, for example, a state legislature, make a difference in performance? Right now we really do not know what difference, if any, these conditions may make. One thing is certain, however, existing methods for assessing performance are not geared to evaluating the role of women or other minorities. Furthermore, there must be a reformulation of existing notions of what constitutes the political elite in order to include participants in social movements and other groups influencing the political order.

THE STATE OF THE ART FOR GENDER RELATED RESEARCH

What, if anything, can one say about the status of gender related research? First of all, this research has provided us with a wealth of information that did not previously exist; if it did no more than this, it would have performed an invaluable service to the discipline of political science. Thus, whatever its flaws in conceptualization or methodology, it has provided empirical data about a little over half the American population. Without this body of information, one cannot speak accurately about political life or political behavior. The discipline owes a debt of gratitude to those who have added so significantly to information about the ways in which just over one-half the population behaves in the political arena.

But, although the gender related research has filled in "information gaps," it has not provided us with any clear unequivocable explanation of women's political behavior at either the citizen or elite level. To the contrary, it has presented us with a mass of conflicting data and interpretations, as the preceding review of the literature demonstrates. The scholar who wishes to take women's political behavior into account can only experience confusion and uncertainty about what, if any, conclusions can be drawn. Perhaps, it is this that encourages all but those deeply committed to gender related research to ignore the research altogether or to treat it with skepticism or derision.

This confusion stems partially from the nature of the research projects undertaken to date. Lack of financial resources has, no doubt, led many researchers to focus on small, basically unrepresentative national samples or localized subsets. As a result, the findings are probably idiosyncratic to the populations investigated. Perhaps, Costantini and Craik's findings on California women in the political elite differ from those of Jennings and Farah's on Michigan women because California is not Michigan; these conclusions might be invalid for women in other states. Alternatively, the time lapses between studies may account for the differences in findings; this, rather than a particularized region, may explain the differences in the findings of Costantini and Craik and of Jennings and Farah. Similarly, the differences in the findings of socialization studies may, at least in part, result from the representativeness of the samples investigated and the time lapses between studies.

There is little doubt that a more comprehensive investigation of women's political behavior is needed at least to clarify some of the ambiguity current in gender related research. But, the argument being advanced here is that even a more systematic and less fragmentary study of women's political behavior will not resolve the basic problems encountered in gender related research. The fundamental problems have little to do with the representativeness of the subsets under investigation. They will not be solved by more sophisticated or less sexist interpretations of the data or more scholarly rigor in drawing conclusions from the data under consideration. Furthermore, these difficulties are not even the result of the general confusion in political science about the linkage of attitude and behavior. Rather, they stem from the gestalt of the discipline of political science itself which encourages and supports a particular weltanschauung. From this spring a number of constraints which

seriously distort both the nature of the research undertaken and the conclusions that can be drawn about both gender and race related research.

These constraints are assumptions about: the nature and diversity of intra-group relations, dealt with in some detail by Jones (1972); the parameters of political activity; the value implicitly attached to certain kinds of political activity; and the definition of political elite.

The problems arising from the present definition of political elite are so strikingly dramatic that it might be best to start with them. If one restricts a definition of political elite to public office holding, one finds few women. Vastly outnumbered, their ability to affect governmental policy outcomes is limited. Realizing that their small numbers may limit their impact, some have suggested alternative measures of performance. However useful alternative modes of evaluating minority performance in governmental or party office may be, they still fail to deal with the critical issue. Both black Americans and women have produced leaders who, although they did not hold office, exerted tremendous political power and affected public policy outcomes that far surpassed those of many white male public office holders defined as politically powerful. In the case of women, there are people like Jane Addams, Emily Balch and Julia Grace Wales, none of whom held any public office, but two of whom received the Nobel Peace Prize, and all of whom profoundly affected the processes of American diplomacy. It was the proposals of these women, and the Women's Peace Party that were the basis for Wilson's Fourteen Points. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, Haig's efforts to resolve the Falkland Island Crisis, Carter's Camp David Accords and recent Israeli-Lebanon negotiations are little more than the implementation of Wale's plan for continuous negotiation by neutrals. In 1915 Addams, Balch and Hamilton along with several European women commanded enough power to be received by the European political heads of state and foreign ministers of fourteen nations, including Great Britain and Germany. The American women, as well as others in the Women's Peace Party, were invited to meet with Woodrow Wilson to discuss their views on a number of occasions. Given the inclusion of their proposals in his Fourteen Points, their meetings with President Wilson may hardly be dismissed as perfunctory or social in nature. Additionally, the Women's Peace Party of this period was a politically active group with a membership high of some 40,000. Similarly, women like Florence Kelley, Alice Hamilton, Madeleine Doty, Lilliam Wald, Grace Abbott and Margaret Sanger, along with a host of supportive, primarily female organizations, were able to effect far reaching changes in social policy affecting the poor and the working class. Yet, because political science equates membership in the political elite with office holding which, parenthetically, may be appropriate in the case of more economically privileged white males, the role of many politically powerful women is ignored. As a result, the role of men in politics is artificially inflated, while the role of women is artificially deflated.

The consequence of this omission of women's non-traditional political activity is most fully spelled out by Gittell and Shtob (1980). They write:

> In reporting on women's participation, few social scientists questioned the reasons for low participation, attributing it to inherent female characteristics or

> offering no explanation at all. Few were aware of the political role of women in the urban political reforms of the Progressive Era. Given this approach to research on women's political activity, many social scientists see the participation of middle-class and working-class women in activist community organization in the 1960s and 1970s as a complete reversal of their "normal" behavior. (p. 73)

The same is obivously the case for black leaders. In the face of the activities of individuals like Tubman, Hammer, King, Garvey, Rustin, Malcolm X and DuBois and the support they generated, descriptions of limited political participation at both the elite and citizen level are absurd. It is as ridiculous to draw conclusions about limited political participation of women and blacks based on the criteria of public office holding as it would be to conclude that based on their participation in the Women's Peace Party or Garvey's movement, more affluent white males participated minimally in politics.

The emphasis given to certain types of political activity further distorts the contribution of women to political life. The designation of peace and social justice as "soft" issues of peripheral concern to the political community while economic policy is pivotal focuses attention on those areas where males have dominated the political arena. While no one can deny the centrality of economic policy to human survival, economic well-being is scarcely possible in a war torn nation whose population has been decimated. The lack of importance attached to political activity for peace makes no sense at all. Similarly, women's involvement in local or community affairs may represent a much more realistic appraisal of where intervention will have the greatest impact. Lipsky's work on street level bureaucracy suggests that emphasis on community level politics may not be as peripheral as had been once supposed. Yet, the implicit or explicit value associated with certain types of political activity persists in the discipline.

What one is confronted with in gender and race related research is a series of norms for participation in politics based on the behavior of more affluent white males. When blacks and women are not found to participate in the same way, there is a search for explanations of their overall limited political participation. These explanations are predicated on group differences stemming from socialization, role orientation, and so forth.

Implicit in the research is also the assumption that groups are homogeneous. Yet the research demonstrates that the groups are in fact not as homogeneous as was supposed nor are the range of differences between groups as great as was anticipated. Yet, one tortured explanation after another is formulated to explain the findings and the confusion grows. The solution to this difficulty lies not in continuing this vicious cycle, but in rethinking and reformulating the issues altogether.

The notion that there is one mode of political participation must be rejected; recognition of the fact that there is a variety of modes of participation is essential. A new construct based on more than just the political activity of affluent white males is now needed. Without a new concept of political activity, research can only show us that women, blacks and those disadvantaged by reason of ethnicity, as well as the economically disadvantaged, are not af-

fluent white males, which is something we already know. Meanwhile, the more interesting and compelling issues about how groups like women and blacks do participate, what they have or can accomplish by alternative modes of participation, and what factors influence the selection of modes of participation are ignored.

Gender and race related research to date has already made an important contribution by providing information about the ways in which both these groups have participated in one form of political activity. Now, these research findings require political scientists to recast their conceptualizations. Although it cannot be expected that the discipline will respond without regrets or tension, it must meet the challenge posed if political science is to move forward in the most productive way. What is now needed is a new research agenda focusing on what women define as political and what they see as appropriate political behavior within this context. To achieve this, methodological tools, frameworks and concepts to pursue such investigation must be developed. The effort involved is great, but the result for the discipline as a whole will be more than worth it.

NOTES

1. An example of this is the questionnaire used in Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan and Ferguson's study of legislature behavior, where there is no item whatsoever referring to the sex of the respondent.
2. Georg Simmel. *Philosophische kultur.* Leipzig: Werner Klinkhardt, 1919. There are no English translations of Simmel's essays. "Das Relative und Das Absolute im Geschlechterproblem" and "Weibliche Kultur." The English translation of the quotes used here is taken from an essay, "The Flight from Womanhood: The Masculinity Complex in Women as Viewed by Men and by Women" by Karen Horney. (*Psychoanalytic Review,* 1935, *12,* pp. 241-257.)
3. The use of the term gender deserves comment. Clearly what is implied is research relating to women, although the definition of gender does not restrict its meaning in this way. In fact research focusing on male behavior—which was the typical case until very recently—is also gender research. Yet, it has never been designated as such. The fact that only studies of female behavior or comparative male/female behavior are described as gender research quite vividly illustrates the accuracy of Simmel's observation.
4. Criticisms of his interpretation of the data have been made as will be discussed later in this essay.
5. Apropos of this is Larwood, Glasser and McDonald's study of male/female cadets' attitudes toward military sex integration (1980). They found that attitudes toward equality deteriorated over time, and after increased interaction between the male and female ROTC cadets.

REFERENCES

Baer, Denise. Theoretical issues in political socialization: The identification of a crucial learning stage using gender roles as a paradigm case. Paper delivered at Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Atlanta, Georgia, 1978.

Barber, James David. *The lawmakers: Recruitment and adaptation to legislative life.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.

Andersen, Kristi. Working women and political participation. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1975, *19,* 439-455.

Bardwick, Judith M. & Douvan, Elizabeth. Ambivalence: The socialization of women. In Vivian Gornick & Barbara K. Moran (Eds.). *Woman in sexist society: Studies in power and powerlessness.* New York: Basic Books, 1971.

Bartol, Kathryn & Wortman, Max S. Jr. Sex of leader and subordinate role stress: A field study. *Sex Roles,* 1979, *5,* 513-518.

Baxter, Sandra & Sansing, Marjorie. *Women and politics: The invisible majority.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980.

Bearison, David J. Sex linked patterns of socialization. *Sex Roles,* 1979, *5,* 11-18.

Beck, P. A. & Jennings, M. Kent. Parents as 'middle persons' in political socialization. *Journal of Politics,* 1975, *37,* 87-99.

Berelson, B. R., Lazarsfeld, P. F., & McPhee, W. N. *Voting: A study of opinion formation in a presidential campaign.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

Bers, Trudy Haffron. Local political elites: Men and women on Boards of Education. *Western Political Quarterly,* 1978, *31,* 381-391.

Biller, H. B. *Father, child and sex role: Parental determinants of personality development.* Lexington: Heath Lexington Books, 1971.

Blay, Eva Alterman. The political participation of women in Brazil: Female mayors. *Signs,* 1979, *5,* 42-59.

Block, J. H. Another look at sex differentiation in the socialization behaviors of mothers and fathers. In J. Sherman & F. Denmark (Eds.). *Psychology of women: Future research.* New York: Psychological Dimensions, 1977.

Boles, Janet. *The politics of the equal rights amendment: Conflict and the decision process.* New York: Longman, 1979.

Boneparth, Ellen. The impact of commissions on the status of women in the policy making process: A California case study. Paper delivered at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Ill., 1976.

Boneparth, Ellen. *Women, power and policy.* New York: Pergamon Press, 1982.

Breckinridge, Sophonisba. *Women in the twentieth century: A study of their political, social and economic activities.* New York: McGraw Hill, 1933.

Bullock, C. S. & Heys, P. F. Recruitment of women for Congress: A research note. *Western Political Quarterly,* 1972, *25,* 416-423.

Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren, & Stokes, Donald E. *The American voter.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960.

Carroll, Berenice A. Political science part I: American politics and political behavior: Review essay. *Signs,* 1979, *5,* 289-306.

Carroll, Susan. Women candidates and support for women's issues: Closet feminism. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Chicago, Ill., 1979.

Carver, Joan. The ERA in Florida. Paper delivered at the Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 1979.

Cavanagh, Thomas E. Changes in American voter turnout, 1964-1976. *Political Science Quarterly,* 1981, *96,* 53-65.

Cook, Beverly B. The personality and procreative behavior of trial judges: A biocultural perspective. *International Political Science Review,* 1980, *3,* 51-70. (a)

Cook, Beverly B. Women judges and public policy in sex integration. In Debra W. Stewart (Ed.). *Women in local politics.* Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1980. (b)

Cook, Beverly B. Will women judges make a difference in women's legal rights? A prediction from attitudes and simulated behavior. In Margherita Rendel (Ed.). *Women power and political systems.* London: Croom-Helm, 1981.

Corbett, Michael, Frankland, E. Gene, & Rudoni, Dorothy. Explorations into the impact of sexist attitudes on other politically relevant attitudes: A research note.

Paper delivered at Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, 1976.

Corbett, M., Rudoni, D., & Frankland, E. G. Change in stability in sexism among 1981 college students: A three year panel study. *Sex Roles,* 1981, *7,* 233-246.

Costantini, Edmond & Craik, Kenneth H. Women as politicians: The social background, personality and political careers of female party leaders. *Journal of Social Issues,* 1972, *28,* 217-236.

Curry, V. Campaign theory and practice—the gender variable. In Githens and Prestage (Eds.), *A portrait of marginality.* New York: David McKay, 1977.

Darcy, R. & Schramm, Sarah Slavin. When women run against men. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1977, *41,* 1-12.

Deaux, Kay. Self-evaluations of male and female managers. *Sex Roles,* 1979, *5,* 571-580.

DeFronzo, James. Differences in the determinants of husbands' and working wives' class and political party identification. *Sex Roles,* 1981, *7,* 355-361.

Diamond, Irene. Why aren't they there?: Women in American state legislatures. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1976.

Diamond, Irene. *Sex roles in the state house.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Diamond, Irene & Hartsock, Nancy. Beyond interests in politics: A comment on Virginia Sapiro's when are interests interesting? The problem of political representation of women. *American Political Science Review,* 1981, *75,* 717-721.

Duncan, Beverly, & Duncan, Otis Dudley. *Sex typing and social roles: A research report.* New York: Academic Press, 1978.

Duverger, Maurice. *La Participation des Femmes a la vie Politique.* Paris: UNESCO, 1955.

Dweck, C. S. Sex differences in the meaning of negative evaluation in achievement situations: Determinants and consequences. Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research and Child Development, 1975.

Easton, David & Dennis, Jack. *Children in the political system.* New York: McGraw Hill, 1969.

Elshtain, Jean. *The public and the private: A critical inquiry.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Etaugh, C., Collins, G. & Gerson, A. Reinforcement of sex typed behaviors of two year old children in a nursery school setting. *Developmental Psychology,* 1975, *11,* 255.

Evans, S. *Personal politics: The roots of women's liberation in the civil rights movement and the new Left.* New York: Vintage Press, 1980.

Fischer, J. L. & Narus, L. R. Sex role development in late adolescence and adulthood. *Sex Roles,* 1981, *7,* 97-106.

Flora, Cornelia B. & Lynn, Naomi B. Women and political socialization: Considerations of the impact of motherhood. In Jane S. Jaquette (Ed.). *Women in politics.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974.

Fowlkes, Diane, Perkins, Jerry & Rinehart, Sue Tollerson. Gender roles and party roles. *American Political Science Review,* 1979, *73,* 722-780.

Frankovic, Kathleen A. Sex and politics—New alignments, old issues. *PS,* 1982, *15,* 439-448.

Freeman, Jo. *The politics of women's liberation.* New York: David McKay, 1975.

Frieze, Irene Hanson & Ramsey, Sheila J. Nonverbal maintenance of traditional sex roles. *Journal of Social Issues,* 1976, *32,* 125-132.

Frueh, T. & McGhee, P. E. Traditional sex role development and amount of time spent watching television. *Developmental Psychology,* 1975, *11,* 109.

Fulenwider, Claire Knoche. Feminist ideology and the political attitudes and partici-

pation of white and minority women. Paper delivered at meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C., 1979.

Gehlen, Frieda. Women members of Congress: A distinctive role. In M. Githens & J. Prestage (Eds.). *A portrait of marginality.* New York: David McKay Co., 1977.

Gelb, Joyce & Palley, Marian Lief. *Women and public policies.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.

Githens, Marianne & Prestage, Jewel L. (Eds.). *A portrait of marginality: The political behavior of the American woman.* New York: David McKay Co., 1977.

Githens, Marianne & Prestage, Jewel. Women state legislators as marginals. *Policy Studies Journal,* 1978, *7,* 264-270.

Githens, Marianne & Prestage, Jewel. Styles and priorities of marginality: Women state legislators. In Marian Lief Palley & Michael Preston (Eds.). *Race, sex and policy problems.* Lexington: Lexington Books, 1979.

Githens, Marianne & Prestage, Jewel. Education and marginality: Some observations on the behavior of women state legislators. Unpublished manuscript, 1980.

Githens, Marianne & Prestage, Jewel. Women state legislators: A reconsideration of characteristic values and attitudes. Unpublished manuscript, 1981.

Githens, M. & Prestage, J. Who consults them? Women state legislators and pressure groups. Unpublished manuscript, 1982.

Gittell, Marilyn & Shtob, Teresa. Changing women's roles in political volunteerism and reform of the city. *Signs,* 1980, *5,* 67-68.

Greenstein, Fred I. *Children and politics.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.

Gruberg, Martin. *Women in politics: An assessment and source book.* Oshkosh, WI: Academia, 1968.

Gruhl, John & Welch, Susan. Women as policy makers: The case of trial judges. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 308-322.

Hartley, R. E. Children's concepts of male and female roles. *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly,* 1960, *6,* 83-91.

Hartley, R. E. A developmental view of female sex role definition and identification. *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly,* 1960, *10,* 3-16.

Hershey, Marjorie Random & Sullivan, John L. Sex role attitudes, identities and political ideology. *Sex Roles,* 1977, *3,* 52-57.

Hess, Robert D. & Torney, Judith V. *The development of political attitudes in children.* Chicago: Aldine, 1967.

Horney, Karen. The flight from womanhood: The masculinity complex in women as viewed by men and by women. *Psychoanalytic Review,* 1935, *12,* 241-257.

Hull, J. L. & Frederickson, R. Sex role stereotyping; A function of age and education as measured by a perceptual-trojective device. *Sex Roles,* 1979, *5,* 77-84.

Hyman, Herbert. *Political socialization: A study in the psychology of political behavior.* New York: Free Press, 1959.

Iglitzin, Lynne. The making of the apolitical woman: Feminity and sex stereotyping in girls. In Jane S. Jaquette (Ed.). *Women in politics.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974.

Jaquette, Jane S. (Ed.). *Women in politics.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974.

Jennings, M. Kent. Another look at the life cycle and political participation. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *23,* 755-771.

Jennings, M. Kent & Farah, Barbara. Ideology, gender and political action: A cross-national survey. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1980, *10,* 219-240.

Jennings, M. Kent & Farah, Barbara. Social roles and political resources: An over-time study of men and women in party elites. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 462-481.

Jennings, M. Kent & Langton, Kenneth. Mothers versus fathers: The formation of

political orientations among young Americans. *Journal of Politics,* 1969, *31,* 329-357.

Jennings, M. Kent & Niemi, Richard G. *The political character of adolescence: The influence of families and schools.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.

Jennings, M. Kent & Niemi, Richard. The persistence of political orientations: An over-time analysis of two generations. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *8,* 333-363.

Jennings, M. Kent & Thomas, Norman. Men and women in party elites: Social roles and political resources. *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 1968, *12,* 469-492.

Johnson, Marilyn & Stanwick, Kathy. *Women in public office: A biographical directory and statistical analysis.* New York: R.R. Bowker, 1976.

Johnson, Marilyn & Carroll, Susan. *Women in public office: A biographical and statistical analysis* (2nd ed.). Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1978.

Jones, Mack. A frame of reference for black politics. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, 1972.

Kagan, J. & Moss, H. A. *Birth to maturity, a study in psychological development.* New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962.

Keller, Edmond J. The political socialization of adolescents in contemporary Africa. *Comparative Politics,* 1978, *10,* 227-250.

Kelly, Rita Mae & Boutilier, Mary A. Mothers, daughters and the socialization of political women. *Sex Roles,* 1978, *4,* 438-443. (a)

Kelly, Rita Mae & Boutilier, Mary A. *The making of the political woman: A study of socialization and role conflict.* Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1978. (b)

Kincaid, Diane D. Over his dead body a new perspective and some feminist footnotes on widows in the U.S. Congress. Paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Chicago, Ill., 1976.

King, Elizabeth. Women in Iowa legislative politics. In Githens and Prestage (Eds.), *A portrait of marginality.* New York: David McKay, 1977.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane. *Political woman.* New York: Basic Books, 1974.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane. *The new presidential elite: Men and women in national politics.* New York: Basic Books, 1976.

Krauss, Wilma Rule. Political implications of gender role: A review of the literature. *American Political Science Review,* 1974, *68,* 1706-1723.

Lambert, W. E., Yackley, A. & Hein, R. N. Child training values of English Canadian and French Canadian parents. *Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science,* 1971, *3,* 217-236.

Lane, Robert E. *Political life: Why people get involved in politics.* Glencoe: Free Press, 1959.

Lee, Marcia. Toward understanding why so few women hold public office: Factors affecting the participation of women in politics. In M. Githens & J. Prestage (Eds.). *A portrait of marginality.* New York: David McKay, 1977.

Liebert, R. M., McCall, R. B. & Hanratty, N. A. Effects of sex type information on children's toy preferences. *Journal of Genetic Psychology,* 1971, *119,* 133-136.

Maccoby, E. E. & Jacklin, C. N. *The psychology of sex differences.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974.

MacManus, Susan. Determinants of the equitability of female representation of 243 city councils. Paper delivered at meeting of American Political Science Association. Chicago, IL, 1976.

Mardel, Ruth. *In the running: The new woman candidate.* New Haven: Ticknor and Fields, 1981.

Meeker, B. J. and Weitzell-O'Neill, P. A. Sex roles and interpersonal and behavior in task-oriented groups. *American Sociological Review,* 1977, *42,* 91-105.

Merelman, R. *Political socialization and educational climates: A study of two school districts.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

Merritt, Sharyne. Winners and losers: Sex differences in municipal elections. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1977, *21,* 731-743.

Mezey, Susan Gluck. Women politicians and women's issues: The case of Hawaii. Paper delivered at meeting of the American Political Science Association. New York, 1976.

Mezey, Susan Gluck. Local representatives in Connecticut: Sex differences in attitudes toward women's rights policy. Paper delivered at meeting of the American Political Science Association. Chicago, IL, 1977.

Milbrath, L. & Goel, M. L. *Political participation: How and why people get involved in politics* (2nd ed.). Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1977.

Miller, Arthur, Gurin, Patricia, Gurin, Gerald, & Malanchuk, Oksana. Group consciousness. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 494-511.

Moss, H. A. Sex, age and state as determinants of mother-infant interaction. *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly,* 1967, *13,* 19-36.

Mussen, P. H. Early sex-role development. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.). *Handbook of socialization theory and research.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969.

National Women's Education Fund. *Evaluation report: A survey of participants in training seminars conducted by the National Women's Education Fund, 1974-1980.* 1981.

Nie, Norman, Verba, Sidney & Petrocik, John. *The changing American voter.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976.

Orkin, S. M. *Women in western political thought.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Orum, Anthony M., Cohen, Roberta S., Grasmuck, Sherri, & Orum, Amy W. Sex socialization and politics. In Marianne Githens and Jewel Prestage (Eds.). *A portrait of marginality.* New York: David McKay, 1977.

Parsons, J. E., Frieze, I. H., & Ruble, D. Sex roles: Persistence and change. *Journal of Social Issues,* 1976, *32,* 1-5.

Perkins, Jerry & Fowlkes, Diane. Opinion representation vs. social representation: Or why women can't run as women and win. *American Political Science Review,* 1980, *74,* 92-103.

Perry, D. G. & Perry, L. C. Observational learning in children: Effects of sex of model and subject's sex role behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 1975, *31,* 1083-1088.

Pierce, John C., Avery, William P. & Carey, Addison Jr. Sex differences in black political beliefs and behavior. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1977, *17,* 422-430.

Pomper, Gerald. *Voter's choice: Varieties of American electoral behavior.* New York: Dodd Mead and Co., 1975.

Rapoport, Ronald B. What they don't know can hurt you. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *23,* 805-815.

Rapoport, Ronald. The sex gap in political persuading: Where the structuring principle works. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 32-47.

Reid, I. S. Traditional political animals? A loud no. In Githens and Prestage (Eds.), *A portrait of marginality.* New York: David McKay, 1977.

Richardson, Deborah, Vinsel, Anne & Taylor, Stuart. Female aggression as a function of attitudes toward women. *Sex Roles,* 1980, *6,* 265-271.

Rinehart, Sue Tollerson. Amateurism among women political party elites. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. 1978.

Roback, Thomas H. The role of women and blacks in the Republican party: Attitudinal perspectives of national convention delegates, 1972 and 1976. Paper delivered at meeting of Southern Political Science Association. 1978.

Robinson, J. Interpersonal influence in election campaigns: Two step-flow hypotheses. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1976, *40,* 304-319.

Rosenberg, Marie Barovic. Political efficacy and sex role: Case study of congresswomen Edith Green and Julia Butler Hansen. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1972.

Ross, Marc Howard & Thadani, Veena. Participation, sex and social class: Some unexpected results from an African city. *Comparative Politics,* 1980, *12,* 323-334.

Rossi, A. *Feminists in politics: A panel analysis of the first national women's conference.* New York: Academic Press, 1982.

Ruble, Diane N. & Higgins, E. Effects of group sex composition on self presentation and sex typing. *Journal of Social Issues,* 1976, *32,* 125-132.

Sapiro, Virginia. Sex and games: On oppression and rationality. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *9,* 385-408.

Sapiro, Virginia. News from the front: Intersex and intergenerational conflict over the status of women. *Western Political Quarterly,* 1980, *33,* 260-277.

Sapiro, Virginia. Research frontier essay: When are interests interesting? The problem of political representation of women. *American Political Science Review,* 1981, *75,* 701-716.

Sapiro, Virginia & Farah, Barbara G. New pride and old prejudice: Political ambition and role orientation among female partisan elites. *Women and Politics,* 1980, *1,* 13-35.

Sapiro, Virginia. *The political integration of women.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983.

Scott, A. F. *The southern lady.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Shabad, Goldie & Andersen, Kristi. Candidate evaluation by men and women. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1979, *43,* 18-35.

Simmel, Georg. *Philosophische Kulter. Philosophisch Soziologische Bucherei* (Vol. 27). Leipzig: Kronet, 1919.

Soule, John W. & McGrath, Wilma E. A comparative study of male-female political attitudes at citizen and elite levels. In M. Githens & J. Prestage (Eds.). *A portrait of marginality.* New York: David McKay, 1977.

Stewart, Debra W. *The women's movement in community politics in the U.S.: The role of local commissions of the status of women.* New York: Pergamon Press, 1980.

Stone, Pauline Terrlonge. The political ambitions of convention delegates: The relevance of race and sex. Paper delivered at meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C., 1979.

Stoper, Emily. Wife and politician: Role strain among women in public office. In M. Githens & J. Prestage (Eds.). *A portrait of marginality.* New York: David McKay, 1977.

Stucker, John. Women as voters: Their maturation as political persons in American society. In M. Githens & J. Prestage (Eds.). *A portrait of marginality.* New York: David McKay, 1977.

Thompson, Martha E. Sex differences: Differential access to power or sex role socialization. *Sex Roles,* 1981, *7,* 413-424.

Verba, Sidney & Nie, Norman H. *Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality.* New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

Verba, Sidney, Nie, Norman H. & Kim Jae-on. *Participation and political equality.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Wahlke, John C., Eulau, Heinz, Buchanan, William & Ferguson, Lorna C. *The legislative system: Explorations in legislative behavior.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962.

Welch, Susan. Women as political animals? A test of some explanations for male-female political participation differences. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1977, *21,* 711-729.